The Houthi Doctrine: Between Zaydism and Jarudism

In many writings, the Zaydi school of thought is presented as the closest Shia sect to Sunni Muslims, while the Houthis are portrayed as having broken away from this moderation into extremism. While this depiction contains a measure of truth, it requires refinement for two reasons: Zaydism was not a single, unified movement from its inception, and the dominant school of thought in Yemen—Hadawism—holds principles regarding the Imamate that are closer to Jarudism than is commonly believed.

The exact position of the Houthis can only be understood by examining three levels: Zayd ibn Ali himself, the early Zaydi sects, and Hadawism in Yemen. Prior to this, it is worth noting a reality imposed by current circumstances.

Talking about the Houthis is no longer a discussion about a mere sect in books of theological doctrines; rather, it is about an established authority over a large part of Yemen, a party to a long war, and a participant in a regional conflict. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between the Houthi movement as a political and ideological project, and Zaydism as a historical school of thought embraced by many Yemenis who do not all share the movement's views or side with it.

Zayd ibn Ali and the Emergence of Zaydism

The school of thought is attributed to Zayd ibn Ali ibn Al-Husayn ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, who revolted against Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik in Kufa and was killed in the year 122 AH. The famous reason for the coining of the term "Rafida" (Rejecters) is that a group of people from Kufa asked him to disavow Abu Bakr and Umar as a condition for supporting him. He refused and prayed for Allah to have mercy on them, so they rejected him and departed from him (1).

Al-Shahrastani reported that Zayd permitted the Imamate of the less meritorious (Mafdul) despite the presence of the most meritorious (Afdal). In his view, Ali was the best of the Companions, but the Imamate of Abu Bakr and Umar was valid due to a benefit recognized by the Muslim nation at the time (2). As for Uthman, the matter was less clear, as those who attributed themselves to Zayd after him differed between withholding judgment and declaring him in error.

The Early Zaydi Sects

Not even a generation passed after Zayd before those affiliated with him divided into several sects, the most famous of which are three (3):

1.      The Jarudiyya: Followers of Abu Al-Jarud Ziyad ibn Al-Mundhir Al-Kufi, also nicknamed the Sarhubiyya.

2.     The Sulaymaniyya: Followers of Sulayman ibn Jarir.

3.     The Salihiyya and the Batriyya: Followers of Al-Hasan ibn Salih ibn Hayy and Kathir Al-Nawa Al-Abtar.

As for the Sulaymaniyya, the Salihiyya, and the Batriyya, the description of being close to Sunni Muslims applies to them, as they affirmed the Imamate of Abu Bakr and Umar (may Allah be pleased with them both) based on the principle of the Imamate of the less meritorious, while some withheld judgment on Uthman (may Allah be pleased with him).

However, the Jarudiyya differed with Zayd’s view regarding the two Sheikhs (Abu Bakr and Umar) and were based on three main principles (4):

1.      Textual Designation of Ali by Description: That the Prophet (pbuh) designated Ali for the Imamate by description rather than by explicit name, and that the Companions failed to recognize the described person and seek him out, straying by abandoning their allegiance to him, and even becoming disbelievers because of it.

2.     Imamate in the Two Descendants: That after Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn (may Allah be pleased with them both), the Imamate is determined through consultation among their descendants.

3.     The Condition of Armed Rebellion (Khuruj): That whoever among them draws his sword in rebellion and calls people to himself, while being learned and pious, is the rightful Imam.

Two matters become clear from this:

• First, criticizing the Companions appeared within Zaydism from its very first generation, as Abu Al-Jarud was a contemporary and companion of Zayd.
• Second, restricting the Imamate to the descendants of Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn and requiring armed rebellion are not exclusive to the Jarudiyya; rather, they are held by mainstream Zaydis. The Jarudiyya uniquely held the view of explicit designation of Ali by description and judged the Companions to have strayed.

