Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi dedicated the second volume of his esteemed book, “Fiqh al Jihad: A Comparative Study of its Rulings and Philosophy in the Light of the Qur'an and Sunna,” to issues related to Muslims fighting against each other. Some Muslims, both in the past and present, have classified this within the framework of legitimate jihad against defiant fitnah (discord). Others considered it a deviation from the Sharia ruling despite the oppression and tyranny, similar to what has occurred throughout our history, continuing into the present era where the Islamic world has fragmented into more than fifty countries, each with its own regular army, police force, border guards, etc. This is evident today in border disputes manufactured by foreign occupation of our lands.
It's disheartening that in our time, we rarely find conflicts where Muslims are not involved as either one of the parties to the conflict or warring factions. Border disputes and civil wars within Muslim countries have not ceased over the past fifty years or so, making this second volume extremely important. The suggestions made by Sheikh al-Qaradawi, which are elaborated in some appendices, hold equal significance.
It is legitimate for us to question: Has the Islamic popular will, like the political will, been absent in stopping the continuous bloodshed among Muslims? And is there anyone daring enough to classify those wars within the framework of legitimate jihad?
The first volume came in six chapters, mostly related to the theoretical framework of jihad, its philosophy, objectives, reality, and rulings. The Sheikh tackled the Muslim stance towards different nations of the world, defensive and offensive jihad, and the concept of Naskh (abrogation) in the Quran to refute the notion held by many that the Quranic verse of the sword abrogated numerous rulings in Islamic jurisprudence.
He also discussed the necessity of preparing the Ummah for jihad and the danger of refraining from it, as well as the duties, etiquette, and constitution of the Islamic jihad army. All of this served as a solid foundation for the concepts, rulings, wisdom, and philosophy of jihad in Islam through an engaging and insightful study, regardless of its length. It requires patience in studying, understanding, and contemplation and necessitates rereading, reflection, and comparison.
The Second Volume
As for the second volume, it served as a practical application of those concepts and rulings in four chapters and six appendices. In it, the honorable Sheikh extensively discussed the cessation of fighting and its rulings, elaborated on the treatment of prisoners, and advocated joining existing international treaties known as the “Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.” He also responded to objections against those rulings. Then he discussed the concept of Dar al-Harb (house of war; any place that Islam cannot be practiced without persecution) and Dar al-Islam (house of peace; any place that allows the free practice of Islam) in moderation and balance, elucidating that the joining of Islamic countries today to the United Nations Treaty and Charter makes the whole world just two houses: Dar al-Islam, which refers to Muslim lands, and Dar al-‘Ahd (house of truce; territories that have a treaty of non-aggression or peace with Muslims), which comprises the rest of the world except for the Zionist entity in Palestine.
The Sheikh delved into the rules concerning the dhimmis (non-Muslims living under Muslim rule) in Islamic society, even though he had previously dedicated a separate book to them many years ago. I believe that including those rulings in a book related to the jurisprudence of jihad was unnecessary if not for the repercussions caused by jihadist groups, particularly unjustified attacks on Christians in Egypt.
I wonder if the Sheikh will have to elaborate further in future editions on the rulings related to Islamic sects such as Shiites, Sunnis, or Ibadiyya, or others, especially if the gruesome massacres between Muslims themselves for sectarian reasons, as is the case now in Iraq, worsen. He has already referred to this in his book, but he did not devote as much to it as other topics.
In reality, he introduced new aspects in dealing with Christians, which must be tackled and spread among Muslims, especially if we realize that one of the important points to fully implement Islamic law is the treatment of non-Muslim citizens, which requires extensive jurisprudential effort from scholars, jurists, legal experts, and politicians while explaining this to those citizens. Some of these citizens’ leaders and intellectuals want to turn them into a thorn in the side of Islamic countries after living in them for centuries in unique tolerance, contributing to and participating in the making of Islamic Arab civilization, and holding many important positions under Islamic rule throughout history.
