After 15 months of intense negotiations and a lengthy period of Arab diplomacy, “Israel” and Hamas revealed a ceasefire agreement via the assistance of Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. government. Israelis and Palestinians are waiting for the ceasefire agreement to be implemented on Sunday, January 19, 2025, which will be implemented in stages with the first stage extending six weeks and that involve the following items:

The exchange of 1,000 Palestinian detainees in Israel for the release of 33 hostages detained in the Gaza Strip.

Thirty Palestinian detainees are freed for each Israeli female soldier. without interruption return of the displaced to northern Gaza.

The names of 95 Palestinian detainees who will be released beginning Sunday, January 19, 2025 as part of an initial exchange process in line with the ceasefire agreement with Hamas were revealed by Israeli officials on Friday.

After 15 months of intense negotiations and a lengthy period of Arab diplomacy, “Israel” and Hamas revealed a ceasefire agreement via the assistance of Egypt, Qatar, and the U.S. government. Israelis and Palestinians are waiting for the ceasefire agreement to be implemented on Sunday, January 19, 2025, which will be implemented in stages with the first stage extending six weeks and that involves the following items:

• The exchange of 1,000 Palestinian detainees in Israel for the release of 33 hostages detained in the Gaza Strip
• Thirty Palestinian prisoners will be released for every Israeli female soldier.
• The return of displaced persons to northern Gaza will continue without interruption.

The names of 95 Palestinian detainees who will be released beginning Sunday, January 19, 2025, as part of an initial exchange process in line with the ceasefire agreement with Hamas were revealed by Israeli officials on Friday.

Final status arrangements mechanism

According to U.S. President Joe Biden, the first stage of the agreement calls for a "comprehensive ceasefire," the release of 33 hostages, including women, children, and the elderly, an Israeli withdrawal from populated areas of the Gaza Strip, and an increase in the amount of humanitarian aid entering the area "600” aid trucks per day once the truce takes effect.

Despite the announcement by Qatar and the US of reaching a ceasefire agreement on Wednesday, the Israeli army continued its airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. The airstrikes resulted in the deaths of more than 110 people, including 60 women and children, according to the Ministry of Health and Civil Defense in the region.

Arrangements for the stage of negotiation will be discussed during the first stage. There were pivotal periods during the complex negotiations, which were mediated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, when the parties exchanged suggestions.

 While Israel postponed its government meeting to approve the truce, Hamas was accused of making new demands. Israeli airstrikes have killed over 86 people in Gaza since the truce was issued, leaving the locals feeling sad and angry. "Put a definitive end to the war," is the target of the second stage, according to Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani

The second and third stages

“The Israeli negotiating delegation is still in Doha to finalize the technical details, and the terms and all related details will be agreed upon during the implementation of the first stage.” The prime minister of Qatar stated that the second and third stages are conditional upon the progress of the first stage.

It appears that Netanyahu's administration is not serious about the Israeli government's withdrawal from the Philadelphi Passage along the Egyptian border, despite Israeli media reporting on intense disagreements that have deepened the rift within the small Israeli cabinet as a result of the agreement's signing.

Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delayed the government's planned approval date of the ceasefire accord, this shows how deeply divided the Cabinet is. The obvious disputes and threats made by Ben Gvir, the security file official, who threatened to leave the government, were also brought to light by Israeli media.

The prime minister of Qatar affirmed that the second and third stages of the agreement will be developed while the first stage is being implemented, regardless of how inflexible the Israeli government is. "Israel will negotiate in the next six weeks the necessary arrangements to move forward to the second stage, which will represent the decisive end of the war," the departing American president added: " I repeat the decisive end of the war"

"There will be an exchange for the release of the remaining hostages, including male soldiers, and all remaining Israeli forces will withdraw from Gaza when the second stage begins," Biden said. The temporary ceasefire will then turn into a permanent one.

