Soviet Muslims After the Demise of the Soviet Empire

 The number of Muslims in the former Soviet Union ranges between 70 to 75 million out of a total population of 300 million. This means they represent the second-largest group after the Russian populations (inside and outside the Russian Federation). Between 50 to 55 million Muslims inhabit the independent republics of East Asia—where one is Caucasian and seven others enjoy autonomous status within the Russian Federation.

Muslims do not constitute a homogeneous group; they are divided along ethnic, linguistic, and even tribal differences. Such an assessment was not permitted under the communist regime. However, they share a cultural identity, the Islamic faith, the Russian language, the Soviet lifestyle, and the common suffering of living under the yoke of white European colonialism during Tsarist rule in the Russian Empire.

The collapse of the Soviet state followed historic transformations in Eastern Europe and the independent Baltic states, coinciding with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This disintegration marked a pivotal point in the history of Soviet Muslims.

The stances of both the Tsarist and Russian Empires were rife with deception, betrayal, and broken promises. Will these changes cause Muslims to distance themselves from the rest of the former Union? Will the Muslim republics accelerate their steps toward complete and comprehensive independence, following the model of other independent countries in Africa and Asia? What are the expected scenarios for the future of Soviet Muslims? And how will they handle various trends? Such questions dominate the concerns of Soviet Muslims today.

Remote from Slavic Conflicts and the Shift of Power

The Islamic republics remained removed from the arena of Slavic conflicts in the former Union, ranging from ethnic disputes among Slavic groups to Boris Yeltsin’s succession of Mikhail Gorbachev as the last strongman in Moscow. Although the foundations of this Commonwealth link are not yet clear—as it does not represent a central power, and choosing Minsk (Belarus) as its capital aims to strip it of the specters of both empire and communism—Yeltsin’s unilateral and defiant control over the former Union's nuclear and conventional weapons makes him effectively in control of what was known as the Red Army.

The new Commonwealth reflects Gorbachev's proposed Union Treaty, yet it lacks the status of statehood and homeland; it is merely a grouping that does not constitute a state or a federation at all. However, as long as economic pressure and control (the shared ruble currency) remain in Yeltsin's hands, remote and impoverished republics will have to turn to the Russian Federation to ensure their security and economic survival. In this regard, the fate of the so-called autonomous republics does not differ much from that of certain Black African republics when they gained fragile independence in the 1960s—independence that was sufficient to divert them from true resistance to achieve full independence. At the very least, if no detailed, fair, and enforceable charter exists for the new Commonwealth, Russian assurances that it does not seek dominance over its smaller partners in the association will convince no one.

The Quietest Empire Collapse in History

In reality, the new Commonwealth is merely an innovative, hastily devised vehicle to ensure a peaceful transition toward the post-Soviet era, which may prove full of surprises. Yeltsin's moves and the new Commonwealth association appear aimed at imposing Russian control over the old empire. Furthermore, the peace and prosperity of nearly 25 million Russians scattered across the former Union are also threatened with collapse.

Within the next two years, a quiet dissolution of the empire is expected to take place.

Of course, it would be the quietest demise of an empire in history. However, looking back at the French, British, and other empires, all of them generated problems and turmoil following their demise. In this respect, the Russian case is far more dangerous due to its past filled with massacres and bloodshed. There is no need to elaborate on the gravity of the ethnic, economic, border, and countless other issues that remain unresolved across what was the Soviet Union. To say the least, these very problems are bound to haunt Yeltsin.

Economic decline and the loss of international status could drive nationalists—who sided with communists against democrats during the failed August 1991 coup attempt—to challenge Russian nationalism, which glorifies the motherland, expansionism, and dominance. In fact, this would turn all balances upside down. Will Yeltsin become a hostage or be forced to ally with the nationalists in his efforts to support the Commonwealth and achieve stability within it? However, this possibility remains unlikely.

A Return to the Islamic Republics

Let us return to the Islamic republics, which last year's referendum showed to fall mostly into the category of conservative republics. However, Tajikistan could potentially transform into an Islamic power due to its proximity to Afghanistan and the strong influence it drew from the Afghan Jihad.

On another front, Uzbekistan is home to the highest proportion of Muslims among the Islamic republics (21 million Muslims). There are concerns regarding Uzbek aspirations for dominance, as they form a significant minority within Tajikistan (23%). Furthermore, fears regarding a larger European presence relate to their high birth rate—the highest in the former Soviet Union—driven by pride in having large and handsome families.

As for Kazakhstan, it is considered an Islamic republic where Russians account for 28% of the population, Ukrainians 6%, Kazakhs 42%, and other Islamic nationalities 11%.

Kazakhstan is also the second-largest nation after the Russian Federation, followed by Kyrgyzstan, where the Russian population stands at 25%. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan share a long border with China, while the proportion of Muslim minorities in the remaining Islamic republics ranges between 7% and 12%. Meanwhile, neighboring Azerbaijan, whose population is predominantly Shia, has been under Iranian influence since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Thus, the Islamic republics located in East Asia are treading a rough and complex path in their Islamic journey. The situation of the autonomous Islamic republics is even more complex and warrants detailed future study.

An Islamic revival is expected in Central Asia, though the existence of ethnic and nationalistic tendencies could act as a divisive factor, as seen in Uzbekistan.

It appears that these republics' neighbors among Muslim nations—such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and further away, the Arab states—do not serve as a political reference model for progress. Therefore, their opening toward Central Asia may drive them into constructive competition with the Central Asian countries.

With the collapse of communism, an ideological vacuum prevailed across what was known as the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that Christianity will fill this spiritual void. Consequently, this region has become fertile ground for the spread of Islam throughout the Central Asian republics and into the broader former Soviet Union. Therefore, a shared language and the presence of a Russian minority could help spread the light of Islam to the far north of our world. This task requires further continuous studies as well as substantial linguistic and analytical capabilities—a responsibility that rests upon Islamic organizations.

Population Estimates (1990–1991)

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Published in Al-Mujtama Issue No. 986 — Sunday, January 26, 1992 - Written by: Raja Ehsan Aziz