I read two articles yesterday: the first is a Special Study on the “Ourouba 22” website by Dr. Muhammad Rumayhi, a liberal Kuwaiti professor and writer who does not criticize normalization, and the other by Mohanna Al-Hubail, a Saudi Islamic writer opposed to normalization who published his article on his “X” account.

Both articles, without delving into details, blame the actions of “Hamas,” viewing the event from the perspective of gathering information and data based on predetermined, biased, and unfair positions.

Both writers agree that the October 7 battle is a strategic investment for the Iranian project, and “Hamas” is merely executing it.

However, prominent “Hamas” leaders in several interviews have denied that all parties, including their political leadership, were aware of this move.

Unfortunately, analyzing the strategic situation in this war and its outcomes from a singular, pivotal perspective is flawed and restricted by preconceived accumulations and specific positions. It often involves overlooking the course of events, distorting facts, and twisting statements to fit pre-arranged judgments. This only reflects the crisis of sovereign thought among Arab elites. Who among us does not know and has not followed the Iranian project, its dangers in the region, and its strategic successes? I wrote a comprehensive study in 2012 on the Iranian project, its dangers, and the opportunities available to contain it, not to mention the hundreds of studies and articles by Arab writers in this field.

But the roots of the Iranian project's success began during the Iran-Iraq war and its repercussions on the region, followed by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

When Kuwait was liberated, Gulf states and some Arab countries joined a US-Western international alliance to achieve this goal. The justification at the time was a significant interest that involved bringing foreign forces into the region and securing them through security agreements. Had this effort solely focused on liberating Kuwait, it would have been a resounding success for this strategic policy. Gulf states and other Arab countries could have contained Saddam's Iraq instead of engaging in toppling a regime that was already weak after the liberation of Kuwait. This would have at least maintained a strategic balance with Iran. However, the region's countries got entangled in the American-Israeli scenario, with Iran looming behind the scenes.

Handing Iraq over to Iran, coordinated with the United States, was catastrophic. It shifted the security equation in the region between Iran, the United States, and Israel, removing Iraq from the power balance equation and making Iran a threat to the region. At that time, “Hamas” was not aligned with either authority or an Iranian alliance to fit the claims of the aforementioned two writers regarding Iran's investment in “Hamas.”

The rest of the story is well known: Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen were handed over to the Iranians, serving as barriers threatening the Sunni component and its states. Iran has thus created a constant state of balance and restlessness for the region's countries, paving the way for normalization agreements with Israel.

The Arabs failed themselves by not supporting the Syrian revolution to overthrow Bashar's regime. In reality, “Hamas” is not providing Iran with true progress or strategic support.

The late Iranian Foreign Minister, Amir-Abdollahian, mentioned in his final book, “Syria Morning,” that he attended the inauguration of an Arab president. During this visit, a former foreign minister delivered a message from this president, requesting gratitude be conveyed to the Iranian Supreme Leader and leadership. The message emphasized that the state would not align with the Gulf and Western countries regarding their stance on Bashar al-Assad, refusing their requests to condemn Iran's nuclear project and support Bashar al-Assad!

Hamas is a popular resistance movement seeking to liberate Palestine and restore the usurped rights of the Palestinian people, which the “Oslo Accords” failed to achieve with Arab, Gulf, and international support. Israel has occupied all of Palestine, from Jerusalem to the West Bank, leaving only Gaza as a liberated area under the control of the Palestinian resistance.

The question is: How can Hamas, as a legitimate resistance movement, survive amid conflicting and diverging alliances with differing interests and goals, especially with zero Arab support for “Hamas,” either out of desire, fear, or submission to American policies in the region?

Here is the Arab-Israeli blockade on Gaza since 2007, and there are normalization agreements initiated by Israel with Arab countries, removing these countries from the conflict with Israel. These agreements have also launched a new era of supplying Israel with its needs, trade, and growth, and even extending its strategic vision in the region.

There is also the daily Israeli brutality against the Palestinian people and the ongoing war on Gaza since 2007 until this day, as well as the international isolation of “Hamas” and the Palestinians and daily violations of human rights and international law.

Therefore, the strategic policy of “Hamas” in fulfilling its duties towards its people is determined by its own assessment of its position. “Hamas” is the owner of the land and the people in Gaza, along with the other factions and popular blocs that have found no ally except by forging possible and available alliances to face the fierce war waged by the Zionist entity, backed by American support, Arab betrayal, and Israeli savagery.

It is natural that when there is an opportunity to cooperate with an axis that supports the resistance and enhances its capabilities in managing the political, military, and economic struggle, “Hamas” finds no option but to align with Iran. This cooperation only emerged after the Gaza blockade in 2007. The decision and the assessment of the situation are not based on what the Iranians think of their project; it is their project, and they naturally work on it with intelligence and patience to extend their interests and power in the Arab region. However, the decision of “Hamas” is determined by legitimate and realistic interests, and Sharia is about seeking benefit or avoiding harm.

It is about prioritizing the greater benefit over the lesser one, or avoiding the greater harm for the lesser one. This falls within the framework of Sharia politics, which involves assessing the situation and taking political, military, and economic measures that achieve the least harm and the greatest benefits.

And the question remains: Did Hamas have any refuge or place it could turn to since 2007? What were its options?

Should it have entered the “Oslo Accords” that Abbas's rule has succeeded in nothing but entrenching the occupation’s control over the West Bank? Or should it have joined the normalization agreements, which established Zionist control over the region? Or should it have aligned with the Arab regimes that decided to end the Palestinian cause through normalization in exchange for a non-viable, disarmed Palestinian state?

The price of liberation from the Israeli occupation must be paid. History shows that nations have been freed through millions of martyrs, war, and the destruction of infrastructure. “Hamas” cannot prevent Iran, the United States, the Zionist entity, or the Arab regimes from exploiting the ongoing conflict—this is beyond its control. Thus, “Hamas” aligned with the Iranian axis, which champions resistance, as it was the available option for survival and for keeping the Palestinian cause alive in the world, as witnessed after the “Al-Aqsa Flood.”