The beginning of the ceasefire at the Rafah crossing

Since any executive action will be within the borders of the Egyptian state, the truce will begin today, Sunday, January 19, 2025, when Egypt will receive the first three detainees. Since the exchange of hostages and inmates is seen as a security event for Egypt, Egypt declared that it has placed all security organizations the Ministry of Health, and the Egyptian government under a high level of alert during the process.

Egypt was selected to participate in the prisoner exchange process because it wants to see the agreement through to its completion in order to avoid any conflict between Israel and Hamas and keeping the conditions of the truce in place for the next six weeks because a prisoner exchange is unsuitable in Gaza, which has been destroyed by the murder.

Priority will be given to the injured during the truce period, as well as to the arrival of medical aid and medical groups. In order to resume medical operations within the Gaza Strip, Egypt will also permit fuel to enter through the Rafah border crossing.

After being security-checked at the Rafah gate, humanitarian aid will first pass via the Karam Abo Salem border before being transported to Israel, which will then deliver it to the UN for delivery to the Gaza Strip. Since the Rafah crossing is regarded as a Palestinian property, Egypt strongly rejects any Israeli oversight there and will return to the 2005 agreement.

The leadership battle between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas on the day after the war

The complexity of the split following each confrontation with the Israeli occupation is seen in the struggle between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The leaders of the Palestinian National Authority insist that Hamas leave and allow the Palestinian people to truly choose their own future, while the Authority rejects any future decisions that do not involve them. Despite the 2007 divide the Authority fulfilled its duties to provide funding for infrastructure, education, and health.

According to Hamas leaders, a state of consensus is necessary, and all Palestinian divisions, including Hamas, must agree on a complete strategic management plan in order to rebuild Gaza. Hamas recognizes that the agreement's drafters do not want Hamas to be present in Gaza.

Israel has made it clear that it will not permit political control of the Gaza Strip by Hamas or the Palestinian Authority, and that the presence of Palestinian officials under American leadership will be sufficient. Gaza's future still depends on the Palestinian leadership' resolve to put behind their differences and create an equal future vision for the Gaza Strip. Israel's decision to leave the Gaza Strip without recognizing its new ruler is consistent with its earlier decision to keep Hamas' control over the area and its complete rejection of the Palestinian Authority.

The "Gaza State" scenario, which entails establishing an independent committee under regional and international supervision to restore the Gaza Strip and all of its institutions under its authority, may become a possibility given the chaotic events taking place in Gaza.

Signed journalistic articles clearly reflect the stance and political context of their authors. In his article published on "The Times of Israel" website, Ahmed Charai, owner of Global Media Holding, defends "Israel" and its policies towards Palestinians, focusing on criticizing the International Criminal Court's (ICC) decision to prosecute Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This critical analysis sheds light on the argumentative structure of the article, its implicit messages, strengths, and weaknesses.

First: Context and General Stance

The article is presented within a clear political framework defending "Israel" as a "democratic state" facing "terrorism" from Hamas. Charai openly opposes the ICC's decision, deeming it a threat to the legal sovereignty of democratic states. This perspective overlooks the complexities of the Palestinian-"Israeli" conflict and displays a clear bias toward exonerating "Israel" while blaming other parties.

Second: Methodology of Argument Construction

1. Reliance on General Concepts

The author focused on concepts like "legal sovereignty" and "the right to self-defense" without providing in-depth analysis or specific examples to support his claims. For instance, discussing "Israel's" democracy ignores international criticism of its policies, which some human rights organizations describe as apartheid against Palestinians.
Additionally, when praising the integrity of the "Israeli" judiciary, the author failed to provide any examples of it upholding Palestinian rights against the oppression and violence of the "Israeli" army and government.

2. Manipulation of International Context

The author attempts to link the ICC's decision to the potential targeting of other democratic states like the United States, creating the impression that the court arbitrarily targets democracies. This approach diverts attention from the core issue: crimes committed in the occupied Palestinian territories.
The most concerning aspect of this perspective is that it provides a free pass to major powers—or, as the author describes them, democratic states—to excuse any aggression or violations of the rights and freedoms of other peoples, particularly the right to life.