Hadawism in Yemen

The Zaydi school of thought entered Yemen at the hands of Imam Al-Hadi Yahya ibn Al-Husayn Al-Rassi (d. 298 AH), who arrived from the Hijaz in 280 AH at the request of some Yemeni Zaydis to resolve conflicts among them. The state of the Imams in Yemen was established upon his doctrine for centuries, and his followers were named after him as the "Hadawis."

Al-Hadi determined regarding the Imamate that Ali was the Imam directly after the Prophet (pbuh) by an implicit text, which is a Jarudi principle. For this reason, some scholars considered Hadawism an extension of Jarudism in its theory of the Imamate, including the orientalist Wilferd Madelung and Ahmad Mahmud Subhi (5). Some researchers believe that Al-Hadi differed from Zayd specifically in this issue; while it is attributed to Zayd that the condition of being from the two descendants is a preference condition, it is a mandatory condition according to Al-Hadi (6).

However, the majority of Hadawi scholars in subsequent centuries did not follow the early Jarudiyya in declaring the Companions to be disbelievers. Some withheld judgment, while others expressed pleasure (Taraddi) with the two Sheikhs while considering them in error for taking precedence over Ali.

Core Beliefs of the Zaydi School of Thought

In the core principles of creed, Hadawism aligns with the Mu'tazila school on many issues, such as denying the vision of Allah in the Hereafter, denying intercession (Shafa'a) for perpetrators of major sins, and holding the view that the Quran is created. These are general Hadawi principles and not exclusive Houthi traits. This can be summarized by saying: the Zaydi school of thought is the creed of the Mu'tazila with the addition of the doctrine of the Imamate.

Within this school, a trend emerged that inclined toward Sunni traditions and freed itself from Hadawi imitation (Taqlid). Prominent figures of this trend include Ibn Al-Wazir, Ibn Al-Amir Al-San'ani, Al-Shawkani, and Al-Muqbili. These scholars grew up as Zaydis, then inclined toward the Hadith corpus in many issues, and their works are well known. This trend is the one to which the description of Zaydism being close to Sunni Islam applies most accurately.

Houthis in Contemporary History

The Houthi movement arose in the city of Sa'dah from within the Hadawi environment. Its founder, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, won a seat in the Parliament in 1993 representing the Al-Haqq Party in the Sa'dah Governorate. He then led the "Believing Youth" movement, and the group transformed into an armed organization in 2004 during what was known as the Sa'dah War. Hussein Al-Houthi was killed in its first round, and was succeeded by his younger brother, Abdul-Malik. Their father, Badreddin Al-Houthi, served as the religious authority for the movement, which calls itself "Ansar Allah."

The clearest event demonstrating the position of the Houthis relative to contemporary Zaydism occurred in 1990. In that year, several Zaydi scholars in Sana'a signed a statement criticizing the principle of restricting the Imamate to the descendants of Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn, considering it tied to specific historical circumstances. However, scholars in Sa'dah, led by Badreddin Al-Houthi, rejected this, considering the restriction of the Imamate to these descendants an immutable creed that cannot be abandoned, even if its implementation is hindered today by overwhelming circumstances. Thus, the Houthis adhered to the original Hadawi principle of the Imamate in its strictest form, at a time when other scholars of the school had relaxed it.

Later came the "Intellectual and Cultural Document" published by the Houthis, which reaffirmed the idea of divine selection (Istifa') for the lineage of Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn—the very idea upon which the Hadawi Imamate state was founded (7).

Furthermore, Hussein Al-Houthi differed from traditional Zaydism itself in certain matters. He called for abandoning some traditional Zaydi methodologies, such as Usul al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), Ilm al-Kalam (scholastic theology), and the authority of certain prophetic traditions, describing them as foreign to the heritage of the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet's family). This was condemned by traditional Zaydis who had taught these subjects for centuries. His position toward some Companions was severe in a manner not approved by most Zaydis, though it aligned with the historical stance of the Jarudiyya. It was reported that Badreddin Al-Houthi refused to express pleasure (Taraddi) with Abu Bakr, Umar, and Aisha, and more than 10 prominent Zaydi scholars issued a statement warning against Hussein Al-Houthi, affirming that his words and actions had no connection to the Ahl al-Bayt or the Zaydi school of thought (8).

