O sons of Palestine... 

It is time for you to know that all the events that took place in this arena in this century were aimed at stripping you of your rights, crushing your sons, persecuting your advocates, and draining your blood. 

Sultan Abdul Hamid was deposed while defending you in 1909 after he made his famous statement: "It is more beloved to me to have a scalpel applied to my body and a limb severed from my body than for Palestine to be taken from the land of Islam." 

The Caliphate was abolished for the sake of Palestine in 1924, and Al-Banna was killed for Palestine on February 12, 1949. The Rhodes Treaty was concluded two days after Al-Banna's assassination, and a revolution occurred in 1952 to abort the Islamic movement, which could be seen, after God, as the hope for the restoration of Palestine. 

The three conditions agreed upon by Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador, with the officers unjustly and falsely labeled as the "Free Officers" were: to crush the Islamic movement, to destroy Al-Azhar from its foundation, and to ensure the safety of "Israel." The man who planned, managed, alerted, and indicated this was the one who concluded the Lausanne Treaty and supervised it, Lahum Hayim, in 1922 to abolish the Caliphate, the rabbi of Judaism in Constantinople. After the Caliphate was abolished, he moved to Egypt to direct the revolution and ensure the safety of the Jews.

The fall of the Ottoman Caliphate is a pivotal event in the civilizational history of our Ummah. Previously, the fall of an Islamic caliphate was followed by the rise of another, carrying the same religious identity regardless of ethnicity, race, and nationality. But the sacred religious foundation would remain untouched, serving as the legitimacy for the new caliphate.

However, the experience of the Ottoman Caliphate was entirely different. The caliphate, which had weakened and suffered from the afflictions of dying nations—an expected occurrence in what is known as the cycle of civilization—was toppled along with the identity that granted it legitimacy, namely, the Islamic union. The center of the caliphate transformed into an extreme nationalism that sought to disdain the Islamic identity, criminalize it, and blame it for civilizational backwardness. This also influenced our Arab countries, which pursued the narrative of Arab nationalism as an alternative identity to the Islamic union that had been discarded, associating it with ignorance, corruption, tyranny, and stagnation—traits found in dying civilizations that have nothing to do with religious identity. In fact, Islamic values that highlight shura (consultation), justice, and responsibility are completely contrary to these negative traits.

After the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate, two new identity trends emerged: patriotism and Arab nationalism.

However, the contradiction between the major values of identity and the miserable reality, along with attempts to reconcile the two, ultimately led (with intellectual and military conspiracies from the Western civilization that had renewed its identity) to a repulsion from the Islamic identity. Religion came to be considered an individual and personal matter, while identity was linked to race and language. Consequently, Arab nationalism flourished as an alternative capable of confronting occupation and its imperialist project in Palestine.

The June Defeat

There is no conflict between national, ethnic, and religious identities—these are merely overlapping circles that may start with smaller identities, perhaps beginning with the family and ending with broader identities encompassing all of humanity under the concept of human brotherhood; however, this notion seems theoretical. There is always one identity that dominates a nation at a given time and becomes the “mother of identities,” so to speak. After the tragic collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, two new identity trends emerged: one was patriotic identity, and the other was Arab national identity. However, with the partitioning of Palestine, the declaration of a national homeland for the Jews, and the war in 1948, the trend of Arab nationalism was heightened as a new identity for the nation in opposition to the occupation and its spearhead in Palestine.

Everything was paving the way for this new identity: educational curricula, arts, new popular organizations, newspapers—everything intertwined to create the new Arab capable of defeating the Zionist entity, liberating his nation from the occupation’s hell, and elevating it to the ranks of advanced nations.

Here, we can observe that the consolidation of the new identity proceeded in two directions: one was popular, represented by student unions in universities, labor unions, and newspapers; the other was official, through attempts at unity, the creation of directed political organizations, and even silencing opposing voices by imprisoning them.

In this context, we observe the emergence of major projects and bold political decisions that challenge colonial powers and attempt to create new international alliances, such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Such efforts ignited the enthusiasm of the masses, eagerly awaiting the anticipated grand step of defeating the Zionist enemy, cleansing the land of its impurity, and, if possible, casting it into the sea!