3. Ignoring the Palestinian Context

The article completely disregards the suffering of Palestinians due to the occupation, including "Israeli" military attacks on civilians. These omissions result in a one-sided narrative serving a specific agenda rather than offering an objective analysis.

Third: Weaknesses in the Article

1. Clear Bias

The article displays excessive bias toward "Israel," portraying it as a victim of the international system while ignoring "Israel's" occupation policies and ongoing human rights violations. For instance, the occupation has assassinated several resistance leaders following Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood" and continues to kill, bomb, and expand its operations. This bias undermines the article's credibility.

2. Marginalization of the ICC's Role

The author attacks the ICC as "politicized" without providing strong evidence, which weakens the validity of his critique. Despite challenges, the ICC remains a recognized international body for addressing major crimes.
Even if we accept the author's claim that the ICC lacks jurisdiction, prosecuting Netanyahu in "Israel" is unrealistic. Netanyahu represents "Israel" and cannot be tried in "Israeli" courts, which view actions in Gaza as normal and not genocidal. Moreover, as he remains the Israeli Prime Minister, it is difficult to imagine him facing trial in a country he governs.

3. Imbalanced Emotional Rhetoric

The article heavily relies on emotional appeals, describing Palestinian "terrorism" and defending "Israeli" civilians while ignoring the humanitarian impact of "Israeli" policies.

4. Neglect of Real Legal Context

The article fails to discuss the legal reasons behind the ICC's investigation into crimes committed, instead focusing on general political attacks.

Fourth: Implicit Messages

1. Justification of "Israeli" Policies

The article aims to justify "Israel's" policies under the pretext of self-defense, ignoring the context of occupation and its implications. It also overlooks how "Israel's" response to Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood" has gone beyond deterrence, turning into retaliation against anyone who supports Palestine, not just its citizens.

2. Undermining the ICC's Image

The article seeks to erode trust in the ICC by portraying it as a tool for political manipulation, likely due to fears that the court may issue further arrest warrants against "Israeli" or even American officials.

Fifth: A Critical Reading of the Media Messaging

Charai's article exemplifies what is termed "biased media discourse," guiding readers toward predetermined conclusions using unbalanced arguments. This is particularly noteworthy as it comes from an Arab Muslim figure, attempting to lend logic and neutrality to such a narrative.

The article aligns with the strategy of recycling "Israeli" political rhetoric, raising questions about the author's independence and the credibility of the narrative.

In conclusion, Charai's article provides a political defense of "Israel" rather than an objective legal or political analysis. It lacks balance and objectivity, relying on evident bias and an incomplete presentation of the Palestinian-"Israeli" conflict. Articles like these highlight the importance of analyzing media discourse to uncover its agendas, especially when authored by influential figures in the Moroccan media landscape.

-------------------------------------------------------------

-A Moroccan journalist and writer.

Read this Article in Arabic

Just as America sacrificed thousands of soldiers from racial minorities such as African Americans and Latin Americans in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the "Israeli" occupation sacrifices Druze and Africans in its war in Gaza, a report revealed that Russia has exploited Muslims from its Islamic republics, sending them to the slaughterhouse of the war in Ukraine.

A report from Radio Free Europe on September 25 revealed that Russia is placing Muslims from Islamic republics like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, and others ahead of its Christian soldiers in the frontline of the ongoing war with Ukraine.

The report confirmed that regions populated by non-Russian ethnic groups, especially Islamic republics, are paying the highest price in this war, where poverty is exploited to attract soldiers, and the residents are forced to volunteer due to the lack of resources or weak income.

Statistics of casualties show that the majority of Russian soldiers killed are Muslims. By September 26, the number of Russian army deaths from the Republic of Bashkortostan, with a population of 4 million, reached at least 3,026 soldiers, while the number of Muslim casualties from the Republic of Tatarstan reached 2,740.