Therefore, the solution is for Arab regimes to awaken from their strategic and religious coma and unify ranks to confront not just Iran but also potential conflicts in Lebanon and a possible coming world war, whose outcomes could spell the end for the Arabs. As mentioned in the Hadith, “Woe to Arabs because of evil which has drawn near!” There is no use of blaming “Hamas” for the strategic mistakes of the Arab regimes over the past decades.

This is a war imposed on Palestinians since the British occupation of Palestine and its handover to the Jews in 1948. “Hamas” is not different from the movements and fighters in Palestine since the 1920s. Criticizing “Hamas” and the people of Gaza in these moments is a mere absurdity that only serves the interests of the Zionist entity and bolsters Iran’s position.

Conclusion

Iran's expansion in the Arab region and its occupation of geographical areas have been facilitated by the strategic policies of some Arab regimes, who were deceived by American promises and Zionist machinations. “Hamas” has nothing to do with Iran's expansionist project. Major countries like Russia and China strategically support Iran, while others, like the United States and the European Union, negotiate with it. Some clash with it according to the rules of conflicts, such as the Zionist entity and some Gulf states.

So, have the Arabs ever considered how to solve their issue with “Hamas” and unify their strategies toward Palestine?

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Read the Article in Arabic

By: Mohammad Salim Al-Rashid

 In a statement, a senior Hamas official said to the AFP: "Contacts with Syria are improving and relations are on the way to a full return to what they were before," referring to several visits by Hamas leaders to Syria. In addition, he added "Syria supports the cause and the Palestinian people, and that Hamas is keen on the relationship with Syria and all Arab countries."

On the other hand, Khalil al-Hayya, a Hamas leader, said; “The movement has made its internal decision to return to Damascus after an internal and external discussion at the level of the Hamas movement in order to resolve the controversy related to restoring relations with Syria. And cadres, influencers, and even detainees inside prisons, expressed their determination to work for restoring the relationship with Damascus.”

The following factors may explain Hamas' decision, according to political analysis:

First: The formation of a new axis (Arab - "Israeli"):

Hamas is subjected to international and regional pressures after the formation of a state of normalization in the last decade in the Arab region between “Israel” and some Gulf States, Morocco and the Sudan, in addition to Egypt and Jordan.

The isolation of these countries from their functional strategic contexts has led to their transformation from countries trying to use the Palestinian cause as a strategic card to negotiate with "Israel" to countries that integrate within the context of US-“Israeli” policy in the region. Thus, those countries find that their functional mission has turned to confront Iran and its arms in the region and Iran's attempt to enter the nuclear club. This means switching to serving the "Israeli" strategy in investing the financial, oil and commercial resources of the allied Arab countries and ending the dictionary of hostility to leave behind the Palestinian cause, after it was a priority card for the Arab negotiation and solidarity.

With signs of forming a Middle Eastern force that includes “Israel”, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Gulf states, Hamas will become a cacophony and a hotbed of concern. Consequently, it will be a future goal in the face of the Iranian project, i.e. it will not only be an "Israeli" target, but also a target for Arab countries under the umbrella of that Middle Eastern power.

Second: The transformations resulting from the Russian-Ukrainian war:

The Russian war in Ukraine has undermined the international certainty in the western alliance force (Europe and the United States), and has led to the escape and restlessness of regional states such as India, Pakistan, Turkey and some countries bordering Ukraine (such as Hungary), as well as countries like Brazil, South Africa and other United States control and influence. This may break up the unipolar domination of the world, which will lead the world to roll towards the growth of regional and international poles, the most important of which are China and Russia. This war may result in economic, military and financial losses that will be reflected in the political positions of many political bodies. Countries and movements, and those states have begun to think about their strategic and political options for the next decade.

Among those bodies is the “Hamas” movement, whose assessment of the international and regional situation resulting from the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war led Hamas to adopt the narrative that emphasizes the rise of Russia and China and the steadfastness and power of Iran in the region as a balancing factor with the power of the Middle East. One of the effects of this will be the weakening and disintegration of the European alliance with the United States, which will weaken the future hegemony in favor of Russia and China.

This assessment of the situation contributed to the shift in the position of Hamas in the direction of restoring relations with Bashar al-Assad. Then merging with the Iranian strategy in the region, hoping that Iranian financial and logistical support will continue to Hamas and the Gaza Strip, in the absence of Arab support and the shift in the Arab position that normalizes relations with "Israel".

Challenges facing Hamas

Hamas will face several challenges, the most important of which are:

  1- The independence of Hamas' political and strategic decision:

After a period of this decision, "Hamas" interests will clash strategically with the interests of the Iranian regime and project in the region. Thus, the question arises: Will Hamas transform from an independent resistance movement into a functional movement in the Iranian project? Hamas has begun to consider this job by exchanging positions of the Lebanese Hezbollah and some of its missions in Daraa and other Sunni areas in Syria, as is rumored.

Hamas will not have the upper hand inside Syria with regard to its strategic policies, as it will remain under the political and legal reality of the Syrian regime, of course. It will be entrusted with a group of tasks in the context of maintaining the coherent Syrian regime, and there are possibilities that it will be exposed to “Israeli” attacks on the Iranian regime’s positions replaced by “Hamas.”. Hamas's combat situation would then be weak and exposed to the Israelis, and it would be easy to strike its positions as well as those of the Iranians and Hezbollah if it were assigned roles to protect the Syrian regime.

This time, Hamaswill return to the Iranian embrace in Syria with weaker conditions, an incompatible organizational force, and a weak position that does not have the upper hand. Is it possible, over time, to employ Hamasto perform the required role in accordance with Iranian strategy rather than in accordance with its independent strategy?  

For several years, Hamas has maintained the independence of its decision, but it is certain that this time it has lost its independence due to a reassessment of its position towards international and Arab changes in the region, after it failed to resume any distinguished Arab relationship that balances its relations with Iran.

2- Iran's role in the region

The second challenge is: Will Hamas be able to jump over the goals of the Iranian project in the region? The project that plans to control, humiliate, and oppress the Sunni public and place it under the framework of dictatorial regimes in Iraq and the minority Alawite regime led by Bashar al-Assad. Will Hamas, like some Palestinian forces, become pro-Bashar against the revolution of the Syrian people? The Iranian project in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen has engaged in killing, displacement, destruction, burning and annihilation of the Sunni peoples of these countries under the pretext of resisting “Israel” and America.