The fervent poems, speeches, and nationalist songs that represented the youth's consciousness during this period served as the emotional and sentimental fuel for this new identity, which formed the great narrative of “Arab nationalism.” The Palestinian cause became a national sacred issue, according to this narrative. Freedoms were marginalized, opposition was rejected, and any discussion of other identities, even the Islamic identity, was dismissed—no voice was louder than the voice of battle.

The heavy defeat in June 1967 represented the first nail in the coffin of Arab nationalist identity.

This was until the nation awakened to the disaster of the Six-Day War, which shattered all the grand dreams and great sacrifices that the Arab people had experienced. It was a disgraceful defeat by all measures, with armies that did not fight, new Arab lands swallowed up along all lines of the conflict, and the loss of the remaining sacred land of Palestine.

The heavy defeat on the ground represented the first nail in the coffin of Arab nationalist identity and opened the door wide for questions and reassessments. The image of the charismatic leaders in whom the nation had placed its hopes fell. The Arab nationalism trend continued to represent the new identity for several more years, perhaps due to inertia or to shift the responsibility of the defeat onto some corrupt leaders rather than the project itself. The defeat was thus considered merely a setback in the path of Arab nationalist progress.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” Battle

The victory of October 1973 served as a restoration of the nation's dignity, which had been squandered in 1967. The slogan “Allahu Akbar” (Allah is Great) raised in this war signaled the emergence of a new identity for the nation. However, what followed was a state of identity conflict between the nationalist identity, which had the highest cultural momentum, and the Islamic identity, seeking renewal away from the Ottoman legacy and its associated schools and experiences. There was also a resurgence of patriotic identity after large sectors rejected national identity and, following the start of negotiations, peace, normalization, reconciliation, and acceptance of the Zionist entity as part of the “Middle East.”

All this led to the gradual emergence of a new identity that partially or almost entirely abandoned the Palestinian cause. Normalization, which began as cold, limited, and condemned in most countries, became normal and enthusiastic, with steps accelerating to catch up with it. The fragmented patriotic identity melted into the new globalized identity, where acceptance and engagement with the Zionist entity became one of the conditions for integration.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” marks the beginnings of a new identity for an Islamic Ummah that is feared and capable of action.

A distorted version of globalization has shaped our nation's identity in recent times. Pragmatism as a philosophy, despotism as a mode of governance, a rentier economy as a source of income, the absence of any genuine major projects on either the national or pan-Arab levels, the rejection of the Arabic language in youth and educational circles, and worst of all, the feeling that we are compelled to accept this identity, unable to act. The Zionist entity has become an existential reality that must be accepted and dealt with.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” Battle on October 7, 2023, came to shake the course of events, as if the victory of the enemy in the Six-Day War and the subsequent developments were met by this battle to shake its foundations and shatter its illusions. The enemy and the new imperialist powers were on the verge of achieving a decisive victory, not like the June War, which could be a setback to correct the course, but rather on the level of penetrating consciousness and identity. The nation was made to accept defeat willingly, even seeing defeat as a victory and perceiving their enemy and its supporters as an unbeatable force, thus deciding to surrender under the guise of friendship.

However, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” proves to them that they have fallen victim to psychological defeat and that a small, primitively equipped resistance group terrifies and frightens the enemy simply because they adopted Allah's words: “And you did not throw when you threw, but it was Allah who threw.” (Al-Anfal: 17) as their slogan. They strove in their efforts and relied on Allah, achieving what the helpless deemed impossible.

We can say that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” marks the beginnings of a new identity for an Islamic Ummah that is feared and capable of action, not just mere scum. Effort, striving, and victory are the gateways for nations to form identities.

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Despite the divine revelation mentioning the “Sunnah” outside the context of the Quran, and despite the progression of civilization and modernization movements in various Islamic environments throughout history, which generally relied on the laws of existence inspired by the divine revelation and the observable universe, the idea of the Sunnah, within our written heritage, has remained tackled only within Islamic studies, scattered across various disciplines, suggesting that an elite understanding has somewhat permeated the study of psychological, social, and universal Sunnah, understanding its central role in the development of life and the flourishing of Islamic societies throughout the ages.

In our estimation, although the science of Sunnah may have been anciently neglected in written records of Islamic heritage for centuries, it remained in the philosophies of the sciences and the minds of scholars in a way that made it seem natural, present in their perceptions and behaviors, without rising to the level of specialized authorship. This made it difficult to trace the concept of Sunnah in Islamic writings over many centuries.

