The Imam Sheikh al-Qaradawi has a huge scholarly jurisprudential project that began with his famous book “The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam,” and his book “Fiqh al-Jihad” won't be his last, in Allah’s will. I've reviewed the most important aspects of the great book “Fiqh al-Jihad” in its two volumes in the previous articles and raised subsidiary questions. But here, I present another idea.

Since acquiring knowledge requires humility, and because I am a student of Shiekh al-Qaradawi, I've learned from his books, studies, and lectures and engaged in lengthy discussions with him on some of his opinions. I've repeatedly asked the Sheikh to write on various topics that I believe are essential for Muslim youth and Islamic movements and occasionally respectfully disagreed with him on few fatwas. He has been patient, responsive, and accommodating to our requests with great affection. So, I am presenting him with these questions that I still find puzzling, hoping he will take an interest in them and dedicate time and effort to them so we can carry on with him this great endeavor on “Fiqh al-Jihad.”

This matter is presented to our great jurists, researchers, and leading scholars, such as Counselor Tarek El-Bishry, Dr. Mohammad Salim Al-Awa, Dr. Muhammad Imara, and others inside and outside Egypt. As well as our young researchers to present their ideas and offer the essence of their efforts for a brighter future for the Islamic Ummah and the Islamic movement. We all believe that Islam will triumph and lead the future. Therefore, we must prepare the Ummah for all possibilities and expectations.

According to what Dr. al-Qaradawi said in his book, two factors prompted the hastening of writing this book:

Firstly, the Islamic Ummah faces today a vigorous onslaught, not to mention the distortion of the concept of jihad. There's a need to present the issue from a moderate and balanced perspective. In this matter, the Sheikh referred to the aggressive Zionist entity and the significant American support for it, as well as the branding of Islam as “terrorism.”

Secondly, the extremism of some enthusiastic youth towards jihad. This includes the phenomenon known as the “Afghan Arabs,” who were later disowned by those who initially encouraged and supported them, leading to the formation of “Al-Qaeda,” which was preceded by various jihadist groups, from which other groups with their own jurisprudence and ideology branched out.

It is these incentives that prompted this esteemed book to answer the questions raised by these two issues.

Missing Incentive

The missing questions were there because they were not raised from the start; the future questions related to the behavior of Islamic governments that take Islam as their creed and legislative reference. They seek modern approaches to the questions of today and tomorrow in the systems and laws they must follow to ensure their commitment to Islam as a creed, law, and internationally recognized behavior in relations between states, especially regarding what is known as “the law of war.”

 The missing motive here for these questions to be raised is related to the future of this religion and its role in contributing to the building of a new human civilization. Not to mention participating in the establishment of international systems that achieve international security and peace. They should offer comprehensive answers to the issue of war, for the absence of Islam from guiding human civilization for several centuries has led to extremely dangerous global and humanitarian misery. Europe, for example, witnessed perpetual wars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to colonial ambitions and competition for global dominance.

These wars then spread to the rest of the world in the twentieth century, which witnessed two world wars that resulted in the deaths of over a hundred million people and the complete destruction of cities in Japan, Germany, Britain, and others. Subsequently, institutions such as the United Nations, international agreements on wars, prisoner treatment, the Red Cross, and others were established, all in the complete absence of representatives from Islam and the Islamic civilization, and even representatives from most nations on earth.

It was human desires that ignited the flames of war, and it was the light of human reason, which did not rely on divine revelation, that organized the laws of international war in response to the call of human nature.

Basic Hypothesis

I want to present to Dr. al-Qaradawi and other scholars and researchers the answer to practical and applied questions in light of comparison with the behavior of major powers today and what we see on the battlefields in light of a fundamental hypothesis: What stance can individual Muslims take? What about active opposition Muslim groups and governments intending to adhere to Islam and Muslim states and societies in terms of their institutions, groups, and individuals when it comes to the subject of “jihad,” war, or the declaration of combat and the shedding of blood?

Wars are still ongoing, and most of their battlefields are in Muslim lands, with Muslims as most of their fuel. We are in a state of defending ourselves against these successive attacks in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and elsewhere. Yet even these wars raise complex and intricate questions about how to confront and address them.

