The Sudan has continued to suffer from a state of mistrust and power struggles not solely driven by external factors but largely influenced by political parties. Not to mention the ethnic and tribal conflicts in this culturally diverse and vast country have created a fragile political structure unable to withstand regional and international pressures, exacerbated by economic deterioration and the inactive role of Arab and African organizations.
Sudan shares open borders with six countries, including two Arab states. The country has experienced approximately 20 military coups, with seven successful attempts, ranking it first in Africa and second globally. Leftist parties, despite their secular orientation, have had the largest share in these attempts due to their pursuit of power, despite conflicting with the prevailing culture and aspirations of the citizens.
The “Janjaweed” Militia
No one can definitively pinpoint when the Janjaweed militia emerged, but its collaboration with political parties began during the Second Democratic period before Omar al-Bashir's government. The “National Umma” party, in that era, forged alliances with various factions from Darfur. According to recent history, the ousted President al-Bashir employed the militia to quell rebellion in the Darfur region. Hemedti emerged as its leader, composed of young men from several Arab tribes with an African pastoral extension, lacking formal education or military training and instead resorting to tactics of intimidation. Many were enticed to join the militia under the pretext of defending their tribes, whether oppressors or oppressed.
The greatest threat emerged when the “Janjaweed” assisted the military in Sudanese politics after the overthrow of al-Bashir.
The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) party aligned with them to confront the regular national army, summoning Hemedti from Darfur to lead his forces into Khartoum, expanding into every void created by the revolutionary change against al-Bashir. His international relations grew significantly following his forces' involvement in Yemen and seizing control of vast economic resources like the Jebel Amer gold mine in Darfur.
The FFC has become the political arm of the militia, co-signing the constitutional document alongside the army after the change. A civilian government was formed, representing the sole force of the revolution. The militia dispersed the protesters who opposed the document, leading to the inauguration of Hamdok as Prime Minister. Hemedti was also appointed as head of the economic committee of that new government, expanding his influence in the absence of the military institution. This led to constraints on honorable nationalists within governmental and military bodies, as well as the dismissal of their solid faction, creating a fragile security situation and the erosion of the minimum aspects of the state and its system.
The inevitable clash between the militia and the national army occurred in April 2023, aimed at installing Hemedti as the country's ruler, considering the militia as a substitute for the national army after eliminating its leadership and achieving field victories over its forces.
The parties of the Forces of Freedom and Change did not benefit from the wisdom that says, “A wise enemy is better than an ignorant friend.” They chose to ally with Hemedti, who bolstered his forces with tribal terror that disregards the political boundaries of states. They came from all Western African countries in an attempt to impose colonial settlement using all means of oppression and persecution against the people of Sudan—killing, looting, and raping. The FFC provided them with political and media coverage in the deliberate absence of Arab and international media that had previously supported change in Sudan.
The militia released prisoners convicted of murder, drug offenses, and terrorism to assist them and mercenaries from neighboring countries in their comprehensive war on Sudan. Homes were occupied, properties were looted, unarmed innocent citizens were killed, tortured, and women were raped, all in the complete absence of local and global media, with journalists and reporters targeted. This truly became one of the most brutal and savage wars in modern times.
The Army Leadership
The Sudanese army leadership chose confrontation and refused to surrender the country to occupation. Citizens from all over Sudan rallied, fighting alongside the army. Armed struggle movements that signed a peace agreement with the army in Juba after the change also participated with their forces in the war against the militias. This included former members of the General Intelligence Service who were previously discharged. All these forces unified in support of the army and in rejection of the militia's project, politically supported by the “FFC” (renamed “Taqaddum” under the leadership of Hamdok, the resigned Prime Minister), and internationally and regionally supported by some neighboring countries that bet on the militias but lost their gamble.
The Rapid Support Forces' attack on the army aimed to install Hemedti as governor and replace the national army with the militia.
This national unity culminated in the declaration of popular resistance and a comprehensive war against the Janjaweed invasion under international isolation imposed by states supporting change in Sudan. This forced the Sudanese leadership to pivot towards the eastern camp to break this isolation and solidify the pillars of victory.
Initiatives presented by some countries and organizations since the beginning of the war generally recognized the militias as a legitimate party in the conflict without directing any condemnation or criminalization towards their war on civilians, civilian property, rape, torture, looting, and plunder. Some of these initiatives may have aimed to coordinate the militias' positions on the battlefield by exaggerating their control areas in the media, attempting to arrange the political side for Hamdok's group in preparation for declaring a government in militia-controlled areas. However, the disappearance of militia military leadership from the field and the disagreement among civil forces supporting the militias foiled this plan.
On another note, the Jeddah Conference did not provide a clear mechanism for implementing its humanitarian outcomes by compelling the militias to vacate homes and refrain from targeting civilians. The nature of the militias, structured as bands of plunder, looting, and killing, prevented the possibility of reaching a binding and ethical agreement with them. They continue to ravage villages and cities in the ugliest forms of organized crime in contemporary history, exploiting network communication capabilities to disseminate images of terrorism, killings, and rape.
Cairo Conference
In early July 2024, Egypt managed to organize the Cairo Conference, which brought together political factions supporting the militias on one side and those supporting the army on the other. This conference, which did not achieve consensus or sign its outcomes, nor did it adopt addresses and speeches for the participating delegations, resulted in Egypt sending clear messages to the international community:
Firstly, Egypt does not recognize the militias that previously captured Egyptian pilots at Merowe Airport just hours before the war.
Secondly, the Hamdok group does not have sole legal authorization from civilians and politicians in Sudan, but there are other components supporting the army.
Thirdly, Egypt recognizes the legitimacy of the Sudanese army as representing the state's sovereignty.
Fourthly, Egypt rejects foreign interventions in the war and insists that the solution must be independently Sudanese.
The army leadership chose confrontation and refused to surrender the country to occupation, with citizens mobilizing and fighting alongside them.
Despite the modest outcomes of the Cairo Conference and its failure to call on the Sudanese government to participate, it provided indications emphasizing the superiority of the regular army over the militias. Within hours, Port Sudan Airport began receiving high-level diplomatic delegations, and Ethiopia hastened to rectify its stance on the war after realizing its losses from betting on the Hamdok group allied with the militias. Ethiopia began to change its position towards the Sudanese army and government.
Meanwhile, popular forces, civil and community leaders, armed struggle movements, and their national army agreed on the liberation of Sudan first, then transparently and resolutely agreed to prepare for elections after a transitional period to recover from the ravages of war and displacement. Sudanese are now awaiting the appointment of a transitional government for this period, followed by preparations for elections.
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