On August 15, the Hebrew newspaper Haaretz revealed that "Israel" is recruiting African asylum seekers in its war on Gaza with false promises to reduce the number of Israeli casualties. An investigation by the "Israeli" newspaper showed that the "Israeli" military establishment is exploiting African asylum seekers by recruiting them for its military operations in its aggression against Gaza in exchange for false promises of granting them residency, which explains why these casualties' names are not included in the official statistics of the Zionist army's dead.

Similarly, African Americans and Latin American minorities in the U.S. have complained about the military's focus on recruiting them compared to the white population, which explains why most of the U.S. army's casualties in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan are from minorities or African Americans.

Why Muslims?

According to Radio Free Europe, the number of Russian army casualties—both dead and wounded—has reached half a million in the past 30 months, based on Western estimates, surpassing the number of Soviet soldiers killed during the entire 10-year Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The report emphasizes that regions populated by non-Russian ethnic groups, especially Islamic republics, are paying the highest price in this war, where poverty is exploited to recruit soldiers, and the residents are forced to volunteer due to limited resources and income.

The majority of the killed soldiers are from the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in central Russia, both of which enjoy autonomy within the Russian Federation and have a Muslim majority.

This toll was partly confirmed by a separate count conducted by BBC Russia / Mediazona, which confirmed 2,705 deaths in Bashkortostan and 2,259 from Tatarstan in the Ukraine war.

In contrast, only 135 deaths were confirmed from Moscow, despite its official population exceeding 13 million.

Tatar political analyst Ruslan Aisin explains that Moscow's reliance on making Muslims bear the brunt of the war in Ukraine stems from the Putin government's desire to pacify discontent among ethnic Russians in major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg by reducing the burden of casualties among them and shifting it onto Muslims.

Chechnya as well

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, Putin's loyal ally, has also taken advantage of the war in Ukraine by sending large forces, of which hundreds have been killed. Ironically, Chechen fighters opposing Moscow, who call Kadyrov a traitor, have joined the fight against Russian and pro-Kadyrov Chechen forces alongside Ukrainian forces!

While Kadyrov's forces poured into Ukraine, the Chechen battalions of "Dzhokhar Dudayev" and "Sheikh Mansur" resumed fighting against Russian and Kadyrov's forces, just as they did in the 2014 war in Donbas.

Adam Osmaev, a Chechen leader living in exile, leads the "Dzhokhar Dudayev" battalion, named after the first president of Chechnya in the 1990s. This battalion is one of two groups of Chechen volunteers openly fighting the Russian-backed separatists and Russian forces in Ukraine since 2014.

The other Chechen unit fighting Russians in Ukraine is the "Sheikh Mansur" battalion, which operates in southeastern Ukraine under the command of Muslim Chibirloevsky. Most of its members fled Chechnya after the Chechen war in 2003 or were forced to leave due to Kadyrov's oppressive rule over the years.

The "Dzhokhar Dudayev" brigade, under the leadership of opposition general Isa Muniev, had already participated in combat against the Russians in Ukraine in 2014, alongside the "Sheikh Mansur" battalion, and they have returned in the current war to fight the Russians again, facing off against their own Chechen counterparts loyal to Kadyrov.

Since Russian President Putin's successful occupation of Chechnya in 2000, consolidating control over its government through force and handing power to Russian collaborators from the Kadyrov family, Chechens have been split between those loyal to Moscow and those opposing its rule.

Among the prominent opponents feared by Moscow is Akhmed Zakayev, leader of the separatist Chechen government in exile, who has formed volunteer brigades from Chechens living abroad to fight alongside the Ukrainian government to repel the Russian invasion.

During the Second Chechen War, which broke out in 2000 as Putin came to power, the Chechens split into two camps: one led by Ramzan Kadyrov that laid down arms and surrendered to Russian influence, and another that decided to continue the war for independence from Russia.

Kadyrov did not stop at aligning with Russia but became a warlord obedient to the Kremlin's orders. He began pursuing Chechen resistance cells, vowing to uproot the rebellion and hunt down every opponent of Russian influence both inside and outside the country.