Important Topics

If we return to Sheikh al-Qaradawi's book “Fiqh al-Jihad,” we find that it spans 1440 pages, covering ten chapters, 62 sections, and six appendices. Throughout these pages, he addressed topics of utmost importance. Some are theoretical, necessary for understanding the issues at hand, while others are practical, driven by the problems faced by Muslim youth today. It also delves into the questions, jurisprudence, and ideologies generated by “jihadist” groups, which must be calmly discussed to clarify their correctness or error. Such as: 

• Armed oppositions and fighting against ruling regimes.
• Istishhad (Martyrdom) operations in Palestine.
• Our struggle with Jews and our conflict against the Zionist entity.
• Our relationship with Christians: dialogue or confrontation?
• Our relationship with Hinduism and Buddhism as a call to Allah.
• Fighting among Islamic countries.
• Seeking assistance from non-Muslims in jihad.
• Is fighting non-Muslims due to their disbelief or because they fight against us, according to the Jumhoor (majority of scholars) opinion?

Along with other necessary theoretical issues.

The Decision of War

However, the Sheikh did not address other matters, such as:

• The decision of war and its declaration, and who has the authority to declare jihad or general mobilization.

While he provided chapters on ending the fighting, reconciliation, truces, and the consequences of defeating the enemy or Muslims, as well as the post-war rulings, prisoners, jizya, and detailing all of that, I did not find in the book the regulations that determine the making of such a very serious decision, nor the institutions involved in making it.

We have suffered in our recent history from decisions of wars that destroyed our dreams of Arab unity and, along with it, many villages and cities, such as the Yemen War, the Lebanese civil wars, and the ongoing war in Somalia. Some involved armies, and some were between civil groups. Currently, we are witnessing an ongoing war in Yemen and another in Pakistan—between the armies and groups that can be labeled as “opposition” or “rebel,” opinions differ—and in Somalia, Sudan, etc.

The question here revolves around the decision to declare war and mobilize armies and how much this decision aligns with constitutional legitimacy and Islamic Sharia. Is it a decision made individually by the president, prince, or king? Or is it a decision for the people through representatives in parliament? Should the people be consulted through a referendum? And is this even practically possible?

Is it a decision for the top official, who then must return to parliament within a short period, or is it a decision in which senior military leaders participate?

The question also applies to groups that oppose governments, initiate aggression, or rebel against armed forces. What is the legitimacy of such a decision, and why do some rush to obey it without insight? What is the ruling on that?

State Institutions

Looking at the world around us, we find disagreement in the United States, for example, regarding the extent of the President's authority to declare war and the ability of Congress, which represents the people, to limit that authority through war financing tools from the general budget, especially when its costs escalate significantly. There is also the role played by military leaders alongside the President and the National Security Council. In the background of all this, there is the role of the military-industrial complex, which manages factories producing weapons of mass destruction used by the US army. Pressure is exerted by these entities to increase their profits at the expense of the lives of war victims. A prominent former general and US president, like “Dwight D. Eisenhower,” has acknowledged the dangerous role played by this investment complex in instigating and fueling wars.

In our countries, however, the clear distinctions between these roles do not seem apparent, not even in the current Islamic state constitutions. Public opinion is mobilized according to the decision of the supreme leadership, which for many years was held by military personnel who waged destructive wars, of which the Sheikh mentioned some, such as the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (even though Saddam Hussein was not military but rather a civilian Ba'athist in military attire).

Due to the absence of such regulations, another important question arises: What is the possibility of peacefully opposing the decision of war by voting against it in parliament or protesting and writing against the ongoing war that was constitutionally decided? Is such opposition considered betrayal, hypocrisy, or defeatism?

Opposition to War

This also relates to the question of conscience when refraining from participating in military operations due to either a lack of conviction in the legitimacy of the war or due to a specific ethical commitment.

All this is seen today in foreign and American countries. We have witnessed, and continue to witness, massive “anti-war” protests involving multiple groups. We rejoice in them greatly because, from our perspective, they oppose the ongoing aggression against our countries. However, we do not ask: Can an Islamic government allow such explicit opposition to a war it is waging when battles break out?

The Sudanese government declared a war it labeled as jihad against the People's Movement in South Sudan, then after years realized the futility of war and reached a peace agreement and power-sharing with those who were considered once rebels, repeating the same mistake in “Darfur.”

How can this be described and analyzed? Is it possible to allow opposition that contradicts the government's decision to gather public opinion during wartime against the decision to wage war and refutes the government’s justifications? Especially considering the Sheikh's description of jihad and fighting as occurring within the framework of “public interest,” with, of course, opinions differing significantly on this matter.

Defensive or Preemptive?!

There's a discussion in the book regarding the right of a non-Muslim to refrain from participating in a war that their religion does not permit or has no religious nature to them. But what about Muslims who hold jurisprudential or political opinions contrary to the governments’ in terms of war? Doesn't that undermine the possibility of mobilization and moral rallying for such a critical decision as war? Another question regarding conscription: should it be mandatory or voluntary in wartime and in preparing regular armies?