In Syria alone, there are more than 11 million refugees outside and inside Syria.

Iran has deliberately changed the demography and spread the Shiite sect in the Sunni areas, colonizing urban areas and turning them into purely Shiite areas.

Iran's resilience and resistance (according to its claims) against the United States (which cooperated with Iran several times and is now negotiating with it on the nuclear project)...is only one of its tactics and not its project.

Iran's project is to control and rule the Arab region stretching between the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and this is a written project.

The question is: Will Hamas be able to jump over the dynamics of this project under the pretext of finding the protection and support lost from the Sunni side? Or will it turn, over time, into just mere cog in the machine of this project. This is what happened with many Palestinian factions that turned from struggling for occupied Palestine to struggling American and "Israel" in the whole Arab region under the Iranian project and the influence and orders of the Supreme Leader in Iran.

Over time, can the ideological Shi’ism infiltrate into Hamas's youth class and change from political to ideological loyalty? These are challenges for Hamas.

3- The future of Hamas’ relationship with its traditional allies (Turkey and Qatar):

The Turkish role with Hamas has been distinguished over the past two decades because of the policy of the ruling Justice and Development Party. Hamas also has distinguished relations with Qatar, semi-strategic relations, as Hamas moved its offices to Qatar after its exit from Syria. Moreover, Qatar continues to support the civilian budget of the Gaza Strip, which is ruled by Hamas.  

Hamas's return to Syria and its re-establishment of relations with Bashar al-Assad's regime will confuse the Turkish equation in Syria, as Turkey is in a line of confrontation with the Syrian regime in Idlib and northern Syria.

Ankara is concerned about this strategic move, which will make a difference in the strategic and political alignment. It is no secret that Iran is a strategic competitor to Turkey, and is also attached to Russian control and has been pressing Turkey in many files in the region.  

Here, a question arises: Will Hamas be able to convince its allies in Turkey and Qatar of its position, and that it will be neutral in theconflict of rivalry between Turkey and Iran in the region, especially in Syria?

4- The popular and legitimate Sunni position:

Since Hamas aligned itself with Iran and sided with it in many positions, visits and statements, the mental image that used to see Hamas as an independent Palestinian resistance movement changed to see it as a pro-Iranian movement. Legal declarations and fatwas have been issued by legal figures and figures in support of Hamas opposing this relationship, or these statements and visits. Everyone knows the popular and legitimate Sunni position on the visit of Abu al-Abed (Ismail Haniyeh) to Iran and his condolences for Qassem Soleimani and naming him "the martyr of Al-Quds". This statement provoked reprehensible reactions from large sectors at the Sunni popular level.

 How will Hamas present its legitimate position in accordance with this shift represented in restoring relations with the Syrian regime, and how will Bashar al-Assad, who has committed all the known crimes in Syria, turn into a strategic ally under the Iranian umbrella? Moreover, how will Hamascompensate for its Sunni incubator in the coming days?

Many symbols, leaders, political and legal figures have defended Hamas in its positions and relations with Iran and the statements of its symbols, justifying their positions with excuses related to corruption, interests and political and necessary constraints. Nevertheless, the political and strategic dose is strong this time around. These symbols and leaders will not be able to defend Hamas' position, which will lead to Hamas losing a large bloc of its popular Sunni incubator and strengthening the position of the hardliners against Hamas's relationship with Iran. It may even reach that Hamas, by taking sides in this position, is going in an opposite direction to the Sunni content in the region. Because of this relationship, Hamas may turn into a legitimate target for confrontation that is exploited by many gloating parties.

Will Hamas be able to promote its position politically, legally and popularly?

On Saturday, June 19, 2021, the state TV of Iran announced the victory of Ibrahim Raisi in the presidential elections, and said that Raisi won the presidency with 62% of the total votes, garnering 17.8 million votes. The TV added that 28 million voters participated in the elections out of a total of 59 million registered voters.

Since Rafsanjani's split with a special party for reformists, the competition has become between two main currents in Iran, conservatives and reformists. Conservatives are usually supported by the main state institutions such as the Leadership Institution, the Regime Diagnostic Service, the Assembly of Experts, the Strike Force (the Revolutionary Guards), and most traditional religious institutions. Nevertheless, a large and popular current supports the reformists, and has supported their victory in the presidency more than once, such as Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rouhani.

The elections of 2021

As usual, the Guardian Council, which oversees the selection of candidates running for the presidential elections, has excluded all reformists from the presidential race, and approved the candidates of conservatives, hard-liners and some little-known independents (two non-prominent names).

The most important candidate for the fundamentalists is Ibrahim Raisi, who is the head of the judiciary in Iran, which is supported by the leadership establishment.

The votes of the reformists were scattered due to the candidacy of the former reformist Maher Ali Zadeh, who defected during the contest for the presidency, which Ahmadinejad won as a representative of the fundamentalist movement at the time. The reformists did not agree with Maher Zadeh in these elections.

However, the competitor who remained in contention against the conservative candidate was an independent candidate with little popular reach, Mr. Hemmati, the governor of the Central Bank. This candidate did not have the support of the leadership institution, and his slogan was that he represents voters and currents from outside the authority and does not represent a particular party or current.

The position of the Sunnis

The position of the Sunnis, as usual, as an electoral bloc, was scattered. The candidacy of , Sheikh Mawla Abdel Hamid, a single weak candidate, whom the Sunnis did not agree with and who is also criticized by the majority of Sunnis for his uniqueness in establishing the Strategic Council without agreement and consensus on the part of the Sunnis. Although he does not have the right to speak on behalf of the Sunnis, Sheikh Mawla Abdel Hamid revealed his support for the fundamentalist conservative candidate, Ibrahim Raisi, even though he used to support the reformists and standing against the conservatives over the past years. Consequently, Many Sunni elites, led by Mr. Jalal Jalali Zadeh, were forced to resign from this strategic council.

