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Despite Trump’s perception of his own successes, his personality, ambitions and leadership style are fueling crises. The more the “aggrieved” resist, refuse to yield and collaborate to thwart him, the more opportunities arise for them, while his policies backfire, leading to performance failures, a decline in the US’s international standing, and escalating internal crises and conflicts.
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Whether admired or opposed, Trump has won the US presidential election, with his Republican Party securing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. This gives him a free hand in leading the world’s (so far) superpower. He is assembling a presidential team and cabinet that, to say the least, is highly Zionist. One expert even noted that had Ben-Gvir been in charge, he could not have formed a more hawkish team!!
Driven by narcissism, evangelical Zionism, and a sense of superiority towards Arabs, Muslims and their political regimes, Trump will likely act as a “bulldozer” to resolve the conflict in favor of Israel. He will aim to impose his vision of sidelining the Palestine issue while enforcing Israeli hegemony and security standards across the region. However, aren’t there any opportunities on the horizon?!
Trump’s approach will fully expose the true nature of US colonialism and exploitation, revealing the religious and cultural biases that shape US decision-makers’ views on Israel and the conflict. It will demonstrate that the peace process and the two-state solution were mere illusions, designed to buy time for further Judaization of the land and people, while imposing new facts on the ground.
This full exposure will reveal the worst sides of US and Israeli decision-makers, deepening the region’s polarization. As the masks fall, all regimes and peoples will be forced to choose between submission and dignity. They will either reveal their worst or their best. This may provide an opportunity for resistance and change movements to attract those who now feel cornered, realizing there is no longer room for detachment or evasion of responsibility. In turn, the conditions for a new, explosive wave akin to the “Arab Spring” will become more imminent and achievable.
Second, Trump’s reluctance to engage in prolonged wars and bear their costs was evident in his expressed desire to Netanyahu to end the Gaza war before his presidency begins. Given Trump’s pragmatism, overconfidence and drive for quick results, if the war continues into his term, he will likely push for its swift conclusion by providing exceptional support to Netanyahu. However, should Netanyahu fail, as he has before, Trump may turn to more pragmatic solutions and pressure Netanyahu to end the war. With an unwavering ally in the US, known for his staunch support of hardline policies, Netanyahu will find it difficult to ignore Trump. Moreover, Israel’s increasingly strained domestic situation will only intensify the pressure on Netanyahu.
Third, Trump may provide the necessary cover for Israel to intensify efforts to Judaize al-Aqsa Mosque, including carving out sections or constructing a synagogue within its courtyards… among other projects. This poses a significant threat and crosses a red line, likely sparking widespread hostility toward the Zionist project and rallying further support for the resistance, which has already proven the justification of Operation al-Aqsa Flood.
Fourth, Trump may offer political cover for Israel to annex large parts of the West Bank (WB), particularly Area C, which makes up about 60% of WB. This could be accompanied by plans to confine Palestinians to ghettos and cantons, effectively dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA) and eliminating any prospects for a settlement or a Palestinian state. The strategy seeks to create unbearable conditions in order to force the displacement of approximately two million Palestinians, a move driven by Israeli desires to push them into Jordan and beyond.
This threat may compel the PA, particularly those not aligned with the security policies serving the occupation, to reassess their position and engage in serious coordination with Hamas and other resistance groups to put the Palestinian home in order and confront the emerging dangers.
Jordan will view this threat as a serious challenge to its national security and a red line, particularly as it aligns with resettlement and alternative homeland projects. This could lead Jordan to adopt clearer, more decisive actions to counter these initiatives, including halting normalization and reassessing its relations with resistance forces to take a more active and determined stance.
Fifth, Trump’s international actions will likely provoke major global powers, particularly China, and fuel resistance from countries opposing a return to hegemony, arrogance and colonialism. His interactions with NATO allies and the European Union will also involve unpleasant and provocative pressures, such as demanding higher contributions to the NATO budget and creating conditions that benefit the US economy at the expense of others.
In this climate, Trump may leverage his power to impose certain conditions, but in doing so, he risks creating numerous enemies, with even his allies hesitant to support him. Countries that once aligned with the “soft US orbit” may be compelled to seek new alliances and international support in response to US arrogance. Meanwhile, major powers like China could exploit the vacuum, advocating for a new global order that diminishes US influence and contributes to its decline.
