Hamas and the Leadership Escalation
Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh
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Strategic Issues
Despite the significant and tragic loss of its leader, Isma‘il Haniyyah, who led Hamas’ political bureau, the movement was able to elect a new leader within few days. Yahya al-Sinwar has taken over this role. This transition is notable given the challenging circumstances Hamas faces. The movement is engaged in a substantial battle, dealing with targeted attacks on its leaders and institutions, restricted freedom of action in many Arab and international settings, and difficulties in communication, meetings and movement. The difficulty of maintaining confidentiality and privacy further complicates the situation. These challenges complicate the implementation of the electoral process in the Hamas’s Shura (consultative) Council. Nevertheless, since its inception, Hamas has maintained a cohesive organizational and consultative structure, along with a flexible and adaptable decision-making mechanism. This setup has proven effective in navigating the complex conditions of occupation and siege within Palestine, as well as the challenges faced by the Palestinian diaspora outside Palestine.
Factors Influencing Leadership Escalation:
First, the educational and religious upbringing of the movement’s cadres and leaders has significantly facilitated the Shura electoral process. This upbringing has reduced the intensity of competition for leadership positions, as these roles carry substantial responsibility and trust. Leaders are aware that they will be held accountable before Allah Almighty for their actions.
Second, the heritage and internal consultative and electoral experience of the Muslim Brothers (MB) movement, to which Hamas is affiliated, have contributed to shaping and enhancing the Hamas experience.
Third, the clarity of ideological, religious, Da‘wah (calling to Islam), political, and jihadist principles and premises contributed to a shared understanding among most cadres and leaders. As a result, the criteria for selecting and differentiating between leaders were based primarily on expertise, competence and experience, given that the “program” remained largely consistent.
Fourth, Hamas avoided the mistake of adopting an “immortal leader,” “eternal president,” or “sacred” leadership symbolism. Its bylaws and internal dynamics allow for accountability, and although it hasn’t occurred in practice, leaders can be recalled if necessary.
Fifth, the approved electoral mechanisms prevent any leader from holding the same position for more than two consecutive terms (eight years). This rule applies to the head of the movement, regional leaders (Gaza Strip (GS), West Bank (WB), and abroad), and even members of the leadership itself, none of whom may serve in the same position for more than two consecutive terms. This system fosters a psychological readiness among leaders to step down from their roles, transition to new positions and responsibilities, or make way for leadership succession. It also helps prepare new leaders and introduces emerging figures to the leadership.
Sixth, it may have contributed to the “purification and filtering” of the electoral process and leadership selection that, throughout the previous stage and continuing to the present, Hamas’s leadership action has been based on “maghram” (sacrifice or burden) rather than “maghnam” (the spoils of war). In the context of working for Palestine, engaging in armed resistance, confronting the Zionist project, and enduring the hostility of Arab regimes and the international system towards the Islamic movement and resistance, pursuing leadership effectively means sacrificing one’s life, time and resources, potentially becoming a “martyr.” Hence, there is little to compete for in terms of “worldly gains.”
Seventh, one factor that contributed to the dynamism of the electoral process is that Hamas is a large and extensive organization, rich in talent and cadres within WB, GS and abroad. Many of its senior leaders have remained influential and active at the internal level, playing a role in decision-making without necessarily being publicly recognized or visible in the media. This provided the movement with a kind of internal safeguard and the ability to present these leaders for public visibility when necessary.
However, Hamas members are not a group of “angels.” While the aforementioned factors help to mitigate the leadership scramble, they do not entirely eliminate it. Differences in judgment, priorities, evaluations of individuals and their performance, and the varying emphasis placed on criteria such as precedent within the movement, knowledge, competence, experience, personal relationships, geography, and interaction all remain. Despite this, Hamas has consistently navigated its electoral processes with significant fluidity since its founding, quickly uniting behind new leaders even when differences in interpretation and perspective arose within the framework of the Shura system during elections.
Perhaps Hamas is one of the few movements in the Arab world that has consistently participated in electoral processes since its inception, without interruption. This is notable given that it remains one of the most persecuted and targeted organizations. This consistency indicates that the Shura electoral process is deeply ingrained in its structure and functioning.