The Sunni "Dawah" and Reform Group

The Sunni reform group criticized Sheikh Mawla Abdel Hamid's position, saying that he does not represent the aspirations of the Sunnis, and demanded that the election mechanism should reflect fair representation of citizens. Accordingly, it called for voting for those who work for the dignity of citizens politically, economically and culturally, and that the global external arena should be dealt with independence and wisdom.

Who is Ibrahim Raisi?

Head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and currently elected President of the Republic of Iran.

Ibrahim Raisi al-Sadati, better known as Ibrahim Raisi (December 14, 1960 AD, in Mashhad). He is an Iranian cleric and politician. The Iranian president elected in June 19, 2021 AD, succeeding Hassan Rouhani, is the first deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, and the current head of the judiciary in Iran. The Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him to this position on March 7, 2019.

Since the Iranian revolution, Raisi has held important positions in his country’s judicial corps. In 1985, he took up the position of Deputy Public Prosecutor in Tehran, and in 1989 AD, he assumed the position of Public Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran and head of the General Follow-up and Inspection Institution. Then he was elected to the Assembly of Experts as a representative of the Razavi Khorasan Province. He also held the position of Deputy Head of the Judiciary, from 2004 to 2014. In 2016, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him to head the Astan Quds Razavi Organization, and he assumed the position of the country's attorney general.

Is there a difference between the reformist current and the hardline conservatives?

The most important projects and strategic plans in Iran were carried out under the auspices and during the era of reformists. The most lethal missile system and the nuclear project were founded by Rafsanjani, developed by Khatami, and Rouhani legitimized the nuclear industry with a treaty concluded with the United States and the Security Council.

Political and military expansion in the region

During the era of Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, and the first term of Hassan Rouhani, Iran continued its foreign policies towards the allied or affiliated powers in Bahrain, Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and there was no Iranian change towards these forces.

Economic solution and international cooperation

Reformists and moderates alike accuse the conservatives of demagoguery, since their vision to solve Iran's economic crisis lies only in integration into the international system, and they have tried to perpetuate this vision over the past eight years of Rouhani's presidency. From their point of view, it led to turning the national economy and production into a hostage and dependent on foreign policy in a way that led to linking it to solving diplomatic problems, which negatively affected the poor classes of society.

Hence, it becomes clear that there is no difference between the hard-liners and the reformers of Iran's leaders except in the method of implementation. They are all implementing one continuous strategy from the beginning of the Khomeinist revolution in 1979 until now. This strategy has its fixed axes, and this stability in the strategic axes and the continuation of its implementation is logically in line with Iran's achievements in all its strategic files. If every president reverses what was started by those before him, they would not have achieved what have done now, especially since the presidents who have settled in the presidency since the revolution until now are Ali Khamenei, Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and then Rouhani. They are five; three of them are reformers. In addition to the fact that the president serves as the chief executive only, while the Supreme Leader of the state is the one who makes the strategies of security, defense, media and foreign policy.

Perhaps the most prominent thing that summarizes the difference between the reformists and the hard-liners of Iran’s politicians is the description of Ayatollah Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, advisor to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the state’s guide, for each of the two groups (reformists or hardliners). He says; “Both lines believe in the Islamic revolution, and believe in the principles of the Imam. Khomeini, and believes in the principles of the constitution, and believes in the most important article in this constitution, which is the necessity of the leader to be a jurist, which is what is expressed in the guardianship of the jurist, and they both believe in these principles, and they differ in the methods and mechanisms of development.”

On Saturday 3/27/2021 AD, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. The American New York Times reported the next day (3/28/2021), that the draft agreement obtained last year detailing $ 400 billion in Chinese investments in dozens of fields, including banking, communications, ports, railways, health care, and information technology over the next 25 years. China will get regular and much discounted supplies of Iranian oil. The draft also called for deepening military cooperation, including exercises, joint research, weapons development and the exchange of intelligence information. This gives China prominent influence in the Gulf and the Middle East, and raises the level of conflict with the United States in the region.

This agreement has great geopolitical importance as it also includes the exchange of military expertise, defense capabilities, security cooperation and support in international forums. Moreover, it expands cooperation between universities and departments of technology, science and tourism.

According to the agreement, Iran will be the heart of trade between East and West, as the agreement stipulates that China will produce many goods in Iran.

If we take into account the Iranian-Russian agreement, in 2001, of cooperation in the nuclear field, for a period of 20 years, the region is on the verge of a frightening geopolitical and strategic conflict. This will put the Arab Gulf states in front of new threats and challenges during the era of US President "Biden", who began his frustrating policies towards the region.

The question that arises is; will the Gulf States, especially the largest country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, remain subject to the results of these geopolitical changes? Will it remain handcuffed in the face of acting in its strategic interests? The greatest reliance today in regaining the initiative rests on the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which must strive to rearrange its strategic security vision, which must adapt to these changes.

Iran today has strategic agreements with Russia and China, and it threatens the security of the region and its influence is increasingly penetrating the Middle East, the Gulf and Yemen, and at the same time it is using its influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen to reach an understanding with the United States.

Restoring the geopolitics of the Arab region from Iranian control is a task that Saudi Arabia alone or it and Egypt cannot face. The US administration is acting in an extortionate manner with both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Thus, the threats of the Iranian and Chinese danger and the new mood of the American president will remain the geopolitical equation that imposes security and economic policies, which work for the interests of the United States and its eternal ally, the Zionist entity. The countries of the region in the Gulf, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, will remain under the weight of the American policy and mood, which is looking for its interest, even if that is made through an understanding with the Iranians about the nuclear crisis at the expense of the interests of the Kingdom and the Gulf states.

Available opportunities

The opportunity is available today to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Turkey. Both have military and economic weight, which they can use in reformulating geopolitical and strategic relations for the benefit of both parties. This has become necessary after the Iranian-Chinese rapprochement, Russian support, and the whims of US policies in the region, especially concerning the Yemen file, and considering the Houthis a non-terrorist organization despite its aggressions and launching missiles and drones against Saudi civilian and military targets.

Positive steps

In December 2020 AD, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended the G20 Summit held in the Kingdom at the invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz. The Kingdom had previously provided aid to the victims of the Izmir earthquake, and the two countries' foreign ministers met Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu; this opens the door to a new spirit that opens the way for discussion of developing relations between the two countries.

