Turkey's Local Elections and Kurdish Issue
• Elections expected to impact internal politics due to Justice and Development Party's defeat.
• President Erdogan's last presidential term constitutionally requires a runoff.
• Unexpected meeting between Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahceli and Peoples’ Democratic Party deputies.
• Bahceli calls for the release of the imprisoned Kurdistan Workers' Party leader, rejecting terrorism.
• Turkey's Kurdish Workers' Party prepares for post-political path, with no specific plan announced by the government.

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It was expected that the recent local elections in Turkey would have repercussions on the internal scene, especially since the Justice and Development Party faced defeat for the first time against its rival, the Republican People's Party, failing to recapture the municipalities of Ankara and Istanbul and losing additional municipalities. In addition, the recent presidential elections were highly competitive, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan needing a runoff to secure victory.

Erdogan's Last Presidential Term and the Kurdish Issue

For these reasons, and because this is Erdogan's last presidential term constitutionally, with his desire to continue and his confidence in his ability to do so, it was expected that some internal issues would be addressed, including the Kurdish issue, especially with signals coming from various parties regarding the matter.

It was expected in principle, but what happened exceeded all expectations. Suddenly and without prior notice, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, the leader of the nationalist movement in the country, Devlet Bahceli, shook hands with deputies from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (the Kurdish Democratic People's Party) at the start of the new legislative year (October), sparking a major surprise a week later.

Bahceli Calls for Kurdistan Workers' Party Leader's Release

Bahceli called for the release of the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, who has been in prison since 1999, and allowing him to address the Kurdish parliamentary bloc, announcing his rejection of terrorism and ending operations against Turkey and the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. He expressed his readiness to do whatever is necessary, regardless of the political cost.

The surprise did not stop at the content of the call, but also in the speaker himself, who had been one of the strictest in Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue and the Kurdistan Workers' Party, advocating for the reinstatement of the death penalty (abolished in 2004) specifically for the execution of the Kurdish leader.

As Bahceli has been a close ally of the President since 2017, attention turned to Erdogan to gauge his reaction to what was said. Erdogan's statements of gratitude and support for Bahceli led many to believe that Bahceli's statement had been pre-agreed upon between the two men, at the very least in broad terms.

Turkey's Kurdish Workers' Party Prepares for Post-Political Path

Despite the shock of the surprise, the presidency and the government did not announce a specific program or plan in this regard. However, the statements hinted that something was being prepared behind the scenes and could be announced soon. Otherwise, Bahceli would not have taken the risk of making such a statement. Many initially thought it was a maneuver, embarrassment, or some form of challenge, before the man confirmed his position in later speeches, with the support of Erdogan.

Furthermore, statements from the other party have reinforced this impression, indicating that there may be a political path that could be announced soon. The Equality and Peoples' Democracy Party welcomed the invitation, expressing readiness to play any necessary role to ensure the success of a political process, but they stressed the need for the end of Abdullah Ocalan's isolation in prison as a sign of seriousness in the approach.

Post-Political Path

Salahaddin Demirtas, the former leader of the Peoples' Democratic Party who is detained on terrorism-related charges, also welcomed the invitation from Bahçeli, urging not to allow anyone to obstruct the political solution this time. Ocalan himself announced in a statement confirming his ability to move the process from a violent path to a political and legal path, "if the conditions are ripe," he expressed.

All of the above indicates the readiness of the parties affiliated with the Kurdish Workers' Party for a post-political path, once its outlines become clear. The announcement of the Equality and Peoples' Democracy Party holding a meeting with the Turkish Minister of Justice to demand the end of Ocalan's isolation, as well as visits by his relatives carrying a message from him, further strengthens this possibility.

Although a specific political program has not been announced in this regard, developments indicate that preparations are underway. It is widely agreed in Turkey that the Kurdish issue remains a fundamental obstacle in the domestic political scene, in addition to its regional complications in Syria and Iraq. The security and military solution alone is not sufficient, but the government has claimed for some time that it has significantly weakened the capabilities of the separatist military, intelligence, economic, and human system, undermining their dreams of a Kurdish state or separatism. This could open the door to a new political path, albeit in a different way this time according to several government and party officials in the country.