Sixth and lastly, Trump’s approach to imposing his vision on the identity of the US, its system of governance, and its social, demographic and cultural makeup… will exacerbate internal tensions, provoke conflicts, and fuel growing support for the idea of certain states seceding from the Union. This will weaken the US from within, creating increasingly unstable conditions.
Trump’s bets and extreme behavior are grounded in the belief that the “other” will submit and accept subjugation. However, what if the “other” possesses a strong sense of pride and dignity, a willingness to sacrifice and confront, and alternative options to consider?! This could provoke the “other” to channel its full energy into challenging and overturning Trump and his approach. The Palestinian, Arab, Muslim and international communities have a significant role to play, especially if they unite in opposition to him.
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While these opportunities remain potential rather than certain, the political climate could allow for the partial or full realization of some of them… However, there is a risk that some forces may prefer to acquiesce to Trump’s “storm,” viewing the opportunities as a “gamble” they cannot afford!! particularly in corrupt and authoritarian regimes that fear their own populations more than they fear Trump’s policies. Nonetheless, it is crucial to emphasize that Trump is not an unstoppable force of destiny. Our peoples possess immense potential, and his actions may, in fact, trigger more of an awakening than a subjugation, inspiring resistance and greater political engagement rather than submission.
Escalation Factors:
The major security breakthrough achieved by the Israelis against Hizbullah, when they blew up thousands of radio receivers (pagers) owned by Hizbullah members and cadres, further fueled the conflict raging in northern Israel and southern Lebanon, intensifying confrontations between Israel and Hizbullah. The breach was unprecedented, with estimates citing over 3,200 injuries, including 400 serious ones, and 32 killed. This raised more questions than ever about the likelihood of a large-scale war and the possibility of an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon.
Hizbullah’s participation in Operation al-Aqsa Flood, in support of the resistance in the Gaza Strip (GS), led to the displacement of about 100 thousand Israelis from northern Israel, negatively impacted tourism and the regional economy, and tied down a significant portion of the Israeli army on the northern front.
Following the assassination of its chief of staff, Fuad Shukr (Haj Muhsen), the assassination of Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyyah, and increased Israeli escalation against Hizbullah and the resistance, Hizbullah enhanced its military operations by expanding the targeted areas in northern Israel. It employed precision missiles and drones that delivered effective strikes, further widening the battle zone and threatening an additional 100 thousand Israelis with displacement. This increased pressure on the Israeli government to shift more focus to the northern front.
Therefore, on Monday, 16/9/2024, the Israeli Cabinet approved the addition of a new objective to its declared war on GS, focusing on securing the northern front and ensuring the “safe” return of displaced Israelis to their homes in light of the Hizbullah threat.
This was accompanied by military and security assessments from senior officers and officials indicating that the military campaign in GS should conclude, as no further objectives can be achieved. They suggested it was time to reach a deal with Hamas and shift the military focus to northern Israel, making the war with Hizbullah and southern Lebanon the primary theater of the combat.
These assessments emphasized leveraging the momentum of the war to impose new conditions on Hizbullah to ensure the security of Israelis in the north—such as Hizbullah’s withdrawal and the prevention of any military or logistical presence of the resistance at a “safe distance” from the armistice lines, among other scenarios and guarantees.
Some Israeli military experts believe that ending the war with GS without addressing the issues in northern Israel and southern Lebanon is futile. They argue that the notion of the Israeli army needing about two years to rehabilitate and regroup (after halting the war in GS) before confronting Hizbullah is flawed. This is because Hizbullah’’s capacity to recover and enhance its capabilities, with support from Iran, is considered to be more dynamic and effective than the Israeli army’s ability to regain its strength. These experts believe it is essential to persist with the attrition and war, aiming to draw the US into the battle, and they are determined not to cease until their conditions are imposed on Hizbullah.
The elements of the Israeli escalation are reinforced by the state of “the arrogance of power” with the advanced military and intelligence capabilities of the Israeli side, strong US military support, and the inability of Arab, Muslim and international environments to curb Israeli aggression.
The Israeli success in carrying out grievous assassinations of leading military and security figures from Hizbullah and Hamas in Lebanon, as well as their success in executing a pre-emptive strike just before the large-scale attack that Hizbullah had planned in retaliation for the assassination of Fuad Shukr and Isma‘il Haniyyah, has further emboldened the Israelis. The harsh blow came with the explosion of the pagers, one of the most prominent means of internal communication among Hizbullah cadres and its security system, further fueling the Israeli appetite for war and their clear desire for escalation.