The Chinese, Iranian, and American challenges to Turkey in the files of its influence, such as the Kurds, Syria and the Mediterranean, also constitute a common concern and motivation, with the countries of the region, to resist the encroachment of these international powers over the geography and the interests of their countries.

The United States supports the Kurdish rebels to remain a source of tension on the Turkish border. In a statement issued by the Security Cooperation Agency of the US Department of Defense (Pentagon), the largest arms deal America provided to the Kurdish forces in Iraq was revealed, when it agreed to sell weapons and equipment worth $ 295.6 million to the Kurdish Peshmerga units of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

Not only has the American military support been provided to the Kurds of Iraq but also there is strong support from Washington for the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in Syria. Numerous reports indicate that these forces obtained military and logistical support from the Pentagon.

In previous statements, the spokesperson of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Talal Selo, revealed US military assistance to the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which is the main force in the ranks of his forces. He explained that the US Department of Defense has provided the Kurdish fighters with many armored vehicles, troop carriers and some heavy weapons through which they can continue fighting inside Syria.

On the other hand, Iran interfered in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in favor of Armenia, and it was revealed that there was Russian-Iranian cooperation to transfer weapons to Armenia. On Tuesday, September 29, 2020 AD, the German newspaper "Economic News" published a report, citing the "Azerbaijani News Agency" (AzToday), in which it said: Russian weapons are being transported to Armenia through Iranian territory and published a video explaining the location and time of transportation of these military shipments.

In light of the challenge of the "Corona" virus, which threatens public health in the region and the world, and the decline of the economy due to the fluctuating closure of labor markets, trade lines, production and trade institutions; the economies of the two countries will be affected in the future.

As for the economy, the Turkish economy is experiencing a complex crisis, and the Turkish lira is experiencing a difficult period after its price declined by more than 140% between 2015 and 2021 AD, and one of the main reasons for this decline is the flight of investments, the decline in tourism, and the consequences of the Corona pandemic. The Turkish lira fell by as much as 17% after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's sudden decision to replace the country's central bank chief.

The Saudi economy is also witnessing great challenges due to the repeated Houthi attacks on its oil facilities. Official data stated that the Saudi economy contracted by 3.9% in the fourth quarter of 2020 compared to the same period a year ago, as it was affected by a significant decline in the oil sector in light of the Kingdom's reduction in production. The non-oil sector has also slowed due to the damage from the coronavirus pandemic.

Data issued by the General Authority for Statistics in Saudi Arabia showed that the oil sector shrank by 8.5%, while the non-oil sector fell by 0.8%.

One of the most important opportunities available today for both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey is to fencing off cooperation as the two countries are subjected to American pressure in their geopolitical decisions in Syria or Yemen, or concerning the   Iranian influence in negotiating for the future of Syria or Yemen. The two countries (Saudi Arabia and Turkey) could have a common vision that preserves the interests of the people of Yemen and Syria, and at the same time diminishes the strategic influence in the upcoming political solutions.

The Turkish UAVs have proven decisive in the battles in Azerbaijan, northern Syria and Libya, which qualifies them to become a strategic tool for cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, especially after the Kingdom signed a contract with the Turkish company "Vestel" for defense industries to manufacture vehicles. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has confirmed that his country is among the top 3-4 countries around the world in manufacturing drones. He also confirmed that Turkey exported more than 130 local "offshore platforms", whose value exceeded 3 billion dollars. Erdogan announced that the volume of Turkey's defense exports annually increased from 248 million dollars to 3 billion dollars. Turkey is one of 10 countries that can design, manufacture and maintain its warships.

The Yemen war can be resolved with such a practical weapon, and with regard to the Palestinian file; the vision of the two countries is in agreement with the Arab solution, which is represented in the Saudi initiative launched by King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, may Allah have mercy on him. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not compatible with normalization in the manner that two Gulf States followed.

The Saudi Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Adel Al-Jubeir, confirmed that his country still insists that it cannot normalize relations with "Israel" until it reaches a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

Turkey recently changed its foreign policy in particular towards "Israel" because of its policies in Palestine and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The availability of investment opportunities in Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which are two of the largest commercial investment markets in the region, and the size of the two economies qualify them for economic integration that achieves profits for both parties. This integration could raise the economies of the two countries in spite of the "Corona" crisis and the future challenges of lower oil prices. It could be useful in filling Turkey's need for oil and gas from the Gulf region. The National Bank of Kuwait (NBK) revealed its expectations for a growth in the gross domestic product of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by 3.2% in 2022, and an increase to 3.5% in the following year (2023), after the expected growth of 1.1% in 2021, which was affected by the reduction in oil production quotas.

With the start of recent contacts between Turkey and Egypt, this provides a good opportunity to embody relations between Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They can rethink in the geopolitical and strategic interests of the three countries, in light of the presence of an Iranian and Zionist project aimed at controlling waterways and trade pressures, dividing the region and igniting internal conflicts in it.

Opening a new page of Gulf reconciliation between Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Bahrain opens the way to support Saudi-Turkish cooperation that embodies a strategic case for the security balance in the region.

On the other hand, the distinguished nature of both Turkish/ Pakistan and Saudi/Pakistani relations also provides a geographical, military and security support to protect the region from the influence of international and regional projects, especially the Iranian and Zionist threats.

Problems facing Saudi Turkish cooperation:

The Saudi-Turkish understanding may face several problems in the future, including:

- The Zionist move in the region to spoil any strategic cooperation between the two countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The right-wing Hebrew newspaper "Jerusalem Post" attacked Turkey, on the background of its objection to the agreement signed by "Israel" with Greece and Cyprus regarding the construction of a water cable to connect the electricity networks in the three countries, because this cable passes through the Turkish continental shelf.

The newspaper said that Turkey's position indicated its willingness to confront "Israel" and "showed its true face", and that it aimed to harm the interests of "Israel". For this, Turkey attacked Kosovo after its decision to launch relations with "Israel", and its criticism of the normalization agreements with Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan.

-The Iranian move in the region, in the media and politically, to thwart any rapprochement between the two countries.

