Turkey's Local Elections and Kurdish Issue
• Elections expected to impact internal politics due to Justice and Development Party's defeat.
• President Erdogan's last presidential term constitutionally requires a runoff.
• Unexpected meeting between Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahceli and Peoples’ Democratic Party deputies.
• Bahceli calls for the release of the imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party leader, rejecting terrorism.
• Turkey's Kurdish Workers' Party prepares for post-political path, with no specific plan announced by the government.

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It was expected that the recent local elections in Turkey would have repercussions on the internal scene, especially since the Justice and Development Party faced defeat for the first time against its rival, the Republican People's Party, failing to recapture the municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul and losing additional municipalities. In addition, the recent presidential elections were highly competitive, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan needing a runoff to secure victory.

Erdogan's Last Presidential Term and the Kurdish Issue

For these reasons, and because this is Erdogan's last presidential term constitutionally, with his desire to continue and his confidence in his ability to do so, it was expected that some internal issues would be addressed, including the Kurdish issue, especially with signals coming from various parties regarding the matter.

It was expected in principle, but what happened exceeded all expectations. Suddenly and without prior notice, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, the leader of the nationalist movement in the country, Devlet Bahceli, shook hands with deputies from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (the Kurdish Democratic People's Party) at the start of the new legislative year (October), sparking a major surprise a week later.

Bahceli Calls for Kurdistan Workers' Party Leader's Release

Bahceli called for the release of the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, who has been in prison since 1999, and allowing him to address the Kurdish parliamentary bloc, announcing his rejection of terrorism and ending operations against Turkey and the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. He expressed his readiness to do whatever is necessary, regardless of the political cost.

The surprise did not stop at the content of the call, but also in the speaker himself, who had been one of the strictest in Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue and the Kurdistan Workers' Party, advocating for the reinstatement of the death penalty (abolished in 2004) specifically for the execution of the Kurdish leader.

As Bahceli has been a close ally of the President since 2017, attention turned to Erdogan to gauge his reaction to what was said. Erdogan's statements of gratitude and support for Bahceli led many to believe that Bahceli's statement had been pre-agreed upon between the two men, at the very least in broad terms.

Turkey's Kurdish Workers' Party Prepares for Post-Political Path

Despite the shock of the surprise, the presidency and the government did not announce a specific program or plan in this regard. However, the statements hinted that something was being prepared behind the scenes and could be announced soon. Otherwise, Bahceli would not have taken the risk of making such a statement. Many initially thought it was a maneuver, embarrassment, or some form of challenge, before the man confirmed his position in later speeches, with the support of Erdogan.

Furthermore, statements from the other party have reinforced this impression, indicating that there may be a political path that could be announced soon. The Equality and Peoples' Democracy Party welcomed the invitation, expressing readiness to play any necessary role to ensure the success of a political process, but they stressed the need for the end of Abdullah Ocalan's isolation in prison as a sign of seriousness in the approach.

Post-Political Path

Salahaddin Demirtas, the former leader of the Peoples' Democratic Party who is detained on terrorism-related charges, also welcomed the invitation from Bahçeli, urging not to allow anyone to obstruct the political solution this time. Ocalan himself announced in a statement confirming his ability to move the process from a violent path to a political and legal path, "if the conditions are ripe," he expressed.

All of the above indicates the readiness of the parties affiliated with the Kurdish Workers' Party for a post-political path, once its outlines become clear. The announcement of the Equality and Peoples' Democracy Party holding a meeting with the Turkish Minister of Justice to demand the end of Ocalan's isolation, as well as visits by his relatives carrying a message from him, further strengthens this possibility.

Although a specific political program has not been announced in this regard, developments indicate that preparations are underway. It is widely agreed in Turkey that the Kurdish issue remains a fundamental obstacle in the domestic political scene, in addition to its regional complications in Syria and Iraq. The security and military solution alone is not sufficient, but the government has claimed for some time that it has significantly weakened the capabilities of the separatist military, intelligence, economic, and human system, undermining their dreams of a Kurdish state or separatism. This could open the door to a new political path, albeit in a different way this time according to several government and party officials in the country.

This groundwork helps facilitate the presumed political path, with Bahçeli's approval as an ally of Erdogan and as the leader of a party in parliament, and subsequently the leader of the nationalist movement in the country which is typically opposed to a political solution. In addition to that, the readiness of the Kurdish party in the country to play a positive role and welcome Bahçeli's initiative, there are several parties representing a majority in parliament that may not object, including the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party, upon hearing the details.