Based on these considerations, Israeli calculations aim to take pre-emptive action to prevent or weaken the chances of a response from Hizbullah and its allies, while not anticipating an overwhelming or decisive response that would lead to an all-out war. This assessment reflects both recent experiences and the political judgment that Hizbullah, Iran and the resistance forces outside Palestine do not wish to enter a regional war and prefer to maintain specific rules of engagement.
Restraining Factors:
On the other hand, despite the increased risk of escalation between Israel and Lebanon, influenced by the extreme religious and nationalist Zionist right which holds sway in decision-making, and despite Netanyahu’s efforts to involve the US in regional confrontations against Iran and resistance forces in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq, there are significant challenges that hinder Israel from engaging in a large-scale regional war or a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, including logistical difficulties.
Israel remains entrenched in the GS quagmire and has yet to achieve any of its objectives. The resistance in GS remains strong and effective, while the Israeli army continues to be depleted and unable to control the Strip or “liberate” Israeli captives.
The Israeli army is experiencing a significant crisis in its human resources and combat personnel. In response, it has extended the service of reserve forces, trained naval personnel for ground roles, and has recruited African immigrants by offering financial incentives and permanent residence in Israel.
There is a significant shortage of equipment, particularly tanks, bulldozers and personnel carriers, many of which were destroyed by the resistance during the confrontations in GS.
There are widespread resignations from the Israeli army, with the most recent being one thousand officers expressing their desire to leave the army.
As such, it would be very difficult to launch a ground attack on Lebanon that would mobilize some 80–120 thousand Israeli soldiers.
On the other hand, the US, along with Israel’s Western allies, do not want the war to escalate into a regional war.
There are US and Western concerns about potential unrest in Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel.
These fears are intensified by the belief among opponents of expanding the war, both inside and outside Israel, that if Israel has struggled to address GS for 11 months, it is even less capable of initiating a regional war that it may start but cannot control. Such a war would expose numerous gaps and weaknesses, leading to increased losses, particularly if prolonged, in an already strained Israeli environment.
This situation enhances the prospects for the resistance’s victory and the potential beginning of the reverse countdown for the Zionist project. Consequently, they attribute Netanyahu and his extremist team’s desire to expand the war not to Israel’s higher interests but to their personal ambition to remain in power, driven by their arrogant mindset and a state of “denial” and reckless aggression.
Conclusion:
Therefore, Israel may seek more “calculated escalation” against Lebanon and might resort to using artillery and air force bombardments, including fighter jets and drones, and become more active in assassinations and intelligence operations. However, it seems that it has not yet approached the stage of a ground invasion or a declaration of total war.
Netanyahu and his government’s approach to the war in Gaza Strip (GS) suggests that it will persist, potentially dragging on indefinitely.
The Mindset of the Israeli Ruling System:
There are several indicators that reflect the mindset and nature of the Israeli government:
First: Netanyahu’s relentless desire to remain in the prime minister’s office and extend the lifespan of his government for as long as possible stems from his attempt to secure a victory or any achievement that might allow him to exit with some dignity. This comes in the face of his failure to achieve his stated objectives of crushing Hamas and the resistance, “liberate” the captives held by Hamas, and impose his vision for the post-war situation in GS. He is also trying to evade the consequences, knowing that any deal on the resistance’s terms would likely signal the end of his political career—and possibly lead to his imprisonment.
Second: The mentality of Likud and Religious Zionism is rooted in a sense of superiority, viewing others with arrogance and refusing to engage with them as equals. They believe that what cannot be achieved through force can be accomplished with even greater force.
Third: There are calls within the ruling system to displace as many Gazans as possible and to revive settlement projects, particularly in the northern GS.
Fourth: Netanyahu’s “state of denial.” With his overbearing personality and his conviction that he is the uncrowned “King of Israel” and a towering figure in Jewish history, he has yet to grasp that both he and his forces have been shaken, and that a seemingly “insignificant entity” like GS has withstood eleven months of war against the “greatest power” in the Middle East, backed by a global coalition. Therefore, Netanyahu will persist in his war with a gambler’s mindset, even if it drains his resources, clinging to the hope that some opportunity will emerge to escape his dilemma.