On the other hand, when we contemplate the Islamic civilizational achievements, with their theoretical foundations, practical manifestations, and value characteristics, we find that the Sunnahs of Allah and His laws in societies and horizons were a central source in managing the Islamic system of life through the ages.

Consequently, the renewed interest of Muslim scholars in studying Sunnah as an independent field, facilitating its understanding and emphasizing its application to different aspects of life, shows how much its absence impacted later generations after it was previously applied in the lives of predecessors.

Based on the available data from bibliographic surveys, we find that the study of the science of Sunnah (Fiqh As-Sunnah) did not receive proper attention until the early writings of the two scholars, Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, to whom the credit can be attributed for laying the foundation of what can be termed “’Ilm As-Sunnah” (the knowledge and teachings based on the Sunnah).

Perhaps what gave those foundational ideas momentum and effectiveness is that the reform movements that emerged following the overthrow of the Islamic Caliphate (1341 AH/1924 CE) began to search for the objective reasons behind this civilizational decline. This contributed to expanding the circles of debate and intellectual discourse on the subject of Sunnah across various scientific and cultural frameworks in the Arab and Islamic spheres. It also reinforced for the elites the effectiveness of the Sunnah approach in various ways, attempting to reclaim the lost Islamic civilizational role.

In the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate and the diminishing hopes of reaching Islamic unity, some contemporary writings dug into the events through the Sunnah approach, investigating the causes of this defeat, to which societies have succumbed, along with the authority of states and the Ummah. This filled the horizons of Islamic existence with questions that stirred the minds of the concerned Muslims, seeking reasonable scientific explanations for the crisis of civilizational decline and the setback that affected the Muslim Ummah in all its parts—individuals, groups, institutions, and governments.

In this context, Shakib Arslan laid out his latest writings as a prelude to posing the most important question in his review, “The Present of the Islamic World: Why did Muslims lag behind while others advanced?” These questions were merely a reflection of the thoughts of the Sunni Al-Manar School, which Arslan accompanied its leaders and pioneers. Thus, his recent writings were significantly influenced by the thought of that school.

The ideas of Sayyid Qutb were an advanced example of the ideas of that reformist school. Almost every book by him reveals the deep meanings of the Sunnah to reform seekers in order to find solutions for the Ummah's civilizational crisis.

It can be said that Fiqh As-Sunnah infiltrated all the martyr Sayyid Qutb's works, promoting the Sunnah among various segments of cultured Arabs and Muslims, where he succeeded remarkably! Additionally, he presented intellectual and Sharia approaches, which had a significant impact on developing Sunnah thought. Unfortunately, he died before producing a comprehensive Sunnah project.

Mercifully, Allah decreed the emergence of a unique Muslim intellect who contributed to strengthening the pillars of Sunnah science and bringing it closer to independent knowledge. That figure was Malek Bennabi.

The ideas of Malek Bennabi came to represent a fundamental characteristic of an innovative phase in the Sunnah related to the universe, life, and humanity. These ideas constituted a serious attempt to uphold the Islamic civilization, whose problems exacerbated as the Ummah lost any remedy, almost leading to the depletion of its energy. Bennabi's inquiries became increasingly urgent day by day, seeking an Islamic civilizational solution, especially after losing confidence in the effectiveness of national projects within Arab and Islamic countries.

The significance of Bennabi's ideas did not settle with diagnosing the Islamic civilizational condition and its outcomes in the light of interpretative Sunnah and laws that describe the various aspects of that condition. But he also presented a framework of advanced deep thinking, providing all sorts of solutions for all problems.

One of the most notable aspects that made Bennabi's ideas about the Sunnah more precise, whether in presenting issues, diagnosing problems and remedies, or describing challenges, was their basis in revelation. His intellectual achievement earned scientific respect and appreciation, in addition to its solid methodology. He used Sunnah to reveal the sources of problems, the reasons for recovery, and the laws of positive development to face challenges through constructive and advanced development efforts.

According to Malik Bennabi's vision, the Sunnah engineered the relationships between the “people’s world,” the “ideas’ world,” and the “things’ world.” He presented a vision that gathered foundational conclusions in the field of Sunnah and gathered them into forms of action that could contribute to resuming civilizational action within a sound legal framework, free from intellectual absurdities or methodological imbalances.