Obstacles

Kurdish Movement's Political Challenges
• Decline in Ocalan's decision-making power and resistance from military leaders.
• International support for Kurds threatens Turkey and regional parties.
• Recent terrorist attacks highlight external pressures.
• Potential presidential election in Turkey after constitutional changes.
• Detention of Kurdish party-affiliated mayors contradicts state's agenda.

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On the other hand, the presumed path will not be without real and deep obstacles. Foremost among them is the decline in Ocalan's centrality in decision-making mechanisms within the Kurdish movement, meaning that his call, if it happens, will not be enough to stop the party's operations and shift towards a political path. The Kurdish movement is not under the control of one person today, and military leaders in the Qandil mountains seem to be rejecting any political solution, as several military leaders have previously stated that Ocalan, while imprisoned, does not have the capacity or authority to determine the party's political and military strategic paths.

On the other hand, the external factor should not be overlooked when it comes to the Kurdish issue and terrorism in general. The international parties supporting the Kurds in their various manifestations will not easily allow the resolution of such a file that gives them leverage and pressure on Turkey and other parties in the region. This dimension is not absent from the statements of Turkish officials who saw in the recent terrorist attack on a specialized defense industries company, which came just one day after statements by Bahceli and during Erdogan's participation in the BRICS summit, messages of external pressure beyond mere terrorist acts.

Finally, there is a problem with the previous track that failed and things have become more complicated, leading the government to wage a war in cities and streets after the self-administrations were declared in some areas of the Kurdish majority in the country. This doubt is also reinforced by estimations that one of the goals of any political course in the Kurdish file could be paving the way for the Turkish president to run for presidential elections after drafting a new constitution or amending the current one, or perhaps by calling for early elections by the parliament (which would allow him to run constitutionally again).

In conclusion, despite not announcing a political program or a specific path regarding this sensitive issue, various developments and statements indicate the existence of preparations that have not yet reached the point of official announcement.

Perhaps the above explanation of complications, entanglements, and challenges explains the lack of harmony between the announcement on one hand, and the detention of mayors affiliated with the "Kurdish" party in the country after the statement, a step that some considered a contradiction in the agenda among currents within the state, while others saw it as pressure on the party or internal parties or on the system to initiate the supposed upcoming settlement. Evaluating the chances of success accurately will not be possible before the official and detailed announcement of the supposed political path.

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Read the article in Arabic

Since 1967, the West Bank and Jerusalem have witnessed a series of settlement waves that constituted radical transformations in the geographical and political situation of the region. Despite the heavy defeat suffered by the Arab countries during that period, it did not lead to the comprehensive displacement of Palestinians as happened in the Nakba of 1948.

After occupying these lands, the Zionist occupation began implementing expansionist strategies aimed at reducing the Palestinian population density and consolidating its control by building new settlements and expanding existing ones.

These waves range between attempts to expand the settlement area by building new settlements and strengthening control over the lands through policies aimed at changing the demographic and geographical reality.

The settlement has gone through several stages, each of which reflects different government policies and specific strategic goals, the most prominent of which are:

• The first wave (1967-1976):

It began immediately after the occupation, as the occupation government aimed to consolidate control over the Palestinian territories and avoid managing the affairs of Palestinian citizens. This stage was characterized by caution in building settlements and attention to basic infrastructure.

The number of settlements established during this period amounted to about 34 settlements. The occupation also demolished the Palestinian Moroccan neighborhood, which was adjacent to the Buraq Wall, and turned it into a Jewish settlement neighborhood in the Old City. These steps were aimed at consolidating the occupation's control over the eastern part of the Holy City.

• The second wave (1977-1987):

With the rise of the right to power in the Zionist entity in 1977, extremist forces rushed to build settlements on the ground for ideological, security, political and economic motives. This period witnessed the establishment of dozens of new settlements and the raising of slogans calling for the deportation of the Palestinians.

98 new settlements were built in the West Bank during that period, most of which was established at the initiative of the ruling right-wing Likud Party and the extremist religious Zionist movement "Gush Emunim", which was active in settlement activities.

• The third wave (1996-2022 AD):

It came in light of the political settlement process that began in the nineties, as the Zionist right sought to obstruct reaching final solutions for fear of handing over Palestinian lands and establishing an independent Palestinian state. This period was characterized by the acceleration of settlement construction to confront any progress in the negotiations.

It aimed to comprehensively Judaize Area (C), which is the area subject to security and administrative occupation according to the Oslo Accords, which constitutes 60% of the area of ​​the West Bank. It also sought to achieve geographical continuity between some distant settlements or between settlement blocs and to expand control over strategic peaks and heights in the West Bank. This wave worked to bring about radical changes in geography and demographics, supporting the settlement project in the West Bank.

