The "Israeli" aggression on the Gaza Strip continued after "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation in October 2023, lasting for over a year and expanding geographically to target Lebanon and even the Syrian Golan Heights. During this long period of time of the genocide war specifically on Gaza, there was a relative stability in the positions of the various parties involved, while there was a relative change and evolution over time in Turkey's stance, a stance that had been repeated in Turkish policy towards several other issues, including the Arab revolutions.
In the early weeks of the war, Ankara's position was noticeably confused and different from its positions in previous wars and confrontations. The official Turkish statements focused on condemning the targeting of civilians, the necessity of releasing hostages, calling on both sides to exercise restraint and avoid escalation, in addition to expressing readiness to mediate.
One reason for this different position was that the war came in the context of normalizing relations between Turkey and the occupation state, just weeks after a meeting between Erdogan and Netanyahu at the United Nations and discussions about the necessity of cooperation in energy and economy. Also, due to a Turkish perception that the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation was targeting this improvement in relations, and that other forces beyond Palestinian resistance may be behind it, such as Iran.
Later, as the occupation forces began to advance on the ground, amidst daily massacres and internal political and popular pressures, Turkey's stance evolved towards adopting the Palestinian narrative and rejecting the occupation's claims completely, holding Netanyahu fully responsible and accusing him of terrorism, talking about turning the page in dealing with him, and later shifting the responsibility to the occupation state itself by labeling it as a "terrorist state" and calling for holding it accountable.
As months passed, Ankara moved towards punitive measures against "Israel", starting by restricting the export of some products to Israel (54 products), then decided to halt all trade relations with it, culminating in South Africa joining the genocide lawsuit against "Israel" before the International Court of Justice approximately 3 months after announcing this direction.
The mentioned statements and decisions stemmed from a stance of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza facing the "Israeli" war machine and genocidal plans. However, recent developments, specifically since the threats made by "Israel" against Hezbollah in Lebanon, pushed Ankara to read a different course of the war.
Turkish Warning
With the launch of these threats, Turkish President Erdogan warned that Netanyahu, after his crimes in Gaza, had set his sights on aggression towards Lebanon, pointing out the negative consequences of such actions on security and stability in the region as a whole. It was noteworthy that officials in the occupation state responded to Turkish statements condemning the genocide war by attacking Erdogan and Turkey, even threatening them. The most prominent statement came from the foreign minister of the occupation state who warned Erdogan of ending up like Saddam Hussein who launched missiles at "Tel Aviv", a statement interpreted as a threat to Erdogan's personal fate like that of the former Iraqi president (execution) and to Turkey as a country with a fate like Iraq's afterwards (occupation and chaos).
The "Israeli" aggression expanded to Lebanon, assassinations intensified, and the possibility of a ground invasion increased. This is where the occupation forces were heading later with threats to several parties in the region from Yemen to Iraq and from Syria to Iran due to their stance on the war. Here, the Turkish tone started to change towards sensing the threat to Turkey and its national security and interests, not just warning against regional escalation.
Plans to Advance into Syrian
Repeatedly, Turkish officials, led by Erdogan, warned that the occupation would attack Syria after Lebanon and that this could include the occupation of Damascus. Some Turkish media outlets spoke of plans for the occupation to advance into Syrian territory up to the borders with Iraq to cut off supply routes for Hezbollah. In one of his statements, Erdogan was clear in expressing the danger that could reach Turkey's borders, indicating that if the "Israeli" forces continued advancing, they could reach the Turkish border in two and a half hours.
Turkish National Security Council
In harmony with these statements conveying a sense of self-threat, many statements emphasized the meaning of readiness and the ability to repel danger, including statements from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the statement of the Turkish National Security Council, which affirmed solidarity with Lebanon, its government and people, standing by its side. However, the most prominent statement in this context was reminding Erdogan of what his country did in Libya and the South Caucasus; military intervention alongside both the Libyan National Accord Government and Azerbaijan, hinting at the possibility of doing the same towards "Israel", emphasizing the need for us to be strong to stop the aggression.
Certainly, Ankara does not view Israeli aggression in the region separately from other developments on the international and regional stages, including the hot and accelerating developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Chinese threats to Taiwan, economic conditions in the world, and the pre-presidential election phase in the United States, which explains the statements of the Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu about the possibility of a third world war, a war that Turkey is prepared for.
This was a noticeable change in Ankara's reading of the developments in the region and Israeli expansionist and aggressive plans, which returned to talk about the "Greater Israel" project. This reading led to more intense and escalated statements, although the orientations and practical actions did not change at the same pace or degree.
On a practical level, the export of some goods continued to the occupation state through intermediaries and a third country, according to multiple reports. Ankara did not stop the flow of Azerbaijani gas to it through Turkish ports, which contributed to strengthening the economy of the Israeli war, and does not align with describing the aggression as a war of annihilation and warning of the dangers facing Turkey and the region.
President Erdogan was mentioned in several instances as not considering completely cutting political and diplomatic relations with "Israel", limiting himself to recalling Turkey's ambassador in "Tel Aviv" for consultation and not sending him back, after the latter withdrew its ambassador in Turkey and several countries following the massacre at the Mavi Marmara Hospital, fearing public backlash at the time.
This is in terms of direct relations with the occupation, facing potential dangers, there is something that can be expected from Ankara, stemming from its concern about the expansion of aggression and escalation in the region on the Syrian issue in general and specifically on the Kurdish file. Turkey fears the crystallization of a political entity for American-backed Kurdish militias in northeast Syria if the war expands and Israeli forces enter Syria, especially if Trump wins the presidency in the United States.
Therefore, it is not unlikely in a scenario of this kind that Ankara resorts to securing its forces in Syrian territory, protecting its borders, and preventing any developments by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expanding their influence in northern Syria, or launching an additional military operation against the SDF.
Beyond that, it is not expected that there will be a significant and radical change in the Turkish position on the war in Gaza in the foreseeable future unless responding to the requirements of a regional war that may more directly touch on Turkey's interests and national security determinants.
