Between December 3, 2025, and January 3, 2026, Yemen witnessed two of the most dramatic turning points in the long crisis that has plagued the country since the fall of its capital into the hands of the Houthi movement in September 2014.

Escalation of the Southern Transitional Council: Roots of the Crisis

At the beginning of December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) decided to escalate in a reckless and unprecedented manner. This regional political entity, born in 2017, carries a project to divide Yemen into two states, claiming to restore the southern borders as they were before the unification of Yemen in mid-1990.

The STC is a mixture of groups and figures opposed to the regime of the late ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Its leadership includes remnants of the socialist left that ruled Aden before the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as pockets linked by training and funding to the “Southern Suburb” camp and its wider project of “Imamate Guardianship,” which had Yemen in its sights from an early stage.

Political Division and Projects of Fragmentation

When popular protests erupted in 2011 demanding Saleh’s departure, leading to a Gulf initiative sponsored by Saudi Arabia that offered him safe exit, factions tied to the guardianship project diverged in their paths but agreed on one principle: distancing themselves from broad popular choices. They exploited the confusion and weakness of the transitional state to pursue destructive options.

• In the North: The Houthi movement, from its stronghold in Saada, transformed into a parallel state, waging expansionist wars until it seized Sana’a by force in late 2014.
• In the South: From the outset of the uprising, the Suburb faction insisted on separate tracks in rural areas and cities, mobilizing for secession and treating anti-Saleh forces as indistinguishable from those who had risen against him.

To many Yemenis, these behaviors seemed like free services to remnants of the old regime. Later, it became clear that all the chaotic shouting ended in alliances with the very regime they had accused the people of colluding with.

“Operation Decisive Storm”: The Night That Changed the Equation

The Houthis advanced madly, swallowing territory, exploiting the vacuum left by most actors. They toppled the capital, moved toward other provinces, reached Aden, and besieged the elected president, confining him in his home in Sana’a. The Arab neighborhood and international community exhausted diplomatic options, but the Houthis pressed forward recklessly.

Resistance emerged—tribal, social, civil, and institutional. The strongest organized resistance was in Marib, east of Sana’a, alongside pockets in Aden and Taiz.

On March 26, 2015, the unexpected happened: Saudi Arabia launched a broad military intervention, forming an Arab-Islamic coalition to restore the Yemeni state from its captors.

Alliances of Opposites and the Fall of Sana’a

In Sana’a, a rapid alliance formed between the Houthis and ousted president Saleh. It was a pact of revenge between two opposites, united only by hostility toward the people who had revolted against one three years earlier and against the other half a century before. Their target was also Saudi Arabia, the solid rock blocking their reckless adventures. Saleh gave them his party’s bases, state weapons, media, tribes, and influence. They gave him temporary safety and recognition.

Meanwhile, in Aden, resistance intensified. Society mobilized in unprecedented unity. A local council of popular resistance was formed, recognized by the coalition leadership, becoming the foundation for liberation and the rebuilding of the national army.

Parallel Entities and Internal Struggles

Like all wars, Yemen’s crisis experienced ebb and flow. Whenever danger receded, private projects re-emerged at the expense of the national project. In the South, figures previously linked to the guardianship project or to Saleh’s regime allied with the Houthis began speaking on behalf of the street. Secessionist movements grew louder, armed, and dominant in provinces.

In May 2017, Aden witnessed the declaration of the so-called Southern Transitional Council. By December of that year, the revenge alliance collapsed when Saleh was killed by his Houthi allies after two days of street battles.

Shifting Alliances: Revenge Reunited

Saleh’s relatives and associates fled Sana’a, becoming victims of personal vendettas with the Houthis. They settled in Aden and areas under STC control.

This new scene seemed impossible but became reality. Yemenis remembered how the STC, obsessed with southern secession, had once refused to allow President Hadi and Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher—both southerners—to land in Aden and Socotra, branding them as former Saleh loyalists.