The Zionists called them "illegal settlement outposts", a misleading name that aims to downplay the importance and size of this settlement attack, which may be the largest among the waves of settlement in the West Bank.

• The Fourth Wave (2002):

It emerged after the failure of the settlement process and the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, as the Zionist leadership believed that the time was right to impose control over as much of the West Bank as possible, so the settlement was greatly expanded and the Palestinian lands were divided into isolated cantons.

This wave was launched under the right's control of the seats of government in the occupying state, as it was initiated by the Prime Minister of the occupation, Ariel Sharon, who assumed leadership between 2001 and 2006, then he was succeeded by Ehud Olmert (2006-2009), and after him Benjamin Netanyahu (2009-2021), all of whom were symbols of the extremist Zionist right that sought to Judaize the West Bank.

These successive waves embody how the occupation sought to change the geographical and political reality in the West Bank and Jerusalem, which greatly affected the lives of Palestinians and complicated the Arab Israeli conflict.

Occupied Jerusalem faces a series of imminent dangers, as the tentacles of the occupation target every inch of the city in an attempt to change its identity and target its sanctities, specially the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque.

The occupation authorities plan to empty the occupied city of its inhabitants and transform it into a city of Jewish landmarks and population. They have resorted to enacting various legislations since the occupation of Jerusalem in an attempt to assert their control over various aspects of the city and achieve Judaization objectives. ⁽¹⁾

What are the most dangerous threats facing occupied Jerusalem?

1- Daily incursions:

Settlers invade the Al-Aqsa Mosque almost daily, with the number of mosque invaders between 2009 and 2023 reaching approximately 303,284 invaders. ⁽²⁾

2- Expulsion:

Expulsion from "Al-Aqsa" is considered a punitive measure against the protesters and worshippers, with the number of Palestinians expelled from the mosque between 2013 and 2023 reaching approximately 3,501 Palestinians. ⁽³⁾

3- Distortion of city landmarks:

The occupation has escalated the construction of Judaizing landmarks aimed at distorting the Arab and Islamic appearance of the city. The occupation has built over 100 Jewish landmarks in the Old City and its surroundings. ⁽⁴⁾

4- Settlement:

In efforts to increase the number of settlers, the occupation's branches approved the construction of approximately 125,591 new settlement units between 2014 and 2023. ⁽⁵⁾

5- Demolition of Jerusalemite Homes:

Israeli occupation authorities demolished approximately 1,869 homes and structures in occupied Jerusalem between January 1, 2009, and March 1, 2024. This led to the displacement of around 3,848 Palestinians, and more than 49,000 others were affected. ⁽⁶⁾

6- Arrests:

Israeli occupation forces arrested around 9,052 Palestinians from occupied Jerusalem between 2021 and 2023, constituting about 2.5% of the total Palestinian population in Jerusalem. ⁽⁷⁾

7- ID Revocations:

According to the Israeli "HaMoked" Centre for Défense of the Individual, Israeli occupation authorities revoked the IDs of 14,727 Palestinians from occupied Jerusalem between 1967 and 2021. ⁽⁸⁾

8- Impoverishment of Jerusalemite Palestinians:

Israeli policies have led to the impoverishment of the Palestinian community in Jerusalem. Approximately 77.5% of Palestinian families in the eastern part of Jerusalem live below the poverty line, and 86% of Palestinian children in Jerusalem are impoverished.Top of Form

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(1) Adnan Abu Amer, "The Future of Jerusalem in the Context of Judaization," a study.

(2) Hisham Yakoub (Editor) and others, "The Annual Report on the Situation of Jerusalem 2023," International Jerusalem Foundation, Beirut, 1st edition, 2024, pp. 23-24.

(3) Reports on the Situation of Jerusalem issued by the International Jerusalem Foundation between 2013 and 2023.

(4) Ali Ibrahim, "Judaization of Jerusalem in 33 Points," International Jerusalem Foundation, Beirut, 1st edition, 2022, p. 6.

(5) Book: "Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2021," Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, 2021. [https://bit.ly/3m7hwTA]

(6) OCHA, Interactive Data Map. [https://bit.ly/3rtHaC2]

(7) Reports on the Situation of Jerusalem issued by the International Jerusalem Foundation between 2021 and 2023.

(8) HaMoked Centre’s Facebook Page, 11/4/2021. [https://bit.ly/3MejhJd]

(9) Jerusalem Institute for Research for Policy, Economic and Employment Indicators in "East" Jerusalem, 2019. [https://bit.ly/3xg8J74]

Read the Article in Arabic.