Digital Disinformation Against the Rohingya

Hate no longer needs an overt political campaign to spread. Sometimes, it begins with an image, a short video, or a statement falsely attributed to someone who never made it. Social media platforms then amplify it until the claim begins to resemble truth in the minds of those who encounter it.

This is what makes digital disinformation against the Rohingya in Malaysia more than a problem of false information. When fabricated claims are circulated about a minority that does not enjoy the same legal protections as citizens, false information can become a stereotype, then hate speech, and eventually social and political pressure whose effects are difficult to separate from reality.

On October 4, 2026, the Malaysian Islamic Consultative Council (MAPIM), which brings together dozens of Islamic organizations and associations, called for action against false and hate-inciting content targeting the Rohingya. It also proposed the creation of a multi-agency national task force to monitor hate speech and digital disinformation, bringing together the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, police, the Ministry of Home Affairs, digital forensics experts, and civil society organizations.

When a Rumor Becomes a Story About an Entire Minority

The danger of false information lies not only in the fact that it is untrue, but also in the image it leaves behind even after it has been debunked.

In 2026, Agence France-Presse documented a series of false claims targeting the Rohingya in Malaysia, including fabricated statements, manipulated videos, fabricated statistics, and AI-generated content. It also identified posts claiming that Rohingya people were seeking land, special rights, or Malaysian citizenship through illegal means.

In one case, a claim circulated that two million children had been born in Malaysia as a result of marriages between Malays and Rohingya, accompanied by fabricated population figures. An AFP investigation found the figures impossible and traced the claim to a fake news report.

Such claims do more than spread false information. They construct an imagined identity for an entire community: a group supposedly expanding in secret, taking over resources, or seeking to alter the composition of society.

When such claims are repeated, one of the most dangerous functions of digital disinformation against the Rohingya emerges: turning an exception into a rule, an individual incident into a collective characteristic, and an unverified claim into a “fact” repeated by thousands.

From Fake News to Real-World Hate

Digital hate does not always remain on the screen.

In June 2026, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) expressed concern over growing hostility, discriminatory rhetoric, and cyberattacks targeting the Rohingya community. It warned that the spread of abusive comments and hate-based narratives represented a dangerous trend toward dehumanizing an already vulnerable community.

For the Rohingya, this is not merely a theoretical danger. In a different context, inside Myanmar, the United Nations documented how social media platforms were used to spread hate speech against them. In a 2024 report, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar analyzed more than 10,000 posts across 43 Facebook pages and found that the pages formed part of a coordinated network linked to the Myanmar military and had disseminated hate speech against the Rohingya during the period of mass violence against them.

Why Do Lies Spread Faster Than Corrections?

Information designed to provoke anger or fear is often more likely to be shared than information that requires readers to understand its context. The problem becomes even more complicated when emotionally charged content is combined with fake accounts, coordinated networks, or AI tools capable of producing large volumes of images, videos, and text.

In Malaysia, MAPIM pointed to content involving fake accounts, AI-generated misinformation, fabricated statistics, and manipulated videos. It also called for an investigation into the possibility of organized networks attempting to influence public opinion.

The problem is no longer limited to one person inventing a misleading post. Artificial intelligence has lowered the cost of producing deceptive content, making it possible to create convincing images, voices, and videos more quickly.

As a result, digital disinformation against the Rohingya does not necessarily depend on a single lie. It can emerge from an entire information environment in which the same message is repeated across multiple sources until its circulation itself begins to appear as evidence of its truth. The danger increases when repeated messages become familiar to audiences simply because they have encountered them so many times.

Platform Responsibility Is Not Optional

If users have a responsibility not to share information they have not verified, platforms that provide the infrastructure through which that information spreads also have a responsibility to reduce foreseeable harm.

The United Nations has placed combating hate speech within a shared responsibility involving governments, communities, and the private sector, including technology companies and social media platforms. Its strategy on hate speech also emphasizes cooperation among these actors, alongside developing a generation of users capable of recognizing and rejecting inciting content.

In Malaysia, new regulatory rules have also come into force under the Online Safety Act 2025. The Communications Ministry has stated that licensed service providers are required to take timely action against harmful content, including blocking high-risk content within 24 hours where the relevant provisions apply.

This does not mean that removing content is the only solution, or that every controversial piece of content should be taken down. But it does reinforce the principle that platform responsibility should not begin only after harmful content has already spread. It should include identifying coordinated networks, scrutinizing suspicious accounts, and limiting the reach of content that combines disinformation with incitement.

Protecting Minorities Begins with Accurate Information

The Rohingya issue in Malaysia also deserves particular attention because of the size of the community living in the country.

According to UNHCR data, Malaysia was hosting approximately 215,600 registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of the end of February 2026, including 126,144 Rohingya. Around 64,680 of the registered refugees and asylum-seekers were children under the age of 18.

These figures do not exempt anyone from accountability if an individual is proven to have committed a crime or violated the law. But they help place the debate in its proper context: accountability should be based on proven conduct, not collective identity.

This is why the statement by MAPIM’s president is significant. He called for hate against the Rohingya not to become normalized in the digital sphere, while emphasizing that discussions about migration, border security, or law enforcement can be legitimate—but such demands must be grounded in facts and justice.

The Role of Islamic Institutions: From Reaction to Prevention

The position taken by MAPIM carries implications beyond the Malaysian context. Islamic institutions should not wait for a rumor to develop into a social crisis before responding to it. Addressing digital disinformation against the Rohingya requires moving beyond correcting false claims after they spread toward building mechanisms that prevent them from becoming part of the wider public narrative.

Institutions can establish fact-checking units focused on information concerning Muslims and minorities, work with journalists and digital forensics experts, and provide the public with accessible platforms for debunking widely circulated claims.

More importantly, the Islamic discourse itself must be clear in distinguishing between defending the rights of Muslims and justifying injustice against others. Justice cannot become a value only when Muslims are the ones being harmed.

Islamic institutions can therefore play a dual role: defending communities targeted by disinformation while teaching audiences how to distinguish news from propaganda, legitimate criticism from incitement, and individual responsibility from collective blame.

In this way, confronting digital disinformation against the Rohingya becomes more than a response to a passing crisis. It becomes part of a broader responsibility to protect truth, uphold justice, and preserve social coexistence.