Regarding the influence of Twelver Shiism, certain occasions that were unfamiliar to Yemeni Zaydis emerged under Houthi rule, such as holding Husayni mourning gatherings (Majalis Husayniyya) and commemorating the death anniversaries of Ja'far Al-Sadiq, Muhammad Al-Baqir, and Ali Zayn Al-Abidin. It was attributed to Badreddin Al-Houthi that he viewed rapprochement with Twelver Shiism as preferable to rapprochement with Sunni Muslims.

However, this influence does not include what is originally Zaydi; Zaydism does not believe in the occultation of the Mahdi nor does it await an absent Imam (9). The celebration of the Day of Ghadir was known among Yemeni Zaydis long before the emergence of the movement. The Day of Ghadir falls on Dhul-Hijjah 18, 10 AH, when the Prophet (pbuh), returning from the Farewell Pilgrimage, stopped at a place called Ghadir Khumm between Mecca and Medina near Al-Juhfah. He addressed the people, recommending adherence to the Book of Allah and his family (Ahl al-Bayt), and his statement regarding Ali was established: "Whomever I am his master, Ali is his master" (10).

Muslims differed on the implication of this Hadith. Shia Muslims, including the Jarudiyya and Hadawiyya, view it as an explicit text on the Imamate of Ali and make it a foundation for the principle of designation by description. Sunni Muslims view it as an affirmation of love, support, and alliance for Ali, rather than a text establishing the Caliphate.

It became customary for Yemeni Zaydis to commemorate this day under the name "Eid al-Wilayah" (Festival of Guardianship), and under Houthi-controlled areas, it has turned into a public occasion with an official and mobilization character.

From Creed to Power

These theological principles did not remain confined to study and debate. On September 21, 2014, the Houthis brought the capital, Sana'a, under their military control and signed a power-sharing agreement with other political forces on the same day while retaining the dominant influence. Since then, the movement has become a de facto authority in Sana'a and vast areas of northern Yemen. The war, after more than 10 years, has left one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world, with warnings of severe famine.

The movement's role expanded beyond Yemeni borders as it became a party to a regional conflict. It attacked shipping in the Red Sea and announced in March 2026 the execution of attacks against Israel. Its controlled territories faced American, British, and Israeli strikes, appearing in this context as an extension of the regional axis led by Iran.

These shifts reveal the importance of the core creed analyzed earlier. The belief in divine selection and restricting guardianship (Wilayah) to the descendants of Al-Hasan and Al-Husayn is not a historical matter for the movement, but rather the foundation of its legitimacy to rule. This explains the eagerness of its opponents, including scholars from Zaydism itself, to recall that the Yemeni Republic was established in 1962 to end the rule of the Imams, and that a group of scholars of the school accepted this transition and endorsed it in a joint statement in 1990.

Conclusion

The accurate comparison is not between a "moderate Hadawi Zaydism" and an "extremist Houthi Jarudism." Rather, the reality is that Hadawism itself is of Jarudi origin regarding the theory of the Imamate and Mu'tazili in its core beliefs, even though the majority of its scholars mitigated their stance toward the Companions throughout history.

The Houthis emerged from this school, adopting its most rigid forms regarding the Imamate and divine selection. They returned to the original Jarudi stance regarding the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) and introduced aspects of Twelver Shiism previously unknown to Yemeni Zaydism. They then transformed all of this into the foundation of a political and military authority. Therefore, it is accurate to describe them as Jarudi in their view of the Imamate and their position on the Companions.

It remains a matter of fairness not to hold the Zaydi school of thought or its general followers responsible for what the movement adopts. A number of Zaydi scholars themselves denounced and disavowed its approach. Zaydis and Sunni Muslims coexisted peacefully in Yemen for centuries before its emergence. This distinction is not a mere courtesy; rather, it is a requirement for a correct understanding, ensuring that political conflict does not turn into a sectarian struggle paid for by all Yemenis.