Over time, thanks to Russian military and intelligence support, Kadyrov tightened his grip on the country, squeezing the opposition, most of whom fled abroad. They found their opportunity to fight back with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, battling Putin and Kadyrov simultaneously.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Read this Article in Arabic

The Sunni popular dissent unconsciously raises the issue of Iran's sectarianism, its role in the region and its actual stance towards Al-Aqsa Flood, especially after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' political bureau, may Allah have mercy on him, in Tehran without any significant response from Iran. This is also evident after the statements of Supreme Leader Khamenei about the conflict between the Husseini front (the Shia world) and the Yazidi front (the Sunni world). However, the reactions from the Sunni populace varied in their approach to dealing with the Iranian stance and its credibility. I propose some fundamental principles to clarify the importance of addressing the “Al-Aqsa Flood” event consciously. Among the most important are:

First: Iran and Sectarianism

1. Iran is a sectarian state according to its constitution, aiming to spread its doctrine in the Arab world, specifically. It has a documented and drawn-out project to control the leadership of the Islamic world.
2. Iran operates as a sovereign state, not subordinate, interacting with the West, the United States, Russia, and China based on mutual interests.
3. Iran's cooperation in certain areas for its own interests, does not prevent it from clashing with these countries in other areas.
4. Iran cooperates with some Arab countries and exchanges interests with them, while being in conflict with others.

Second: The Zionist Entity

1. The Zionist entity is an enemy and occupier of Palestine, violating all human rights of our Palestinian brethren.
2. The Zionist entity has a religious project in the region to Judaize Palestine and expand to “Greater Israel.” It is the primary enemy and planner of all strategic changes in the Arab region, in collaboration with the United States and the West.
3. “Israel” is a state that operates based on interests, cooperating with Iran and others, understanding with it on certain issues or strategic matters, ensuring Iran does not intrude on Israeli interests and sovereignty, while maintaining control over Sunni areas under a balance overseen by the United States.
4. “Israel” competes with Iran in areas of influence based on a push-pull equation without changing positions.

Third: The Arab System

1. The Arab system, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, is not a single geographical sovereignty system. It has no comprehensive project and is unwittingly consumed by internal conflicts in various areas (Western Sahara, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iraq...), making it weak without vision or project.
2. The Arab system is predominantly subject to the will of the United States and the Western system, executing the will of these major countries more than mutual Arab interests.
3. All Arab countries lack the strength to change Iranian and Israeli occupations due to division and selfishness, thus lacking a geographical project, relying on protection and support from major countries.
4. Most Arab countries have surrendered to the reality of Israeli occupation, peace, and normalization, while also submitting to Iranian expansion in the region.
5. The majority of Arab countries want to end the resistance explicitly, publicly, and some covertly, thus supporting Israel in its mission to eradicate the resistance.

Geopolitical Situation in the Region

1. Iran exploited this situation by supporting Jihad and Hamas in Palestine for its interests and to create a threatening force to Israel from within.
2. The Arab normalization trend acted oppositely, supporting the Oslo Accords and normalization, thus standing against the resistance.
3. This created a conflict in vision, interests, and struggle between the Arabs and Iran, causing a significant imbalance in the Palestinian cause's trajectory.
4. Hamas, Jihad, or the resistance in Palestine found no support from the Arabs except for some developmental aid; hence, the battle became existential and zero-sum for them, relying entirely on Iranian support, which they consider a matter of evaluating harms and benefits.
5. Hamas and the resistance did not change their Sunni doctrine but altered their alliances based on changing Arab realities and interests, adjusting the positions of enemies, allies, and friends.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” Battle

When the “Al-Aqsa Flood” occurred, it was an event within the political and military dynamics that did not change the fundamental strategic equation (Iranian project and Israeli project). This event tactically created two fronts: a predominantly Iranian and Shia front supporting the resistance, and a front supporting Israel and normalization with it. Hamas collaborated with the resistance support front as it had no choice, while Arab regime countries (the normalization path) supported Israel, not directly against the Iranian regime but to end the Palestinian cause and the resistance.

