To begin with, Trump’s plan for Gaza Strip (GS) and its resistance operates on two levels:

First: At a higher level, it aims to appropriate GS, displace its people, and exert immense pressure on both Gazans and neighboring Egypt and Jordan to force a pragmatic response. This includes pushing for whatever concessions can be secured and imposing a so-called “voluntary exit” through the establishment of a fait accompli.

Second: This represents a more seriously targeted intermediary level that Trump and Israel view as achievable and more realistic. It is expected to resonate positively in the Arab environment and with the Palestinian Authority (PA). The objective is to accomplish what Israel has failed to achieve in its stated goals—crushing Hamas and disarming the resistance—not only by removing them from governing GS but also by excluding them from institutions and civil life, as has been done in the West Bank (WB).

If the first level is not achieved, it is “conceded” to allow progress to the second level, giving the illusion of a “victory” for Arab countries, while “baiting” the Palestinians into responding to it!!

***

Scenarios:

Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan, face three possible scenarios for addressing Trump’s plan to displace Palestinians from GS:

1. The tacit or practical approval of Trump’s plan, and paving the way for displacement under the guise of “temporary” humanitarian aid, claiming that this is a consequence of Israel’s actions. These actions include turning GS into a devastated, uninhabitable area, blocking the entry of construction and reconstruction materials, and continuing various forms of aggression, all of which have fostered an insecure and expulsive environment.
2. A “soft rejection” of Trump’s plan will involve maintaining border closures to prevent displacement while using measured language to absorb and gradually defuse his actions. Direct confrontation will be avoided, with an emphasis on how his behavior threatens US national security and core interests. Furthermore, it will be highlighted that the US risks losing regional allies, which could undermine its position in the region.
3. A strong and decisive rejection of Trump’s plan, coupled with the activation of popular movements and official institutions against it, the use of deterrent and offensive language, a firm stance against political and financial blackmail, and holding both Trump and Israel accountable for undermining the peace process and the two-state solution.

So far, the first scenario seems unlikely due to its conflict with the national security interests of these countries, as well as the potential political and social troubles it could cause, particularly in Jordan. The third scenario also appears improbable, as there is neither the desire nor the capacity for political regimes to confront or challenge Trump. Therefore, based on a realistic reading of the Arab system and its political dynamics, the second scenario of “soft rejection” seems more likely.

***

Marketing the Disarmament of the Resistance:

Since the Arab position will reject the displacement plan, it will be framed as a “heroic” national and nationalist stance, gaining popular support. At that point, Israel and the US will exert pressure on GS through three strategies: first, the threat of resuming the war, with its accompanying tragedies and suffering; second, blocking aid entry and hindering reconstruction efforts; and third, continuing internal displacement within GS to render the area uninhabitable.

At that point, the proposal to send Arab and international forces to GS, with the participation of the PA according to Israeli standards, will be promoted. This plan will involve removing Hamas and the resistance movement from political and public life, disarming the resistance… and framing these measures as essential to halting the bloodshed, thwarting the displacement project, and initiating reconstruction. Presented as an overriding interest, Hamas will be portrayed as the entity responsible for disrupting these goals.

The “convincing” of Israeli and US parties to “abandon” the displacement plan will be portrayed as a major concession. In reality, Israel will have achieved its primary goal in the war.

During the war, public opinion in Palestine overwhelmingly rejected both Arab and foreign intervention in managing GS, with only two or three percent supporting such ideas. About 15% favored the PA managing GS under Mahmud ‘Abbas’s leadership. However, these solutions will likely become viable not because they are seen as the best options, but rather as the lesser of two evils. In contrast, Hamas enjoyed approximately 60% support.

***

Meeting the Challenge:

This challenge can be addressed through the following general guidelines:

1. The administration of GS is a Palestinian responsibility, with Palestinians leading the development of appropriate concepts and decision-making in alignment with their national consensus. As for the Palestinian refugees in GS, their rightful relocation, supported by international resolutions, is to the land they were expelled from in 1948.
2. The resistance weapon that has safeguarded GS through five wars waged by Israel reflects the Palestinian people’s natural right to defend themselves and liberate their land.
3. The resistance weapon has been crucial in preventing displacement, driving the occupation’s withdrawal from GS, and securing an honorable prisoner exchange deal. It serves as the first line of defense for the Arab and Muslim Ummah (nation), as well as for the national security of Arab and Muslim countries. Its preservation and strengthening are of supreme interest, as any attempt to dismantle it would open the door to Israeli encroachment on the Arab world, further normalizing and weakening the region.
4. Israel must not be rewarded for its criminality, massacres and brutality, nor should the resistance be punished for its heroism, sacrifices and achievements. Adopting the Israeli-US agenda accomplishes through politics what they have failed to achieve through war. This positions Arab states aligning with this agenda not only against the free will of the Palestinian people but also against their own populations, who generally support the resistance.
5. The Arab world must prioritize thwarting the schemes of displacement and normalization, emphasizing the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and their land’s liberation. This can be achieved by lifting the siege and allowing the entry of relief and reconstruction materials.
6. The wills of both the US and Israel are not predetermined. Both Israel and the US administration are grappling with significant crises, leaving them unable to initiate large-scale wars.

Moreover, Trump’s approach tends to favor escalation and negotiation over war. Therefore, if the resistance can challenge and thwart Israeli-US aggression and plans, Arab countries should be equally capable of doing the same. In fact, it is even more certain that the Arab countries can succeed in thwarting these efforts if they decide to act and employ the necessary tools.