- The nature of the Zionist cooperation with some Gulf States might contradict the interests of the two countries converging. In late January 2019, the Deputy Minister of Information in the government of Sanaa, Fahmi Al-Youssefi, stated that there was a surprise about the "Israeli" presence in the Yemeni arena. Before that, more than one Zionist and Western media outlet reported that the "Israeli" army would use a military base to be established on the island of Socotra.   Less than a week passed on Al-Youssefi's statements, when the head of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidaroos Al-Zubaidi, allied with the UAE, announced the possibility that the Council could fully normalize relations with "Israel" if the "State of South Yemen" was restored, blessing at the same time the Emirati normalization with the occupation entity. In February 2019, the Yemeni Foreign Minister in Hadi's government, Khaled Al-Yamani, sat next to Benjamin Netanyahu during the opening of the "Middle East Conference" in the Polish capital, Warsaw.

Moreover, there is the American pressure that pushes to prevent cooperation and strategic integration between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Both countries have strategic relations with the United States, but the United States wants to employ these two countries for the benefit of its strategy in confronting China and the Iranian nuclear file without having a common vision that might conflict with the interests of the United States.

Integration and cooperation are strategic steps:

Integration is based on political, economic and security cooperation, and the current opportunities and motives for it, and the challenges facing the two countries are greater than the sub-differences. What brings the two countries together is more than what separates them.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the two largest Sunni states in the region and possess economic and military power that qualifies them to create a regional strategic umbrella. The classification of the Saudi army jumped to the fourth regionally, the 17th globally, and the first in the Gulf. The volume of Saudi military spending reached 67 billion and 600 million dollars. Saudi Arabia has 879 aircraft in its air force; of these 270 fighter aircraft, 82 assault aircraft, 283 helicopters, 34 attack helicopters, 208 training aircraft, 49 transport aircraft, and 13 special-mission aircraft.

Concerning the ground forces, Arabia has 1062 tanks and 12,825 armored vehicles, which made the country superior in the armored corps over world military powers such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France. It also has 705 self-propelled guns, 1,818 towing cannons, 122 devices for displaying missiles, and 1,423 armored personnel carriers. Its navy includes 55 warships, 3 frigates, 5 corvettes, 10 sentry boats, and 4 mine warfare ships, but it does not have any submarines or aircraft carriers. In terms of the number of fighters, the Saudi army currently includes 478,000 active soldiers (out of 803,000 who are the total force), compared to 252,000 in 2017. Saudi Arabia has about 325,000 reservists.

Likewise, the Turkish army is one of the most powerful armies in the world, in light of its possession of military capabilities. On land, sea and air, the Turkish army has great experience in fighting.

The Turkish defense budget for 2019, according to the "Global Fire Power" website, which is specialized in military statistics for the world's armies, amounted to 8 billion and 600 million dollars. There is no doubt that the rapprochement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey will help build a large umbrella for other countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan and the Gulf states, to bring about stability and balance with the Iranian, Chinese, Russian, Zionist and American influence in the region.

Pakistan is a military nuclear power that ranks sixth in the world in terms of the number of active forces in the army. The number of these forces is 654 thousand soldiers, while the number of reserve forces is estimated at 550 thousand, meaning that the total number of Pakistani forces is 1.2 million.

The Pakistani army is also ranked fifteenth on the combat capability index of the famous "Global Fire Power" website, which does not take into account the nuclear capabilities of countries.

Strategic cooperation between the two countries needs a bold initiative launched by the two countries, in which all the years of the past decade have gone beyond the strife and disagreement in the Arab region.

The Moroccan recognition of the Zionist entity and the establishment of relations with it in exchange for the United States' recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Moroccan Sahara caused a difficult shock to the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party and placed it at a crossroads with the state.

Last August, Saad Eddin El Othmani, the Moroccan Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the Justice and Development Party, confirmed his opposition to any normalization with the Zionist entity.

In fact, the Justice and Development Party has not issued a decisive statement on the matter until now, pending a meeting of the party’s general secretariat. The critical situation of the party and its government with the state is heading towards complexity and decay. The party and its government will either submit to the will of the state or oppose it; and this would put the government's stability into question.

For the record, the amendments and consensus that took place during the Moroccan movement, in the past decade, that the government and the king share power and manage the state, the king is the head of the system and the government, and there is the Prime Minister (Saad al-Din al-Othmani). The king is the one who determines all the features of the foreign policy, even if the ministers are chosen from the government coalition parties, Al- Othmani and his government have no role in preventing normalization, so he must issue a clear position.

When the prime minister, Al-Othmani announced his rejection of normalization in a previous declaration, the king respected it. Anyway, it seems that the current trend is going towards establishing relations with the Zionist entity while allowing opposition with historical positions on the Palestinian issue to announce its position! This is what happened by national and Islamic institutions in which the Justice Party and its members contribute. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the ruling Party may put the government in an embarrassing situation with the state, even if the political necessities make it a deeper Islamic party pragmatism.

On the other hand, Trump's announcement that the Moroccan Sahara belongs to Morocco is a media gain, and nothing more. As it will not entail any legal confirmation of this sovereignty. With the presence of a new upcoming administration, all options and promises of Trump may be cancelled due to the presence of a stream of Democrats and Republicans opposing to this step, but they do not object to normalization between the Zionist entity and Morocco.

In the end, the Zionist entity will make a new breakthrough at the expense of the Palestinian cause, with the country presiding over the Jerusalem summit!

Despite the statement that Morocco will stand with Palestinian rights, it has nothing to offer to oblige the Zionist entity to these rights after the normalization of the relationship with it.

The new change made by Kuwaiti voters on December 5, 2020 AD calls us to understand what the Kuwaiti people want to reform at the various political, economic and legal levels.

Only a popularly supported national parliamentary bloc can achieve this. This national bloc will only succeed under the following conditions:

1. Having a clear vision for the political action in the National Assemblythrough an effective use to the monitoring and legislation tools.
2. Setting deserving goals for political, economic and legal reform.
3. Defining agreed priorities for action among the members of this bloc related to guarantees to restore political stability and solve the economic problem.
4. Choosing a consensus leadership that would lead this bloc.
5. Establishing a joint center to serve citizens and track their rights.