Hamas Leadership
In Hamas, symbolic leadership did not necessarily involve taking on executive responsibilities. For example, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin’s status as a founding leader and figurehead of the movement did not mean he held executive power, but he remained the “spiritual father” and an inspiration to Hamas until his assassination. When Hamas was officially launched in December 1987, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin was part of the leadership. However, the GS leadership office was managed by ‘Abdul Fattah Dukhan, who oversaw operations within Palestine, specifically WB and GS. This office operated under the Palestine apparatus, led by Khairy al-Agha, who resided abroad. The Palestine apparatus, in turn, was subordinate to the Bilad al-Sham organization (MB branch) in Jordan, headed by Muhammad ‘Abdul Rahman Khalifah.
From the founding of Hamas until 1993, Khairy al-Agha served as its first president both inside Palestine and abroad, leading the movement unanimously until he insisted on resigning. He was succeeded by his deputy, Musa Abu Marzuq, who led the movement until 1995. Abu Marzuq was then forced to leave Jordan, and after failing to find a suitable place to live in the Arab world, he returned to the US, where he was subsequently arrested. Following Abu Marzuq’s departure, Khalid Mish‘al, his deputy, took over leadership. Mish‘al led the movement with strong consensus through subsequent electoral cycles until 2017. During his tenure, a decision was made to limit the presidency to two consecutive terms. His second term ended that year, and he was succeeded by Isma‘il Haniyyah, who was elected with overwhelming support in the 2017 elections and re-elected for a second term in 2021.
Sinwar’s Election
When Haniyyah was assassinated, his second term was still about a year away. His deputy, Saleh al-‘Arouri, was assassinated earlier, in early January 2024. Consequently, it was unsurprising that attention shifted to the movement’s leaders in GS, Yahya al-Sinwar, and abroad, Khalid Mish‘al, who, as regional leaders, are considered vice presidents. Given that Khalid Mish‘al had stated several months before Operation al-Aqsa Flood that he did not wish to return to leadership, Sinwar became the natural and expected candidate to lead the movement.
The Gaza Strip’s central role in the resistance, along with its Hamas leadership; the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood by Hamas from the Strip; the historical and formidable model of combat demonstrated under Sinwar’s leadership against a brutal Israeli aggression backed by a global alliance of major powers; the unity within Hamas, both domestically and internationally, in maintaining steadfastness; and the escalating defiance in the face of aggression—especially after Haniyyah’s assassination—have all contributed to Sinwar’s election.
Sinwar has been a prominent Hamas leader since the 1980s and played a crucial role in the formation of the Da‘wah Security Forces in 1983 under the leadership of ‘Abdul Rahman Tamraz. In 1986, he became the head of the Jihad and Da‘wah Organization (Majd), a military strike force within the Hamas security forces, initially focused on combating corruption and later expanding its efforts to resist agents and other threats. Sinwar was arrested in 1988 and sentenced to four life sentences. During his time in prison, he held leadership roles, including leading the High Command Authority of Hamas prisoners. He was released in 2011 as part the “Devotion of the Free” prisoner exchange deal. In 2012, he was elected as a member of the Hamas leadership in GS. Subsequently, he was elected head of Hamas in the GS for the 2017 and 2021 terms.
Sinwar is recognized for his strength of character, serious and practical nature. His inclinations and experience in military security have fueled his strong interest in this field and fostered a collaborative relationship with his colleagues involved in its management. His most notable contributions were evident during Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
Conclusion
In general, Hamas will continue its institutional work. The movement has already experienced the assassination of prominent leaders such as Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Rantisi, Salah Shehadeh, Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh, Ism‘ail Abu Shanab, Ahmad al-Ja‘bari, Jamal Mansur, Jamal Salim and Yahya ‘Ayyash, among others. Additionally, several senior commanders, including Khairy al-Agha, Sulaiman Hamad, ‘Abdul Fattah Dukhan, Hasan al-Qiq and Muhammad Hasan Sham‘ah, have preferred to relinquish their positions to make way for their colleagues and younger generations. Despite the loss of these leaders, the movement has grown stronger and broader over time. This is because Hamas is not reliant on any single symbol or individual, but on a set of core ideas. Each generation of leaders builds upon the achievements of their predecessors. Therefore, Netanyahu’s and the Israel’s efforts to weaken Hamas have been misguided and unsuccessful. The assassination of Haniyyah is likely to further inspire and motivate the movement to continue its resistance efforts, following in the footsteps of its martyrs and those of its people and Ummah.