Fifth: The “state of allure” in which Netanyahu and his extremist government operate is characterized by a favorable environment. This environment includes a weak official Palestinian leadership and an authority in Ramallah that collaborates with Israel, suppresses resistance in the West Bank (WB), and anticipates the fall of Hamas in order to take over in GS. Additionally, the Arab and Islamic environment is weak and ineffective; many hope for Israel’s victory over Hamas, with some normalizing relations and supplying Israel’s needs, while others contribute to the blockade, impede support for the resistance, and distort the resistance’s positions both politically and in the media. Internationally, despite the expressed sympathy and growing isolation of Israel, there remains an inability to prevent the ongoing brutal massacres and systematic destruction.
Being aware of all this, Netanyahu and his extremist clique still believe there is an opportunity to exploit. They continue to pursue a “mirage” in their attempts to suppress the resistance and subdue GS.
Indicators Related to the Management of the War:
Certain indicators suggest that the manner in which the war in GS is being managed may be contributing to its prolongation:
First: Deliberately obstructing negotiations to reach a deal with Hamas and the resistance and introducing new conditions, such as the establishment of the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor and the refusal to withdraw from it, Netanyahu has set a condition designed to be rejected. This demand, opposed by the resistance, the Ramallah Authority, Egypt and other Arab regimes, and facing global disapproval—even from the Israel’s allies—will likely derail any forthcoming negotiations. Essentially, Netanyahu’s intention is for this condition to be rejected!! which would enable him to continue the war.
Second: Pursuing a deal for the release of captives while maintaining the current level of military engagement and not fully withdrawing from GS would effectively separate these two issues. This approach would relieve the Israeli army of the complexities and pressures related to the captives’ release, allowing it to focus more effectively on targeting and neutralizing resistance over an extended period.
Third: On 28 August 2024, Israel announced the appointment of Brigadier General Elad Goren as the GS military commander, designated as the “head of the humanitarian-civil efforts.” This role is similar to that of the head of the civil administration in WB and focuses on overseeing civilian aspects of life, including humanitarian aid, relief efforts, management of crossings, and long-term initiatives such as the return of displaced persons, restoration of civilian infrastructure, and reconstruction efforts. The appointment suggests that the occupation could persist for years, aiming to establish an alternative local authority to Hamas.
Between Israeli Terms and Resistance Terms:
While Israel seeks to crush the resistance and “liberate” the captives on its terms, it also aims to prolong the war and remain in GS until its objectives are met. Israel wants to impose its vision for post-war Gaza’s governance, ultimately installing a local puppet administration that disarms the resistance and ensures security for the GS envelope. Meanwhile, the resistance rejects any deal that does not guarantee a complete end to the war, full withdrawal from the Strip, and an honorable prisoner exchange. This means Israel’s maximum offer falls short of the resistance’s minimum demands, ensuring the war will continue. The resistance, with no other option, will persist in its efforts to wear down Israel until Netanyahu is forced to accept its terms.
Assessment of the Situation:
The points discussed above highlight Netanyahu’s intent to continue the war and extend his tenure as prime minister. However, they do not necessarily reflect his ability to implement these objectives on the ground. An analysis of several parameters reveals that, while framed as strategic moves, they are, in practice, temporary tactical pressure points.
Here are five key considerations when assessing the situation:
First: Israel aims, through its stringent measures on the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, the appointment of a military governor for GS, and the suggestion of an extended stay, to undermine Gazan popular support and demoralize it. This strategy is intended to foster, among Gazan people, an environment of “abandonment” of the resistance and acceptance of Israeli conditions and standards, thereby pressuring the resistance to secure the best possible outcome in any negotiations with Israel.
Recent negotiations, mediated by the US, Qatar and Egypt, show that Israel has agreed to withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor, the northern GS and most of its occupation points. Consequently, issues of displacement, settlement, and preventing displaced persons from returning lose their significance if the resistance and popular steadfastness persist.