On the ground, the STC sought to monopolize Aden and its surroundings. Its ally, Saleh’s camp, positioned itself westward in areas it had recently fought against the Houthis. Both appeared as parallel entities outside state authority, exercising powers and stripping the government of its prerogatives.

Presidential Transformation in 2022

In mid-2022, Riyadh hosted broad Yemeni consultations, producing a new formula and radical change in governance. President Hadi delegated his powers to a council of one president and seven deputies, including STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi and Tariq Saleh, nephew of the late president.

Thus, parallel entities formally reached the top of the presidency, holding half the seats. This produced relative calm in Aden, enabling it to host the leadership council and cabinet. Yet stability remained fragile, subject to regional winds and interventions.

A Month That Reversed a Decade

Without prior indicators, sudden tension erupted in STC rhetoric calling for southern secession, echoed by Tariq Saleh from Mocha. Escalation—military, media, and political—coincided with the presence of Presidential Council head Rashad al-Alimi in Aden.

The Hadramawt Offensive and Reactions

The STC escalated militarily, launching an armed advance from Aden toward Hadramawt, over 800 kilometers east. The declared goal was to expel remaining non-southern units from Hadramawt’s valley and desert, bordering Saudi Arabia, and from al-Mahra, bordering Saudi Arabia and Oman.

Its militias clashed with military units in Hadramawt valley. Others withdrew to avoid escalation toward Marib. President al-Alimi remained silent in his Aden palace. The militias then escalated against Hadrami tribes, attacking homes of tribal leader Amr bin Habreesh, who held official status as deputy governor and head of two major political blocs.

Al-Alimi and his government fled Aden to Riyadh. Silence turned into a fireball. For Hadramawt and al-Mahra communities, bin Habreesh described the forces as “invading tribal groups.” The governor declared: “Hadramawt will not accept secession. Either we are an active region in greater Yemen, or we will choose to be an independent state.”

Saudi Resolution and Restoration of the State

Once al-Alimi left Aden for Riyadh, positions crystallized. The Yemeni government issued angry statements. Saudi Arabia responded with high-level mediation, meeting STC leaders in Aden, then moving to Hadramawt. Mediation failed. The Saudi Foreign Ministry issued a statement explaining the problem, receiving unprecedented international support. The Defense Minister followed with a stern declaration.

The crisis escalated further when the Yemeni government demanded the UAE leave Yemen within 24 hours. Saudi Arabia’s cabinet, chaired by King Salman, affirmed the need to meet this demand.

The four-member bloc in the Presidential Council issued a defiant statement rejecting the government’s demand. Yet within an hour, their ally announced unilateral withdrawal.

Instead of restraint, the STC threatened to declare secession, providing justification for military action. Within four days, the legitimate government regained control of all Hadramawt—coast, valley, and desert—and al-Mahra, extending into Shabwa and Abyan.

The militias left Hadramawt before a month passed, facing social rejection and isolation. They deliberately left weapons depots open to looting, creating deadly security vacuums.

Saudi Arabia Regains Trust

Once again, Saudi Arabia regained the trust of Yemenis across factions. Even those who had resisted now welcomed dialogue hosted in Riyadh. Within two days, they flocked to talks, abandoning a decade of rhetoric describing Saudi Arabia as aggressor, occupier, or invader.

The events of December 2025–January 2026 revealed the fragility of fragmentation projects. They showed that secessionist adventures, however loud, collapse when confronted by unified social rejection and decisive regional intervention. The restoration of Hadramawt and al-Mahra marked not only a military victory but a political turning point.

The question remains: Fragmenting Arab states—whose interest does it serve? The Yemeni case demonstrates that such projects serve neither local communities nor national aspirations. They serve only external agendas, prolong chaos, and weaken sovereignty. The Hadramawt episode may be remembered as the moment Yemen began to break the waves of division and reclaim its