This groundwork helps facilitate the presumed political path, with Bahçeli's approval as an ally of Erdogan and as the leader of a party in parliament, and subsequently the leader of the nationalist movement in the country which is typically opposed to a political solution. In addition to that, the readiness of the Kurdish party in the country to play a positive role and welcome Bahçeli's initiative, there are several parties representing a majority in parliament that may not object, including the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party, upon hearing the details.

Obstacles

Kurdish Movement's Political Challenges
• Decline in Ocalan's decision-making power and resistance from military leaders.
• International support for Kurds threatens Turkey and regional parties.
• Recent terrorist attacks highlight external pressures.
• Potential presidential election in Turkey after constitutional changes.
• Detention of Kurdish party-affiliated mayors contradicts state's agenda.

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On the other hand, the presumed path will not be without real and deep obstacles. Foremost among them is the decline in Ocalan's centrality in decision-making mechanisms within the Kurdish movement, meaning that his call, if it happens, will not be enough to stop the party's operations and shift towards a political path. The Kurdish movement is not under the control of one person today, and military leaders in the Qandil mountains seem to be rejecting any political solution, as several military leaders have previously stated that Ocalan, while imprisoned, does not have the capacity or authority to determine the party's political and military strategic paths.

On the other hand, the external factor should not be overlooked when it comes to the Kurdish issue and terrorism in general. The international parties supporting the Kurds in their various manifestations will not easily allow the resolution of such a file that gives them leverage and pressure on Turkey and other parties in the region. This dimension is not absent from the statements of Turkish officials who saw in the recent terrorist attack on a specialized defense industries company, which came just one day after statements by Bahceli and during Erdogan's participation in the BRICS summit, messages of external pressure beyond mere terrorist acts.

Finally, there is a problem with the previous track that failed and things have become more complicated, leading the government to wage a war in cities and streets after the self-administrations were declared in some areas of the Kurdish majority in the country. This doubt is also reinforced by estimations that one of the goals of any political course in the Kurdish file could be paving the way for the Turkish president to run for presidential elections after drafting a new constitution or amending the current one, or perhaps by calling for early elections by the parliament (which would allow him to run constitutionally again).

In conclusion, despite not announcing a political program or a specific path regarding this sensitive issue, various developments and statements indicate the existence of preparations that have not yet reached the point of official announcement.

Perhaps the above explanation of complications, entanglements, and challenges explains the lack of harmony between the announcement on one hand, and the detention of mayors affiliated with the "Kurdish" party in the country after the statement, a step that some considered a contradiction in the agenda among currents within the state, while others saw it as pressure on the party or internal parties or on the system to initiate the supposed upcoming settlement. Evaluating the chances of success accurately will not be possible before the official and detailed announcement of the supposed political path.

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Read the article in Arabic

The "Israeli" aggression on the Gaza Strip continued after "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation in October 2023, lasting for over a year and expanding geographically to target Lebanon and even the Syrian Golan Heights. During this long period of time of the genocide war specifically on Gaza, there was a relative stability in the positions of the various parties involved, while there was a relative change and evolution over time in Turkey's stance, a stance that had been repeated in Turkish policy towards several other issues, including the Arab revolutions.

In the early weeks of the war, Ankara's position was noticeably confused and different from its positions in previous wars and confrontations. The official Turkish statements focused on condemning the targeting of civilians, the necessity of releasing hostages, calling on both sides to exercise restraint and avoid escalation, in addition to expressing readiness to mediate.

One reason for this different position was that the war came in the context of normalizing relations between Turkey and the occupation state, just weeks after a meeting between Erdogan and Netanyahu at the United Nations and discussions about the necessity of cooperation in energy and economy. Also, due to a Turkish perception that the "Al-Aqsa Storm" operation was targeting this improvement in relations, and that other forces beyond Palestinian resistance may be behind it, such as Iran.

Later, as the occupation forces began to advance on the ground, amidst daily massacres and internal political and popular pressures, Turkey's stance evolved towards adopting the Palestinian narrative and rejecting the occupation's claims completely, holding Netanyahu fully responsible and accusing him of terrorism, talking about turning the page in dealing with him, and later shifting the responsibility to the occupation state itself by labeling it as a "terrorist state" and calling for holding it accountable.

As months passed, Ankara moved towards punitive measures against "Israel", starting by restricting the export of some products to Israel (54 products), then decided to halt all trade relations with it, culminating in South Africa joining the genocide lawsuit against "Israel" before the International Court of Justice approximately 3 months after announcing this direction.