The first test for Parliament will be to decide on choosing a speaker, even if the national bloc candidate does not succeed. This will prove the effectiveness of national consensus, after the Kuwaiti people fulfilled their task by removing the majority of former representatives. Those who supported the imbalances of reform and the foundations of political, financial and legal corruption.

The next step for the representatives of the national bloc is to choose a speaker that suits the choices of the Kuwaiti people. Then, turning the page of the political exclusivity, and the page of using the assembly’s presidency to resolve political conflicts. Thus, the presidency seat remains representing the Kuwaiti people.

A comprehensive amnesty law to restore political cohesion and political stability should follow this. They should also amend the electoral law to produce members truly representing the Kuwaiti people.

The new results of the Kuwaiti National Assembly present a message to the government about the importance of building a rational government that cooperates with the council to fix political imbalances, fight corruption, establish justice and appoint the competent people to run the government. The government should also agree with the parliament to choose a speaker who represents the people according to the new options, and cooperate with all to achieve national priorities.

Congratulations to all the winning representatives. We hope that the idea of the national parliamentary bloc and the rational government will succeed in working together for Kuwait, for its interest and its future.

French President "Emmanuel Macron" thinks that some caricatures of the fractures of the French or European press will affect our Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. "May my mother and father be sacrificed for you!" Allah and His angels may send blessings on him as long as time and space continue.

No individual, whether a president or a subordinate, in a European country or in France, would exceed what (Hamalat Al-Hattab) meaning ‘the wood bearer’ Umm Jamil Arwa bint Harb, the wife of Abu Lahab bin Abdul Muttalib did. Allah has given a command to his prophet: (And warn your tribe of near kindred.) (Al-Shu’ara: 214), then the Prophet, peace be upon him, rose, gathered his people and informed them that he is a messenger from Allah Almighty, and warned them as his Lord commanded him.

Abu Lahab said: “Woe to you, is that why you brought us together?!” Umm Jamil, the “wood bearer”, used to place thorns in the way of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him.

Their story, Umm Jamil and Abu Lahab, has ended with the Almighty saying: "The power of Abu Lahab will perish, and he will perish. (1) His wealth and gains will not exempt him. (2) He will be plunged in flaming Fire, (3) And his wife, the wood-carrier, (4) Will have upon her neck a halter of palm-fibre. (5)"

Every letter, line, or drawing in a caricature drawn by a hateful or an ignorant one is destined to perish. As for those who supported him with his political and international authority as President of France, his action is nothing more than the act of Abu Lahab. It will surely end. His fate is the fate of everyone who transgressed the Prophet, may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, in his life or after his death, since John of Damascus (676-749 AD). John of Damascus was the first to falsely mention in his book "DEVAERESBIUS" that the monk Bahira was the one who assisted the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in writing the Holy Qur’an.

The Spanish Church played a role in spreading myths about our Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Among the most prominent of those who wrote insulting to the Prophet, may God bless him, was the German "Martin Luther" (1483-1564 AD). Martin Luther - may Allah curse him - fondly stated “Muhammad is Satan, and he is the first child of Satan,” "May my mother and father be sacrificed for you!" .

In the modern era comes the book "Satanic Verses" by the apostate Indian Salman Rushdie, which was published in 1988 AD.

The list of those who attempted to belittle the status of the Messenger, may God bless him, and falsely accuse him is long.

France, by the nature of its historical heritage, continues its hatred now veiled by the secularism and slogans of freedom since Pope Urban II called for its first crusade in 1095 AD in Clermont, southern France, in an attempt to wrest Jerusalem from the hands of Muslims.

The French monk "Saint Bernard" played the most effective role in the second Crusade against the Levant, and the Pope of Rome "John III" held a church council for it in the city of Vézelay in the French province of Avalon, and the French king, Louis VII, was enthusiastic about the campaign.

The French King "Philip Augustus" was one of the pillars of the Third Crusade against the Levant.

France continued its anti-Muslim approach, raising the flag of the Cross and launching the Crusades, among them was the campaign of "Louis IX" against Egypt in 1249 AD, which ended with his defeat, 21 years later, France launch the eighth crusade in 1270 AD, which was also defeated.

Napoleon Bonaparte returned with the same hostile approach against the Muslims in 1798 AD to occupy Egypt and then leave it unsuccessfully. Then, the French occupied Algeria in 1830 AD and Tunisia in 1881 AD.

France capped its course with the fragmentation of the Islamic entity with the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, so that the Arab and Islamic world remains disintegrated to this day.

France has a long history of conflict with Muslims and Islam, a historical legacy based on a religious ideology. With all this, Could "Macron" cover the light of prophethood and the light religion of Islam?

Islam will reach all parts of the world, and Muslims will continue to remember Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him, five times with every call to prayer. Allah wanted that, the remembrance of Muhammad, May Allah bless him, will remain the highest “and raised high your reputation” (Al-Inshirah: 4). History will forget France and Macron, but Muhammad, May Allah bless him, will remain.

The axes on which the theory of (realism - idealism) is based: -

First: Estimating the National Security Authority of the State of Kuwait:

The national security interest of the State of Kuwait is appreciated by analyzing this interest in establishing a cordon of Kuwait’s sphere. Establishing national sovereignty and multiple defense and security agreements of understanding. Preserving the unity and solidity of social power in the state, and not opening the way for internal parties to interfere in the paths of international relations. Putting the assessment of the national security interest in the hands of one center, which is the authority of the Emir through the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry and its political tools.

Second: To be shielded by the internationally recognized forces in a balanced way without resorting to bilateral security agreements with any regional state:

Kuwait has signed more than one agreement of understanding, cooperation and joint defense with the five major permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China), since the war of liberation of Kuwait in 1991 until today. Moreover, Kuwait is renewing and re-establishing some of these agreements according to the nature of the shifts and changes. These agreements have contributed to protecting and eliminating the lust of regional conflict to pressure the State of Kuwait up till now.

