The term "popular resistance" is defined as the action of people or a group of people resisting a collective threat that endangers their existence and lives. Since it is resistance, it means it is more defensive than offensive, or at least that is the implication of the term.
Popular resistance in Sudan began two months after the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, when the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announced the opening of the call for mobilization and the bearing of arms for anyone capable of defending their family, honor, and the country. The response was officially initiated by large groups who directly engaged in combat; this was because they had previously fought in the South Sudan War and later in Darfur. These groups included the Popular Defense Forces, the Mujahideen, and volunteers who had received military training in national service camps, or what were known as the "Pride of Sudan" camps and had fought in previous battles.
The popular resistance began two months after the outbreak of the war
Immediately following Burhan's announcement of mobilization and the bearing of arms, these groups were organized into army camps such as the Armored Corps in the Shagara area south of Khartoum, the Signal Corps in Khartoum North, the Engineering Corps, and the Sarkab and Karari camps in Omdurman and other states. These qualitative additions to the armed forces played a significant role in the battles with the Rapid Support Forces, which were much better prepared in terms of equipment and fighters compared to the army.
Popular resistance committees were formed in all Sudanese states except for the Darfur states, with the exception of North Darfur State, which did not engage in the battles until after the fall of the other four states (South, West, East, and Central Darfur). The ongoing battle in El Fasher for several months has witnessed a strong role of popular resistance and its mobilized members in supporting the armed forces and the joint forces composed of Darfurian armed movements that signed the peace agreement with the Sudanese government since 2020 in South Sudan.
Conflicting State Stance
While the call for and response to popular resistance in Sudan was significant, it clashed with the conflicting stance of the state's leadership in dealing with and benefiting from it. The state's positions on this issue were erratic, with the state sometimes calling for and encouraging resistance, then at other times attacking it through some army leaders, and occasionally denying it access to weapons. Thus, the official stance on popular resistance in Sudan has been inconsistent.
An estimated 10 million Sudanese joined the popular resistance, including 200,000 lightly armed fighters
The fact is that these fluctuating positions by the state are driven by the current leadership's fear that the popular resistance might become powerful and establish its authority and influence, which could rival the position and ambitions of the current state leadership. There is also a fear of the international community, which mostly views the resistance movement in Sudan as being backed by Islamists. Consequently, the Sovereignty Council issued a decision for the formation and subordination of the supreme resistance committees in the states through decisions issued and appointments made by the state governor. This was done to ensure that these committees remained under the state's control and influence, which, according to many, weakened the role and effectiveness of the armed popular resistance committees, thus limiting their impact. This led to weakened self-defense in many areas that were entered by the Rapid Support Forces militia in the capital Khartoum and the states of Al-Jazira, Sennar, and West Kordofan.
The number of those who joined the popular resistance is estimated to be around 10 million resistors across all states of Sudan, with approximately 200,000 armed with light weapons ranging from "Kalash" to "Kalashnikov," which is a relatively small armament given the readiness and willingness of the resistors. In contrast, the other side is well-prepared, recruiting large numbers from its social bases and neighboring countries and sending them to fight in Sudan.
This current armed popular resistance in Sudan is not the first of its kind; there have been similar experiences in the past, although previous wars differed from the current war with the Rapid Support Forces. Sudan previously presented a model of popular support for the regular forces through the experience of the Popular Defense Forces (PDF), a remarkable initiative from the "Salvation" regime. This unique experience successfully mobilized the Sudanese people to face a violent war supported by countries and global organizations backing the Sudan People's Liberation Army led by John Garang for over 20 years before the signing of the Naivasha Peace Agreement with the Sudanese government in 2005. Without the continuous support of the PDF for the army, the Western European project in Sudan through Garang's forces might have succeeded. The PDF continuously supplied the army with men and went beyond that by encouraging citizens to donate and support the war effort. The PDF experience created a new model for preparing and mobilizing the people for combat, making them partners in the war and giving them the right to self-defense.
Reality and Aspiration
After a year and three months, based on the developments of the war and an assessment of the role of popular resistance between its reality and what is expected of it, the results are less than what is required. The rebellion has overrun many states, cities, and villages, and the scale of resistance and support for the army has been weak in comparison. The main reason for this is the state's failure to adequately equip the resistance and its intervention in limiting popular support for the resistance in terms of arms and other supplies. This is due to the authorities' control over the resistance bodies and their leaders, restricting them within the official institution and its complexities.
Popular Resistance Capable of Playing Key Roles in Decisive Battle if Properly Utilized by the State
What is certain is that the popular resistance is capable of playing significant and crucial roles in deciding the current battle, provided that the state utilizes it effectively and without any agendas or fear of the resistance's future roles. The current war in Sudan is not a conflict between two armies or military forces fighting each other; it is a war between a professional regular army and a scattered militia composed of bandits and border-crossers whose primary focus is the theft and looting of citizens' and state properties. It is fundamentally a war against the citizens.
The Rapid Support Forces militia has recruited criminals with criminal records, whom they freed from prisons after storming them. The most recent incident occurred in Sennar prison, where the militia recently broke in and released all the prisoners, enlisting them into its ranks. This large number of outlaws who are involved in robbing and looting citizens requires a popular force to defend and support the army. This capability is present in the popular resistance, which can accomplish this mission in residential and commercial areas, provided it is organized, structured, and armed. In this way, the popular and official roles complement each other, fulfilling the requirements of popular resistance in Sudan to face a new and unusual war characterized by criminals and foreign mercenaries.
The Sudanese popular resistance has played significant roles in the current war but has fallen short of expectations due to reasons related to the state and not the resistance itself, which is an independent and spontaneous popular body. It can achieve substantial work if the current experience is reviewed and addressed, and if the popular resistance is reformed to fulfill its intended goal without any further interventions.
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