Important Lessons
The Sheikh also elaborated on establishing an important principle in international relations: the other side of the law of war or jihad in Islam. It states that disbelief alone is not a reason to fight non-Muslims, as aggression is the only reason for defense or attack in Muslim wars. He refuted arguments that had settled in the consciences of the scholars and jurists’ students for many years during times when the Muslim Ummah was capable of fighting and initiating wars. But now, Muslims are defeated and culturally backward, importing their weapons and much of their food from their enemies, living as dependents on others, and having not yet achieved genuine independence.
Jurisprudence is the response of jurists to reality, finding solutions to all people's problems, especially the leaders’, otherwise matters would become confused for them and they would depart completely from the framework of Shariah, as sometimes happened in the history of Muslims. The response of al-Qaradawi to this situation, his continuous experience, and his successive advice—in his lessons, sermons, articles, books, and TV programs—to the Islamic awakening leading the Islamic movement today, forming the vanguard of the Ummah to return Muslims to eras of prosperity, have yielded important lessons and internal debates in the heart and mind of the Sheikh over the past three decades. This includes the Afghan Jihad, the Palestinian Jihad, and the ongoing bloodshed due to successive events during the last decade of “Al-Qaeda,” which marked an era of internal fighting against ruling systems in Muslim countries. This has captivated the minds of many enthusiastic youth to defend their religion, Shariah, and uprise their Ummah, and the Sheikh's writings were largely a response to this shocking reality.
This suffering has yielded that distinguished book, which is not diminished by its extensive explorations in examining some jurisprudential issues, or the absence of a future vision for the law of war in Islam compared to what is currently happening in other countries in terms of forming investigation committees into ended wars, opposing the initiation of new wars, refraining from enlisting in morally unjustified wars, or how to make the decision of war and divide the decision between the president and the representatives of the people, and so on, which raises important questions that need answers.
Throughout “Fiqh al-Jihad"—in both volumes—the Sheikh sought to establish and consolidate several jurisprudential rules that suit the current era and may in fact continue with Muslims for centuries to come within the framework of the fundamental rule that “fatwas change with changing times, places, circumstances, and conditions,” and the most important of these rules and conclusions are:
- Jihad's concept is broad in scope and is not limited to fighting. Most of what is mentioned in the Quran by that term refers to this width in spreading and defending the Islamic call, even though it has settled in the jurisprudential tradition as fighting against disbelievers and aggressors.
Jihad includes the work of the heart with intention and determination, the tongue with calling and clarification, the mind with opinion and planning, and the body with fighting and others. Or, as the Sheikh summarizes, “jihad means the Muslim exerting their effort and capabilities in resisting evil and chasing falsehood, starting with the jihad against evil within themselves by resisting its temptations, continuing with the resistance of evil within the surrounding society, and ending with chasing evil wherever it may be, according to their ability.”
- There is no consensus on the obligation of “offensive” jihad and invading the enemy once every year to be fard kifayah (communal obligation) on the Ummah. Instead, there are two matters on which there is unanimous agreement:
Firstly, if the enemy invades a Muslim land, it becomes obligatory for them to engage in jihad, and it is obligatory for everyone to support them until they defeat this enemy.
Secondly, preparing armies, equipping the necessary resources for defense, having a sufficient military force to deter the enemy, and having trained human resources in accordance with the requirements of the era on land, sea, and air.
This annual invasion against enemies has been subject to changing historical circumstances and is subject to the jurisprudence of Sharia politics, characterized by width, flexibility, susceptibility to development, and pluralism of viewpoints, because it is fundamentally based on the jurisprudence of interests.
- Every Muslim has two obligations when defensive jihad becomes fard ayn (individual duty):
Firstly, to intend jihad in the cause of Allah, whether given the opportunity or not.
Secondly, to be ready to respond to the call to battle at any time, without hesitation or delay.
- There is no disagreement on the obligation of jihad or initiating it in the following cases:
1- Securing the freedom of the Islamic call and preventing religious fitnah (discord).
2- Securing the safety of the Islamic state and its borders.
3- Rescuing the oppressed among the Muslim prisoners or their minorities.