Subsequently, there were various writings, ranging from intellectual works to academic studies and articles of varying quantity and quality. These writings were put together to provide a comprehensive picture of the Sunnah, attempting to infer the divine Sunnah that doesn’t change, derive its partial laws, and target its message in the general field of succession.

Naturally, Islamic studies and intellectual works have engaged with Sunnah thought in one way or another over the years, across different intellectual, academic, and cultural environments. Consequently, the topic of the Sunnah, due to researchers' interest and enthusiasm, has become a subject for public cultural discourse. Books were authored, articles were crafted, and research plans were proposed in higher academic studies to fill the gaps in the field of the Sunnah. However, we may notice some randomness in those efforts, which might be excusable for three reasons: 

The first reason is the lack of a roadmap to show the tackled topics, the nature of the approach, and its conclusions, to enable subsequent efforts to build constructively upon them.

The second reason is the absence of foundational methodologies and principles that govern the course of intellectual and academic activity, leading to the establishment of an independent scientific Sunnah discipline. Such a discipline should be comprehensive in its pillars, characteristics, and features and clear in its visions, means, objectives, and goals.

The third reason is the lack of a practical methodological connection between the jurisprudence of monotheism (Tawheed) and the jurisprudence of the Sunnah.

In conclusion, it's worth noting that the integration of Sunnah jurisprudence with Tawheed jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of rationalization, and the approach to rectification is what crowns rationality with the creation of capabilities to resume civilizational action anew.

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Establishing the Caliphate System and Recognizing the Ummah's Right to Choose Its Leaders

Despite the great calamity of the Prophet's death (peace be upon him), the Muslims did not neglect to aspire to their future. They disliked remaining without a leader, even for a day, leading the Ansar to gather at the Saqifa of the Banu Sa'ida to discuss it. Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him) was chosen as the first of the rightly guided caliphs on the day the Prophet (peace be upon him) passed away, even before his burial, in a remarkable practice of Shura (consultation).

Umar ibn Al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) confirmed the Ummah's right to choose its caliph, which remained the method after, saying: “If any person gives the Pledge of allegiance to somebody (to become a Caliph) without consulting the other Muslims, then the one he has selected should not be granted allegiance, lest both of them should be killed.” 

Shura wasn't a political act that people resorted to when the caliph died; rather, it was a method of governance.

The Sustainability of Shura and its Breadth

Shura was not merely a political act that people resorted to upon the death of a caliph or when he was nearing his death; rather, it was a method of governance. The evidence of caliphs practicing Shura in their governance is abundant and cannot be fully listed. Amir al-Mu'minin Umar ibn al-Khattab would allow intelligent youth to attend his Shura councils and say, “No one should be prevented from expressing their opinion due to their young age, as knowledge is not based on age or seniority, but rather Allah places it wherever He wills.” The circles of consultation expanded to encompass military planning to achieve the best outcomes, as well as the jurisprudential matters that arose. Abu Bakr, upon facing an issue, would gather the leaders and the virtuous for consultation, and if they reached a consensus, he would act accordingly. Umar consulted even on the matter of wine punishment, and he would even consult women in their matters, taking their opinions into consideration.

Preserving the Islamic State’s Unity

Abu Bakr realized the political motivations behind the Ridda (apostasy) movement—that it meant dismantling the state in favor of tribalism. He confronted it with strength and decisiveness. When Amir al-Mu'minin, Umar ibn al-Khattab, removed Khalid ibn al-Walid from the general command of the army, some sought to incite Khalid to rebel. But his response was, “Never, as long as Ibn al-Khattab lives.” This statement strongly indicates the determination of the people, leaders, and soldiers alike, to maintain the unity of the state and obedience to the caliph, even in the darkest moments of anger.Top of Form

Balancing Rights and Duties between Caliphs and Subjects

The caliphs understood that their appointment by the people did not grant them sanctity or immunity. Abu Bakr said in his speech when he became the caliph: “I have been appointed your leader, but I am not the best among you.” Umar declared at the beginning of his caliphate that it was a test from Allah and that he was a servant of the Ummah. It is no surprise that the Ummah, represented by its opinion leaders, imposed the salaries of the caliphs, as happened at the beginning of the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar. When Abu Bakr passed away, he ordered the return of all the money he had taken from the public treasury as salary.

Illustrating the importance of this issue during the era of the Rashidun Caliphs, Umar once asked Salman al-Farisi, “Am I a king or a caliph?" Salman replied, “If you took from the lands of the Muslims a single dirham or less or more and then misused it, then you are a king, not a caliph.

