Syria and the Zionist Entity: Constants of Stance and Limits of Possible Relations

 Fatih Hababa

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In light of the recent escalation between the Zionist entity and Iran, an important question arises about the nature of the future relationship between the new Syria and the entity. This is especially pertinent given Damascus's silence, which may be linked to the complexities of the Iranian file in Syria and the recent memory of Iranian crimes in Syria.

However, Damascus's new stance toward the Palestinian issue has been different. Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara' spoke clearly about the occupation's crimes against Palestinians at his first Arab summit, which raises questions about the form of the new relationship between Syria and the Zionist entity.

This question takes us back to the complex and ambiguous historical background of Syrian-Zionist relations, due to several considerations.

Since the 1948 Nakba, through the 1967 defeat and the occupation of the Golan, the relationship has been characterized by overt hostility and resistance. This narrative continued during the rule of the two Assads, despite the absence of any actual movement against the entity since the 1973 October War.

The rise of the Ba'ath Party, which coincided with the occupation of the Golan, was interpreted by some as a rise that served the entity, a fact revealed by years of hollow slogans. This perception was further solidified by the entity's repeated strikes on Syrian territory and the "reservation of the right to respond," especially its targeting of military sites and Iranian militias in recent years. The clear objective seems to be to destroy military power on the entity's borders, preventing it from falling into the hands of the victors after the fall of the former regime.

In any case, the most important agreement between Syria and the entity remains the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, which defined the contours of the historical relationship.

With the fall of the former regime at the end of 2024, a new phase began, carrying a heavy legacy in the relationship with the entity, requiring a rearrangement of affairs.

The Big Shock

In a historic moment, the military operations administration in Syria took a historic action, reaching Damascus. This represented a regional and international shock, especially for the Zionist entity, which lost an undeclared ally that had maintained the stability of its borders for decades.

The Hebrew media appeared confused, and the Zionist discourse refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new regime. The title "Golanite" changed globally, but it has not changed on the tongues of the occupation's leaders to this moment. How could a young Islamic and ruling power govern Syria on the entity's borders?!

However, the reality, represented by successive regional and international positions, forced it to try to absorb the situation, without ceasing its attempts at sabotage day and night, and working to prevent Syria from achieving any military or economic renaissance, and moving internal cards, seeking to stir divisions through minorities and others. But it failed amid local and international transformations.

Since President al-Shara' assumed power, rumors about his relationship with the entity have not stopped. Sometimes his name is dragged into agreements like the "Abraham Accords," and at other times, secret meetings or normalization paths are rumored, or even acceptance of American conditions for lifting sanctions, which are a right for the Syrian people, as the President expressed in his speech after the US President announced their lifting.

Rumors even reached the extent of claiming that the President is supported by the entity, which some described as an ironic paradox! But the coming days will reveal the hidden truths, solidifying the true position in the Syrian relationship with the occupying entity.

Determinants and Possible Limits of the Relationship

Through the current Syrian circumstances, the possible features of the relationship between the new Syria and the occupying entity can be identified, most notably:

First: Syria's International Role. Its geopolitical location makes it an undeniable player in the new world order, especially amid US-Chinese competition. From this determinant, Syria's shift from the Eastern to the Western axis can be understood, and accordingly, Syrian diplomacy can pursue a pragmatic path in its relations with the occupation.

Second: Regional Reordering. With Syria's strong presence in the Arab heartland, clear Gulf support, and the welcoming of the new Syria in Arab countries, it can enter into agreements where it plays a hindering role to the occupation's aims, which would ultimately reflect positively on it, despite potential popular rejection.

Third: International Legitimacy of the New Regime. This can be controlled by understanding the nature of international and Arab recognition of the new era and what it was based on. Was the new government given an unconditional opportunity and remains under observation? Or were preconditions set for its recognition and support? The nature of Turkey's role in the future phase cannot be overlooked, especially in the military and diplomatic fields.

Fourth: Security Considerations. No economy can prosper without security stability. This means the necessity of understandings—and perhaps agreements—that ensure a minimum level of stability on the borders and an end to "Israeli" aerial attacks.

Fifth: Common Enemy, Iran. The new Syria and the entity both consider Iran a threat to both sides. Therefore, the nature of the relationship in this specific determinant could be similar to the relationship between some Arab countries and the entity.

Sixth: Syrian Public Opinion. Which views the "Israeli" occupation as a cancerous germ planted in the body of the Arab and Islamic nations, and as the main reason for the entire region's current state, will constitute a fundamental axis in defining and controlling the nature of this relationship.

Seventh: Occupied Territories. The occupied Golan remains a fundamental obstacle to any potential normalization path. No relationship with the entity can be separated from the ongoing occupation of Syrian lands, which will make it a stumbling block in any step that benefits the entity.

In the end, the official Syrian position remains steadfast to this moment: the Zionist entity is an occupying entity that cannot be dealt with outside this framework. The 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement remains the cornerstone of the relationship, and even if some parties wish to push Syria toward a normalization path, the continued occupation of the Golan will remain a major obstacle.

Moreover, the occupation's intransigence in hindering Syria from being a militarily, economically, politically, and diplomatically strong state may open a new page that turns everything being promoted upside down.

Just as "October 7th" marked a historical turning point in the world and the region, when a historical moment coincided with a historical action, and just as another historical moment coincided with a historical action and brought down the former Assad regime, despite its reaching the height of tyranny and being re-floated, here the occupation is experiencing a state of apparent arrogance on the ground, and internal exhaustion. And who knows, a historical moment may be coming and coincide with a historical Arab and Islamic action?! Then we will talk about the nature of the Syrian relationship with Palestine, not with the entity.