Certainly, there are differences between defensive wars when the homeland is under imminent threat or facing military invasion. In such cases, general mobilization is obligatory and cannot be avoided, as is prevalent in Islamic countries now. And then there are offensive or preemptive wars, as witnessed in American and Western wars around the world, justified by the events of September 11, 2001, as acts of self-defense, although many around the world doubt the legitimacy of that pretense or the wars waged by Iraq against Iran and Kuwait.

We see today a US president (Barack Obama), who was once a senator and opposed the war in Iraq, now seeking a safe exit from Iraq, then hesitating for a long time about the decision to continue the war in Afghanistan. After deciding to go to war, he sets a timetable for withdrawal. This is a rare case of an anti-war person now in a decision-making position.

Before him, there was “Bill Clinton,” who avoided military service in the Vietnam War and then became President of the United States, favoring remote wars through missile strikes and airstrikes without engaging in direct combat.

These are practical questions related to the war decision and its consequences, and there are other questions about the war and jihad scene.

Preparing Armies

What role do armies play in Islamic countries after becoming a major power? What role do their leaders play in shaping public policies and preserving the constitution and societal foundations? Can boundaries be drawn for that role, both internally and externally? What percentage of the budget is allocated to defense and army preparation? Is this preparation limited to the state and governments only? How do we prevent the echoes of huge bribes and commissions and the accumulation of unnecessary weapons that eventually become scrap after draining huge sums of money?

Or do we need a new approach that allows the private sector, as in the West, to participate in military industries? How do we mitigate the growing danger of such a sector, as discussed in America, for example? How do we prevent the military from overreaching, leading to budget drains, waging unnecessary wars, or even overthrowing the constitution instead of protecting it?

What is the ruling on internal fighting, the possibility of opposing it in every way, and the refusal of regular military leaders, committed to obedience, to participate?! Can they oppose, as happens in other countries? What if the army intervenes when things escalate to take control of the country, as has happened frequently? How legitimate is that? Should the people obey them if they dominate—something that may encourage the repetition of military coups as happened in our recent history? What is the Sharia perspective on this?

Investigative Committee

How can the circumstances and decisions made since the beginning of the war until its end be investigated, as we see happening in Britain now regarding the Iraq War and as it happened in the Zionist entity regarding the First and Second Lebanon Wars? To what extent can such an investigation delve into the decision-making process, war financing, military preparation, the suitability of equipment, and the ethical and moral violations committed by soldiers and leaders during the war?

What punishment would befall the responsible individual if their guilt was proven? Is this the role of the elected parliament, or is there a need for a special committee? If so, how would such a committee be formed? ... and so on.

We are in need of a practical and realistic Sharia perspective that involves experts from all fields to answer such perplexing questions, which are imposed upon us by the reality of the Ummah and the hope for a better future for Muslims who long to live under an Islamic system that aligns with the modern age, providing them with security, peace, and stability in their countries, while achieving stable international relations. They look forward to a day when Muslims can truly be the masters of the world, as they were for six centuries.

A Purposeful Project

We want to establish a law of war in Islam, and we want to draft a framework for international relations from our Islamic perspective on peace and war. I am aware that there have been previous efforts in this regard, but it is of utmost importance now that a large-scale project be undertaken by a global Islamic body such as the Muslim World League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, or the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, bringing together senior jurists, young researchers, prominent legalists, military experts, and scholars in political and strategic studies to engage in extensive discussions, covering:

• The history of Islamic wars.
• The writings of previous jurists.
• Modern Islamic experiences in warfare and their outcomes.
• Global and regional wars during the past century and their circumstances.
• Comparative studies of different countries and cultures.
• The status of armies and their role in the contemporary Islamic world.

Then, ultimately, even if it takes years, they will reach a draft law for warfare and another for relations among Islamic governments, both with each other and with other governments, organizations, and international alliances that manage global affairs. These drafts will be presented for public debate in the parliaments of Islamic countries, their legislative bodies, and various sovereign entities for approval and implementation.

If these entities fail to undertake this great task, then no less than a great figure as Imam al-Qaradawi, along with his disciples, should step forward to raise awareness about these questions and begin a lengthy journey to conduct the necessary research to answer these questions and more. May Allah grant success and assistance. 

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This article was published in a 1917 issue on 18 Ramadan, 1431 AH/28 August 2010 CE, pp. 36–39.

Read the Article in Arabic