The Required Position

Therefore, the positions of the honorable and supportive peoples for the resistance and the Palestinian cause should not exceed the following:

1. Fully supporting the Palestinian resistance, avoiding any harm to it or the people of Gaza, as they are at war with Israel and its allies. This is a necessary faith-based doctrinal stance, with no choice but to cooperate with Iran due to the Arabs' cessation of support, with some countries even aiding Israel in besieging and killing them.
2. Using all means to stand against Israeli dominance and project.
3. Employing all legitimate means against the normalization project and Arab betrayal.
4. Warning against the Iranian project and its strategic danger to the Sunni population and livelihood in the Arab region without delving into sectarian disputes.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Read the Article in Arabic

The relationship between politics and certain concepts, such as human values and ethics, is often a subject of debate. Some believe that politics should adhere to ethical rules rather than interests, while others argue that interests play a strong role in shaping the positions and decisions of states. They point out that in the realm of politics, it is unclear how interests intertwine, and they assert that during crises, every country acts according to its own interests.

Therefore, when examining the stance of any given country on a particular issue, it is important to consider that relations between countries are often based on mutual interests, which may shift over time. This prevents us from forming judgments driven by emotions, which often lead our people to make misguided decisions.

Between all of this, it seems necessary to act objectively in response to events and to align with the humanitarian side, rather than taking positions based on interests aligned with one party or another.

When looking at China's policies towards our Arab region, we see that China is one of the influential countries in the geopolitical arena. Its policies are driven by interests. Beijing has managed to maintain good relations with Arab and Islamic countries as part of its struggle against American imperialism while simultaneously preserving its economic interests with “Israel,” a key U.S. ally.

China Strives to Please All Parties

Not long ago, China adopted a policy of “friends with everyone.” However, its policies toward the Arab region are now undergoing significant geopolitical and geostrategic transformations, especially after the genocide in Gaza. Despite China's interest in the region and its desire to play a regional role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, new rules have emerged that guide its policies, particularly regarding its relations with “Israel” and the major global powers. These shifts signal major changes in the global power structure.

In general, China's policies dangle between all sides. It cannot afford to align with just one party because it needs all of them to fulfill its interests. China needs “Israel,” as it is its largest trading partner in East Asia. China has sought to benefit from “Israel's” expertise in solar energy, robotics, irrigation, construction, agriculture, and water management.

At the same time, China needs Iran as an ally and wants to invest in its relationships with Arab countries while maintaining strong ties with their sworn enemy, “Israel.” Historically, Beijing has tried to balance its relations with “Israel” while simultaneously presenting itself as a champion for Palestinians on the global stage.

The History of Sino-Israeli Relations

In 1950, “Israel” recognized China, but just one year later, in 1951, the United States pressured “Israel” to freeze its relations with China due to the U.S.-Chinese conflict during the Korean War. There were no official relations between the two countries for more than 40 years. Chinese leader Mao Zedong adopted an anti-Israel stance, seeing both “Israel” and Taiwan as imperialist bases in Asia, established by the West against the Arabs and China.

In 1988, Beijing recognized Palestine and invited the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to send a semi-diplomatic mission to China. This was the first such mission for Palestine in a non-Arab country.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Madrid Peace Conference, developments in bilateral relations led to the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992. In 2000, the Chinese president made a historic visit to “Israel,” and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Beijing in 2007, resulting in numerous agreements.

In return, “Israel” has carefully balanced its relationship with China while maintaining its close ties with the United States. However, a major shift in bilateral relations occurred in 2013, coinciding with tensions between Netanyahu's government and the former Obama administration.

Mutual Interests Drive Sino-Israeli Relations

Shared interests push “Israel” to deepen its ties with China's economy, which is considered one of the fastest-growing economies, while also being cautious against the potential rise of China as a dominant global power. According to a 2019 study by the RAND Corporation, Beijing is keen to increase investment in Israeli infrastructure and encourage its involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative as part of its efforts to undermine Washington's ties with allied nations.

