The journey of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) from trade to power is one of the most intriguing, embodying the various transformations of the Sudanese crisis, culminating in the April 15, 2023 rebellion. Following the beginnings of this journey, one finds an old authoritarian project meticulously nurtured and developed, exploiting the state's weaknesses and its political system at times while also leveraging tribal alignments at other times, in a region filled with political and economic demands and regional confrontations.
Hemedti grew up in the northern Darfur countryside, belonging to the Mahariya, a branch of the northern Rizeigat Arabs who practice herding, especially camel herding, hence referred to as “Abbala Arabs.” Around 1983, the first violent transformations occurred when a severe drought ravaged the region, destroying everything. This forced many from these areas to shift from their traditional production patterns (herding and farming) to more secure forms of production to preserve their wealth. Most inhabitants turned to cross-border trade, taking advantage of Darfur's geographical location adjacent to markets in neighboring Libya and Chad.
Hemedti grew up in the northern Darfur countryside and belongs to the Mahariya, a branch of the northern Rizeigat Arabs who practice camel herding.
Among these individuals was Mohamed Hamdan, who, driven by the harsh natural challenges that swept the region, engaged in commercial activities. His trade flourished from areas of Darfur through Kufra and then to Misrata in the heart of Libya. The preservation of wealth represented by camel herds became synonymous with survival and existence, as any threat to their camel herds was seen as a direct threat to the existence of these pastoral groups in the region. Therefore, one of the most critical requirements for the continuation and stability of commercial activity was securing trade routes to and from production areas and markets.
The crisis of urbanization and its delay in Darfur, characterized by traditional production patterns and a lack of basic services due to governmental weakness and negligence, along with harsh climatic and natural conditions, contributed to the deterioration of living conditions for most of the region's inhabitants. This drove several armed groups belonging to social components of African origins to declare their rebellion against the state, fueled by political and economic demands aimed at improving their conditions in the region.
The first targets of the rebel movements were the important urban cities in the region, aiming at markets and trade routes that were subjected to looting and robbery. They also targeted border points and centers to disrupt commercial activities and undermine the stability project, which was already tenuous.
Militia Strategy
Since the outbreak of the armed rebellion in Darfur in 2003, which led to the disruption of commercial activity, Hemedti, like other traders, has found himself facing a new challenge beyond their capacity to confront. They turned to the state for assistance in facing the escalating threat of the rebellion, which was not only growing in danger but also eroding their commercial base and source of livelihood. They benefited from the state's desire to eliminate the rebellion and assert control over the troubled region.
By joining the ranks of the “Janjaweed” forces, this marked the first transformation of Mohamed Hamdan from a trader to Hemedti, the fighter.
The government in Khartoum had previously announced its strategy to combat and eliminate the rebellion in Darfur by forming Janjaweed militias (Arab groups in Darfur). These militias began their training in special camps under the umbrella of the Border Guard Forces led by the tribal leader Musa Hilal, the chief of the Mahamid tribe, to which Hemedti chose to align himself with a group of his affected kin. Thus, he became part of the intelligence personnel, marking the first transformation of Mohamed Hamdan from a trader to Hemedti, the fighter.
The First Rebellion of Mohamed Hamdan (Hemedti)
From 2003 to 2005, the “Janjaweed” groups roamed extensively, aggressively targeting rebel positions in their pursuit of armed movements, leaving behind numerous humanitarian crimes and violations. This brought the world's attention to the inhumane aspects of the Darfur issue. The impact of these events on several symbols of the political regime in Sudan was very harsh, leading to international demands against them by the International Criminal Court, including the President of the Republic and the leader of the Mahamid, Musa Hilal himself. This compelled the government to change its strategy by hastening to achieve peace to rectify its mistakes, and it immediately began negotiations with one of the rebel factions (the Arcua Minawi faction), which culminated in the Abuja Agreement in 2006. Under this agreement, Arcua Minawi received a share of power and was appointed as an advisor to the President.
After the success of the “Rapid Support Forces” in the Darfur crisis, Hemedti sought to play external roles by participating in “Operation Decisive Storm.”
Hemedti and his fighters felt neglected by the government due to a lack of adequate compensation for their sacrifices. Consequently, he gathered his fighters and formed a force called “The Honest Promise,” declaring their rebellion against the regime while possessing a significant number of vehicles, light weapons, and communication devices.
Emergence of the “Rapid Support Forces”
After the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim, executed the “Long Arm” operation targeting the capital Khartoum in 2008, the government was determined this time to eliminate the rebellion in Darfur once and for all. They aimed to establish a more lethal military force, taking into account professional, organizational, and legislative aspects. Thus, the Sudanese authorities passed a law to regulate the “Rapid Support Forces” from within parliament in January 2017.
This phase marked a new area of influence for Hemedti, as he became independent with considerable power. He played satisfactory roles for the government, engaging in numerous battles that enabled him to extinguish the flames of rebellion and restore relative stability to the Darfur region. In return, the government supplied him with more weapons, equipment, and money. For the first time, there was a quasi-military institution managed by the Dagalo family, protected by law, and with significant influence and substantial investments.
Following the significant success of the “Rapid Support Forces” in managing the Darfur crisis, Hemedti began to seek roles beyond the local framework. An opportunity arose through changes in the Gulf region with his forces participating in “Operation Decisive Storm” in 2017, which the Sudanese government joined to re-establish its relations with the Gulf states in exchange for financial support to face its numerous economic challenges.
The December 2018 Revolution paved the way for the “Rapid Support Forces” to acquire an unprecedented share of power.
Thanks to his external participation, Hemedti was able to double his forces to exceed 20,000 under the pretext of strengthening them in “Operation Decisive Storm.” For the first time, his military institution was linked with regional and global entities (the Russian “Wagner” group), which helped him create a new regional and global sphere with geopolitical dimensions. He also developed important military and investment relations, providing him with lucrative income and significant wealth that helped him recruit more youth from within and outside Sudan, which enhanced the capabilities of his forces and developed qualitative skills in armament and training.
Hemedti after the Sudanese Revolution
The period of the December 2018 Revolution and the subsequent transitional phase constituted a crucial stage that paved the way for the “Rapid Support Forces” to acquire a significant and unprecedented share of power, especially at the sovereign level. This was achieved both directly through the appointment of Hemedti as Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and indirectly through the extension of the “Rapid Support Forces” into various other sovereign positions and their control over vital state institutions.
Hemedti leveraged every internal and external opportunity, taking advantage of the weaknesses of the political system and the adoption of regional agendas.
The climate became more favorable than ever for Hemedti to advance towards achieving additional gains for his authoritarian project, gaining new ground at the expense of the revolution and its inexperienced politicians. His institutions expanded at the expense of other security institutions, extending their investment arms through Al-Junaid Company, controlling gold exports, and monopolizing economic institutions for supplying petroleum derivatives to the country. He did not stop there; his influence extended to the banking sector by acquiring Gulf Bank and significantly contributing to Livestock Bank.
In this manner, Hemedti, as a camel trader, seized every available internal and external opportunity while capitalizing on the state’s turmoil and fragility, its troubled policies, and the political system's weaknesses. He invested in the changing situation and adopted regional agendas, culminating in his failed attempt to seize power and rule Sudan on Saturday, April 15, 2023.
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