The Rightly Guided Caliphs realized that when the people chose them, it did not make them immune or sacred.

Obeying Obeying the Caliph is obligatory, as long as it aligns with Allah’s Sharia. This was the approach of the Rightly Guided Caliphs in governance. Abu Bakr said, “Obey me as long as I obey Allah and His Messenger; but if I disobey Allah and His Messenger, you owe me no obedience.” Umar said, “No one should be obeyed in disobedience to Allah.” The Caliphs acknowledged the right of the subjects to criticize and correct them. Abu Bakr stated in his first speech, “If I do well, support me; and if I do wrong, correct me.” Al-Bukhari narrated in “The Great History” that when Umar asked the companions what they would do if he deviated from righteousness, Bashir ibn Saad told him that they would correct him. When a man said to Umar, “Fear Allah!” he replied, “There is no good in you if you do not say it, and there is no good in us if we do not accept it.” The Caliph must acknowledge their mistakes if they recognize them. Uthman ibn Affan, in response to criticism, wrote to the people of Kufa, “I am not a scale that doesn’t incline.”

The most reliable reports suggest that Saad ibn Ubada, Ansar’s candidate for caliphate on the day of the Saqifah, did not pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr or Umar afterwards. Narrations in Bukhari also mention that Ali ibn Abi Talib and a group from Banu Abd Manaf initially refused to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr until six months after the death of Fatimah, the Prophet's daughter. Political awareness at the time allowed for such disagreements without causing harm, as the majority's allegiance to Abu Bakr was sufficient, and “unanimity was not necessary,” as Ibn Taymiyyah states. Umar tore up the land grant document issued by Abu Bakr to Uyainah bin Hisn, the leader of Fazarah, when he became a Muslim, as it was no longer necessary to soften his heart to accept Islam. Ayinah complained to Abu Bakr, asking, “Are you the leader or Umar?” He replied, “Indeed, it is Umar, if Allah wills.”

A number of companions opposed Umar's decision to leave conquered lands as Muslim states’ endowments, advocating for them to be divided among Muslims like the spoils of war. Umar was so troubled by this opposition that he prayed to Allah to save him from it. During Uthman's caliphate, the opposition escalated into anger and rebellion, resulting in his assassination. The armed conflict continued during Ali ibn Abi Talib's caliphate, culminating in wars among Muslims.

Keeping Up with the State’s Vast Expansion

Since the conquests began yielding their fruits, new needs emerged, and the Rightly Guided Caliphs exerted efforts to keep pace with them. One such effort was the administrative delegation policy adopted by Abu Bakr in managing the conquering armies, as he did with Khalid ibn al-Walid, unleashing the potential of the great conqueror. When Umar became caliph, his policy tended towards centralized control over settled conquests and states, with the fear of prominent leaders becoming an infatuation.Top of Form

Since the conquests began yielding their fruits, new needs emerged, and the Rightly Guided Caliphs exerted efforts to keep up with them.

This policy did not pass without the caliph realizing the necessity of changing the management approach of the conquered lands, even if he contradicted it. This is evident in his rebuke of Muawiyah, the governor of the Levant, when he would parade in a procession, with people stopping at his door to attend to their needs. Muawiyah argued with the abundance of the enemy's eyes and the necessity of making them aware of the authority's grandeur. Umar, then let him be. Similarly, Umar kept the senior companions close to him to benefit from their opinions and appointed governors based on their competence and obedience rather than their popularity.

Umar also recognized the importance of establishing new cities according to the growing needs of the state. He ordered the construction of Basra, Kufa, and Fustat. The first two were needed as stable camps for the armies close to the battlegrounds, while Fustat was made the new capital of Egypt to prevent the danger of residing in Alexandria due to its vulnerable maritime location.

Facing the Consequences of Becoming a Global State

The Islamic state transitioned into a global entity, which resulted in changes in power dynamics and political effectiveness. The number of early Muslims, who were the pillars of the state and the original bearers of the message, decreased due to death and assimilation with the conquests. Umar sought to prioritize them and maintain their status and influence by organizing the Diwan al-Jund (military register) and giving them the greatest financial rewards. However, the emergence of the political effectiveness of Arab tribes and the increasing influence of new territories imposed a new reality. The dissatisfaction of the provinces with their governors intensified despite frequent changes, as they “were not satisfied with a governor, and no governor was satisfied with them.” Umar also realized the danger of the formation of a Qurayshite aristocracy receiving the greatest rewards, arousing the resentment of the tribes. He announced that if he lived until the following year, he would equalize the grants among the people, but he died before he could fulfill this promise. 