Second: The Israeli focus on maintaining control over the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, as insisted upon by Netanyahu, is essentially a tactical pressure tool rather than a strategic asset. Netanyahu himself did not recognize the Corridor’s significance until the eighth month of the war. By then, Egypt had already effectively sealed the tunnels, and numerous alternative Arab and international methods and tools were available for Israel. Notably, Israel has been unable to find a Palestinian, Egyptian or Arab party willing to cooperate in managing the Rafah crossing and remaining in the region. Furthermore, most of its international allies oppose its presence there. US proposals for a deal with the resistance include withdrawing Israeli forces from the Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor. The army leadership, headed by Yoav Gallant, and the security establishment do not see the need to remain at the crossing. This perspective is also supported by senior military commanders, including former chiefs of staff Ehud Barak and Gadi Eisenkot.
Third: The continued strong performance of the resistance and the significant attrition experienced by the Israeli army in GS, combined with Israeli and international assessments of the resistance’s ability to endure and the challenges, if not impossibility, of eliminating it in the foreseeable future. Additionally, there are growing concerns that the army may struggle to maintain control over key areas, such as Netzarim and Salah al-Din (Philadelphi) Corridors, as Netanyahu desires, potentially leading to increasing gaps within the Israeli forces over time. All of these factors enhance the resistance’s chances of maximizing its effectiveness and imposing its terms.
Maariv newspaper (29/8/2024) reported that August 2024 was the deadliest month for the Israeli army during the war, highlighting the effectiveness of the resistance. Conversely, Israeli radio cited military officials claiming that the army’s operations in GS have largely concluded and that the political leadership has been advised that it is time to negotiate a deal with the resistance. This sentiment was echoed by Defense Minister Gallant, who initially voted against staying in the Philadelphi Corridor and later requested a re-vote in favor of withdrawing from it. Retired General Yitzhak Brik, in an article published by Haaretz on 22/8/2024, warned that “Israel will collapse within a year if the war of attrition against Hamas and Hezbollah continues,” adding, “All of the paths chosen by Israel’s political and military leadership are leading the country down a slippery slope.”
Fourth: After the Qassam Brigades were forced to execute six Israeli prisoners on August 30 before the Israeli army could intervene, the temporary “honeymoon” period Netanyahu experienced following his return from the US, buoyed by strong American support and his success in assassinating Hamas leader Isma‘il Haniyyah and Hizbullah Chief of Staff Fuad Shukr, effectively ended. The internal sentiment shifted against Netanyahu, with the prevailing belief that his approach would only return the captives in coffins. This led to massive demonstrations, with approximately 750 thousand participants demanding negotiations with the resistance. The intensity of both popular and political opposition to Netanyahu grew. Opinion polls indicated that Gantz had regained the lead over Netanyahu, with 61% of respondents dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s performance. Additionally, 53% supported the withdrawal from the Rafah crossing, and a large majority preferred that Netanyahu not run in the next elections.
Fifth: A significant challenge confronts Israel if it insists on remaining in GS and administering it militarily. It would bear direct responsibility (both in practice and under international law) for the welfare of the population, including providing relief, rebuilding infrastructure, and maintaining essential services such as schools and hospitals. Additionally, it would find itself operating in a hostile environment characterized by resistance and strong public support for it, making it impossible to perpetuate massacres indefinitely. Most Israelis believe that the last thing the Israeli leadership wants is to directly manage GS and address the civilian and daily needs of its inhabitants.
Conclusion:
By prolonging the conflict and signaling his intent to remain in GS, Netanyahu aims to cling to power and project an image of victory over the resistance and suppress popular support. However, various pressures on Netanyahu and his government undermine these efforts, especially as the resistance maintains its strong performance and continues to garner widespread support.
For over thirty years, Israel has failed to suppress resistance in WB or diminish public support, despite extensive cooperation with the Ramallah Authority. Hamas remains strong and popular in WB. Consequently, its strategies and efforts in GS are destined to fail.
The indicators suggest that the GS war is likely to be prolonged. However, Netanyahu may not fully grasp how the arrogance of power blinds him to the ongoing attrition and the substantial costs—military, security, political, economic and social—that he and his government are incurring. This situation could be interpreted as a form of divine retribution for the occupation, potentially signaling the beginning of a countdown to the decline of the Zionist project and the Israeli occupation. Conversely, this does not absolve those who are in a position to support GS from their significant responsibilities. Individuals, nations, movements and organizations must each contribute according to their capacity. It is crucial for everyone to acknowledge the critical historical juncture that the Palestine issue is experiencing, to prevent Israel from isolating GS, to stop the bloodshed and destruction, and to intensify efforts toward liberation and ending the occupation.