4- Clearing the Arabian Peninsula from “aggressive polytheism,” which is a reason that no longer exists.
- The default in the relationship between Muslims and others is peaceful coexistence, unless aggression is committed against Muslims themselves, their wealth, their land, their religion, or against the oppressed among Muslims or their allies, and so on.
- The reason for fighting non-Muslims is not merely their disbelief in Allah or their rejection of Islam, but rather their aggression against Muslims, harming Islam and its people. The goal of fighting in Islam is not to eradicate disbelief from the world or to seek spoils and seize wealth and lands.
- Jizya is a substitute for the military protection provided by the Islamic state to the dhimmis. If it cannot provide protection, it no longer has the right to collect this tax. Also, the dhimmis who participate with Muslims in fighting and defending the Islamic land against the enemies of Islam are exempt from paying the jizya.
- In offensive jihad, withdrawal is mandatory as soon as there is a fear of annihilation. In defensive jihad and resistance, effort is exerted without exposing the group to extermination. It is neither wise nor appropriate to engage with the enemy in a battle of annihilation and genocide if the forces are unequal or not comparable.
Minorities and Confronting Reality
In the second part, there was a short chapter about the relationship of Muslims with Hindus, Buddhists, and others, which concluded with treating them fairly: whoever extends peace to us, we extend peace to them, and whoever aggresses against us, we resist and fight them back. The Sheikh began a new dialogue with Hindus in India but couldn't attend personally due to health problems. Instead, Dr. Ali Al-Qaradaghi attended, representing the International Union of Muslim Scholars. Perhaps this could mark the beginning of positive interactions with the Eastern world.
However, he did not elaborate on how Muslim minorities in those countries, which number in the millions and exceed those in many Muslim countries, are treated. For example, the number of Muslims in India exceeds 100 million, and 70 million in China receive various treatments in their respective countries. Muslims in India sometimes receive good treatment, especially during the rule of Muslim Mughals for centuries, while in China, particularly in East Turkestan (Uyghur Muslims), they face harsh treatment after the region was annexed by the Chinese state. Is it permissible for them as a minority to take up arms, as the Chechen Muslims did against communist Russia in the past? What is the duty of the Islamic Ummah in this case? Is this considered legitimate fighting, or is there a specific path for them, considering their unique circumstances?
They are indigenous citizens, not immigrants like Arab Muslims in Europe. They were rulers of the country in the past, and while their state and sovereignty disappeared, they did not migrate or get displaced from their homeland like Muslims in Al-Andalus, for example. They stayed and persisted under communist pressure, managing to retain their identity to some extent. Nationalistic dreams have mingled with religious sentiments, and they are unable to confront the power of the dominant state. They need, before financial, literary, or media support, a jurisprudence to face the reality they live in.
Jihad in Kashmir
Muslims in India who refused to migrate to the newly formed Pakistan in 1947 or were forced to stay in their homeland despite the horrific massacres they faced enjoy greater freedom and apply Islamic law in their personal affairs. Some of them also participate in political life. The question here is: What is their role? And what is the concept of jihad for them?
The Sheikh did not delve into the issue of Kashmir in any way, except for a very brief mention. However, it is known that Muslims in Pakistan, in particular, attach special importance to this issue, no less than the importance of the Palestinian cause for Arabs. They complain about the neglect of Islamic movements on this issue, despite its significant difference from the Zionist racial settler occupation of Palestine. Kashmir is a dispute that arose after the partition of the Indian subcontinent between Muslims and Hindus, resulting ultimately in the separation of Pakistan and its subsequent division and the separation of Bangladesh. Kashmir remains awaiting a solution, stirring conflict and war between India and Pakistan. The majority of its inhabitants, strongly supported by Pakistan, are striving for independence and joining Pakistan, or at least enjoying a special status, which India rejects harshly. So, the question remains, what is the stance on the jihad of Kashmiris?
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This article was published in a 1916 issue on 11 Ramadan, 1431 AH/21 August 2010 CE, pp. 40–42.
Read the Article in Arabic