Third: Adopting balanced neutrality in the regional and the international conflicts and avoiding regional axes:

During the reign of Sheikh Sabah, may Allah have mercy on him; the State of Kuwait committed itself to its international, regional, and institutional obligations without inclining to enter the fray of conflict in the Gulf, Yemen, Iraq or Syria. Although these are areas that require Kuwait to have a national role in them, according to the policy of "realism - idealism", it has not entered any axis of the conflict except in accordance with agreed upon legal agreements; Such as the joint defense agreement for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and within the limits required by that agreement.

The realistic interest was to save Kuwait from any interference by regional parties to the conflict. At the same time, this ideal policy aimed at improving the state of peace in the region, reducing losses, and preserving the unity and cohesion of the region in the face of Zionist, Iranian and international arrogance.

Therefore, Kuwait did not participate in the "MOC" room that was established by regional countries under the auspices of the major countries (except for Russia and China) in the Syrian conflict, and at the same time it stood with the Syrian people in their ordeal and endured humanitarian relief in this conflict.

In the midst of the conflict in Egypt between the military coup and the popular forces entrenched in the constitution in 2013, Kuwait stood with the stability of Egypt as it stood with the revolutionary constitutional Egypt in 2011. In Yemen, it stood with the Yemeni legitimacy and its agreements with the coalition countries without exaggeration, and fostered reconciliation between the Yemeni parties. That is why the "realistic - ideal" policy made Kuwait a unique model in dealing with international and regional conflict.

Fourth: Non-interference in the internal affairs of states and non-support of any of the conflicting parties:

The method of the Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad School, may Allah have mercy on him, decided not to interfere in the internal affairs of the conflicting parties, as it is an internal matter, in which regional and international systems should not interfere. Thus, Kuwait has not interfered in the Iraqi conflict among different militias and their supporters. Kuwait rejected Turkish intervention in the “Olive Branch” operation, and it refused to interfere in Sudanese affairs during and after the Revolution of Change. Kuwait has not contributed any role in developing the internal conflict between any opposition and government in its regional or Arab sphere.

Fifth: Recognition of constitutional and international legitimacy:

When the Arab world was divided during the Arab Spring, and the Arab geography has become a scene of regional and international conflict, Kuwait has always stood with the constitutional and international legitimacy that was approved by the peoples and recognized by international legitimacy. Kuwait did not slip, like some Gulf and Arab countries, and intervene to change that legitimacy or breach the principle of sovereignty, as some countries did in Libya, Yemen, Syria, Sudan and Iraq. This policy reduced the political and financial costs paid by the State of Kuwait, and did not exhaust its economy in wars it had not established or planned. Kuwait has remained a country that enjoys the respect of all local parties, and everyone accepts its mediation and initiatives because it has no interest in tipping the balance in favor of the other.

Sixth: Rejecting violent conflict and calling for understanding and peace:

Kuwait, according to its "realistic - idealistic" policy, contributed to reducing conflict and calling for understanding and national peace in the Arab region, either by supporting international resolutions on relevant issues in the United Nations, especially at the time of its presidency of the Security Council, or through the mediation in which it participated and the initiatives that it called for. Likewise, by inviting the parties without announcing this, or with the announced initiatives, as happened in April 2016 between the Yemeni parties under the auspices of the United Nations and Kuwait's hosting of them as a neutral mediator.

Seventh: Encouraging adherence to the law and international decisions, not violating rights, and establishing justice:

Kuwait affirmed, in accordance with the policies of the late Emir, may Allah have mercy on him, the implementation of international decisions on Palestinian rights in all international stations. Kuwait presidency of the Security Council in 2019 had a prominent role in standing with the just issues of the Arab region and the Palestinian case and the just cases of the Islamic world (such as the issues of the Kashmiri and the Rohingya people).

Its rejection of the principle of normalization with the Zionist entity is considered a commitment to an idealistic and realistic policy at the same time, and the rigidity of the late Emir’s position, may Allah have mercy on him, is evident in more than one position in this regard.

Eighth: Recognizing the geostrategic dimension of the State of Kuwait and aligning with it at points of contact and conflict:

Kuwait, which has an open nature, has maintained normal and cautious relations with the three countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq), but upon the strategic disagreement over the strategic priorities and interests of the region, it automatically aligns itself with its integrated Gulf dimension, both with regard to illegal and legal interventions as in Yemen. With regard to the Iranian attacks on the Gulf States, or the movements of some internal parties linked to sectarian lines to Iran or Iraq, they are bound by their constitution in any security agreement, especially the Gulf Security Agreement, and its binding constitution for foreign policy, which is bound by its controls and rights.

The relationship with Egypt is characterized by an Arab national strategic dimension that has nothing to do with the nature of the ruling regime, but rather the nature of the strategic weight that Egypt represents for the balance of the Arab conflict with the Zionist entity and the Iranian influence in the region. In light of this policy, Kuwait stood with the results of the 2012 elections in the Egyptian state, and it stood with the results of the military coup regime as well, as popular movements and legal practices covered it. At the same time, Kuwait did not respond to calls for stigmatizing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This is not part of its policy towards any local party in the conflict in Egypt, and the statement issued by the new Brotherhood’s deputy guide, Ibrahim Munir, had a prominent praise for the late Emir’s role in the Arab region, because Kuwait did not join the axis of countries that stood against the results of the constitutional revolutions.

Similarly, in its dealings with the new (sectarian) Iraq, Kuwait did not favor the Sunni doctrine, but rather dealt with the Iraqi state with its existing constitutional entity, and also contributed to strengthening the involvement of Arab Sunnis in the rule of Iraq and supporting the Sunni region after the events of "ISIS" as primarily humanitarian support.

Ninth: Constancy and solidity in determining Kuwaiti sovereignty:

With its "realistic - idealistic" policy, Kuwait settled the issue of sovereignty regarding the demarcation of the southern land and sea borders in the neutral zone with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in December 2019, and ended a century of border dispute with Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad's calm, solid and long-winded policy had a decisive effect in launching the border agreement and resolving the dispute over the Dorra field with Iran, and the demarcation of the Iraqi borders was carried out under the supervision of Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, may God have mercy on him. Thus, the sovereignty of Kuwait over its lands was settled. All of this happened thanks to the realistic-idealistic policy of Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad practiced during his long experiences in international relations.