The mentioned statements and decisions stemmed from a stance of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza facing the "Israeli" war machine and genocidal plans. However, recent developments, specifically since the threats made by "Israel" against Hezbollah in Lebanon, pushed Ankara to read a different course of the war.

Turkish Warning
With the launch of these threats, Turkish President Erdogan warned that Netanyahu, after his crimes in Gaza, had set his sights on aggression towards Lebanon, pointing out the negative consequences of such actions on security and stability in the region as a whole. It was noteworthy that officials in the occupation state responded to Turkish statements condemning the genocide war by attacking Erdogan and Turkey, even threatening them. The most prominent statement came from the foreign minister of the occupation state who warned Erdogan of ending up like Saddam Hussein who launched missiles at "Tel Aviv", a statement interpreted as a threat to Erdogan's personal fate like that of the former Iraqi president (execution) and to Turkey as a country with a fate like Iraq's afterwards (occupation and chaos).

The "Israeli" aggression expanded to Lebanon, assassinations intensified, and the possibility of a ground invasion increased. This is where the occupation forces were heading later with threats to several parties in the region from Yemen to Iraq and from Syria to Iran due to their stance on the war. Here, the Turkish tone started to change towards sensing the threat to Turkey and its national security and interests, not just warning against regional escalation.
Plans to Advance into Syrian
Repeatedly, Turkish officials, led by Erdogan, warned that the occupation would attack Syria after Lebanon and that this could include the occupation of Damascus. Some Turkish media outlets spoke of plans for the occupation to advance into Syrian territory up to the borders with Iraq to cut off supply routes for Hezbollah. In one of his statements, Erdogan was clear in expressing the danger that could reach Turkey's borders, indicating that if the "Israeli" forces continued advancing, they could reach the Turkish border in two and a half hours.

Turkish National Security Council
In harmony with these statements conveying a sense of self-threat, many statements emphasized the meaning of readiness and the ability to repel danger, including statements from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the statement of the Turkish National Security Council, which affirmed solidarity with Lebanon, its government and people, standing by its side. However, the most prominent statement in this context was reminding Erdogan of what his country did in Libya and the South Caucasus; military intervention alongside both the Libyan National Accord Government and Azerbaijan, hinting at the possibility of doing the same towards "Israel", emphasizing the need for us to be strong to stop the aggression.

Certainly, Ankara does not view Israeli aggression in the region separately from other developments on the international and regional stages, including the hot and accelerating developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war, Chinese threats to Taiwan, economic conditions in the world, and the pre-presidential election phase in the United States, which explains the statements of the Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu about the possibility of a third world war, a war that Turkey is prepared for.

This was a noticeable change in Ankara's reading of the developments in the region and Israeli expansionist and aggressive plans, which returned to talk about the "Greater Israel" project. This reading led to more intense and escalated statements, although the orientations and practical actions did not change at the same pace or degree.

On a practical level, the export of some goods continued to the occupation state through intermediaries and a third country, according to multiple reports. Ankara did not stop the flow of Azerbaijani gas to it through Turkish ports, which contributed to strengthening the economy of the Israeli war, and does not align with describing the aggression as a war of annihilation and warning of the dangers facing Turkey and the region.

President Erdogan was mentioned in several instances as not considering completely cutting political and diplomatic relations with "Israel", limiting himself to recalling Turkey's ambassador in "Tel Aviv" for consultation and not sending him back, after the latter withdrew its ambassador in Turkey and several countries following the massacre at the Mavi Marmara Hospital, fearing public backlash at the time.

This is in terms of direct relations with the occupation, facing potential dangers, there is something that can be expected from Ankara, stemming from its concern about the expansion of aggression and escalation in the region on the Syrian issue in general and specifically on the Kurdish file. Turkey fears the crystallization of a political entity for American-backed Kurdish militias in northeast Syria if the war expands and Israeli forces enter Syria, especially if Trump wins the presidency in the United States.

Therefore, it is not unlikely in a scenario of this kind that Ankara resorts to securing its forces in Syrian territory, protecting its borders, and preventing any developments by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) expanding their influence in northern Syria, or launching an additional military operation against the SDF.

Beyond that, it is not expected that there will be a significant and radical change in the Turkish position on the war in Gaza in the foreseeable future unless responding to the requirements of a regional war that may more directly touch on Turkey's interests and national security determinants.