Challenges Facing Sino-Israeli Relations

Washington views China as a global competitor and is concerned about the transfer of any technology that could provide China with military superiority. As a result, Washington remains an obstacle in Sino-Israeli relations. In 2000, the U.S. forced “Israel” to cancel the sale of the airborne radar system Falcon to the Chinese military, though it allowed “Israel” to sell it to India three years later.

Meanwhile, Israel's growing military relations with India present a challenge to Beijing. India accounted for 33% of Israel's total arms exports between 2001 and 2021. Additionally, China's military ties with Iran present another challenge. China is Iran's largest importer of oil and has helped Tehran bolster its military capabilities by selling it ballistic missiles and anti-ship weapons.

China's Relations with the Arab World

In December 2022, several agreements and memoranda of understanding were signed between China and Saudi Arabia, including plans to align Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 with China's Belt and Road Initiative, as well as a memorandum of understanding in the field of hydrogen energy and agreements in the fields of security and investment promotion. Chinese tourism to Saudi Arabia has also seen significant promotion.

Since 2013, China has become Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, and in 2022, bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded $116 billion, representing a 33.1% year-on-year increase. Recently, Saudi Arabia introduced the teaching of Chinese in all the government secondary schools, marking the first such initiative by an Arab country. All of these understandings and agreements bring enormous economic benefits to China.

China Becomes a Key Player in the Arab Region

On June 14, 2023, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited China. During his visit, Beijing affirmed its support for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and emphasized the two-state solution.

Beijing has also demonstrated its role as a key mediator between the Palestinians and as a reliable partner in addressing regional issues. In June, China succeeded in bringing together all Palestinian factions, inviting 14 Palestinian groups to a national meeting in Beijing, where they agreed to achieve comprehensive national unity within the framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in what became known as the “Beijing Agreement.”

In May, Beijing hosted the 10th ministerial meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, which coincided with the 20th anniversary of its founding in 2004. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that one of the most significant outcomes of the meeting was that President Xi Jinping responded to the decision made at the Arab League summit by announcing that the second China-Arab summit would be held in China in 2026.

China's Role in Mediating Between Saudi Arabia and Iran

China also successfully mediated the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been severed since 2016. After seven years of estrangement, the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic ties following negotiations hosted by China.

China's Growing Role at the Expense of U.S. Influence

The New York Times observed that China's role in the Middle East is growing economically and politically, while U.S. influence in the region is shrinking. The Washington Post described this development as a significant breakthrough in a bitter rivalry, highlighting the failure of former President Obama's attempts to mend relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Obama had viewed the conflict between the two nations as a source of sectarian tension in the region.

The Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza

The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has greatly impacted China's previous “friends with everyone” policy. In the past, Beijing aimed to avoid taking sides in conflicts that did not directly affect it. However, more recently, China has begun to view such conflicts as opportunities to turn diplomatic pressure and global public opinion against Washington. This approach has led China to side against U.S. allies, such as “Israel” and Ukraine, purely to score points against the West. Beijing, alongside Russia, used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block a U.S.-sponsored resolution condemning Hamas and not calling for a ceasefire. In response, “Israel” joined 50 other countries at the UN in October to condemn China's actions against the Uyghur people in East Turkestan.

Based on the above, it is expected that the political gap between the two countries will widen, in contrast to the situation over the past decade. Here we can say that China's interests are the primary driver behind its pro-Arab positions. In this historical moment, Chinese and Arab interests have aligned. Is there anyone to capitalize on this for the benefit of our people?

-------------------------------------------------------------

1. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/28/world/asia/china-israel-hamas-antisemitism.html
2. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/lmadha-tnhaz-alsyn-dd-asrayyl-wlmadha-syaty-dhlk-ly-alarjh-bntayj-ksyt
3. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2641.html
4. https://www.spa.gov.sa/w1824251
5. https://www.cairn.info/revue-confluences-mediterranee-2019-2-page-147.htm?ref=doi
6. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48600106

Read the Article in Arabic