The most prominent feature was the development of the concept of “Ahlul-Hal wal-'Aqd,” so they no longer were the earlier Muslims.

The most prominent feature was the development of the concept of Ahlul-Hal wal-'Aqd (the decision-making Muslim committee), so they no longer were the participants of the Battle of Badr and the earlier Muslims. The numbers and influence of these early companions declined, while the leadership of tribes and provinces, which played a major role in the conquests and the state's resources, emerged. The rebilion against Uthman and his martyrdom in the capital city by groups of those was the declaration of the new reality. Despite this, the Rashidun Caliphs continued to try to rely on the early companions. Uthman did not submit to the will of the rebels who sought to depose him because they were not Ahlul-Hal wal-'Aqd, and so did Ali, who refused to accept their allegiance, stating, “This matter is not for you to decide; it is only for the people of Badr.” However, he was forced to accept the inevitability of change and move the caliphate from Medina to Kufa, justifying that the wealth and men were in Iraq.
The Rashidun Caliphs also recognized the consequences of the emergence of large groups of servants and slaves who had no protection or control. They did not fit within the tribal organization of the Muslim community. Many of them joined the rebels against Uthman, forming a severely dangerous element of the state. They became the backbone of the workforce in society because Arabs were content to employ their slaves in their markets. Umar expressed his concerns when he saw that they composed most of those in the marketplace, saying to his companion, “If this continues, your men will need their men, and your women will need their women.” When one of them, Abu Lu'lu'a, stabbed him, Umar said to Ibn Abbas, “You and your father were fond of having many non-Arab disbelievers in Medina!”

Umar recognized the danger of this problem before it happened, fearing that the vast conquests would overwhelm the sincere Muslims' capacity to absorb these masses flocking to the heart of state and society, calling them to the true religion. He used to say, “I wish there was a mountain of fire between us and the Persians, so they couldn’t reach us and we couldn’t reach them!” He advised the Arabs, after their wealth had increased, on the importance of investment for the future and urged them to work themselves and not succumb to unemployment and dependency.

Despite Umar's fear of the increase in the numbers and influence of non-Muslims, he and those who followed him acknowledged their rights to care and justice. It was Umar who gave assistance to the poor among the dhimmis from the Muslim treasury, and Ali ibn Abi Talib ordered his official on Modar to treat the subjects, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, with kindness and justice, as they were either brothers in religion or equals in humanity.  

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At the onset of the twentieth century, the field of Islamic Sharia politics stayed in its original form, as formulated by the early theorists who laid the foundations of Islamic political theory. Its studies remained scattered, and the chapter on the caliphate—its most important aspect—was included within the realm of 'Ilm al-kalam (Islamic theology) rather than jurisprudence to refute the beliefs of sects and schools of thought that held deviant beliefs about it. This was only due to the reluctance of jurists to classify it, either out of fear of facing the tyranny of autocratic authority or out of adherence to caution and restraint, so as not to lead the expansion of Islamic Sharia politics to further injustices. Whatever the reasons, this led to an almost complete disconnection between Islamic political theory and reality.

However, there were new factors that compelled scholars to reconsider Islamic Sharia politics and resume the suspended classification process. In the Ottoman Empire, the political organizations adopted from Europe represented a real challenge, and it was upon the scholars to demonstrate the competence of Islamic political theory in comparison to its Western counterpart. Then, after the fall of the caliphate, they had to prove it did not meet the conditions of validity and that the emergence of nation-states did not contradict Islam.

In Egypt, there have been growing claims to separate politics from religion since the 1920s, and the consolidation of the Egyptian state provided an incentive for scholars to revive Islamic Sharia politics and introduce significant modifications and developments to make it consistent with the times.

In light of these factors, the classification movement in Islamic Sharia politics was resumed. A few works can be mentioned that emerged during the early period in both countries. In the Ottoman Empire, the book “Al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah fi Huquq al-Ra'i wa Sa'adat al-Ra'iyah” by its author Abdullah Jamal al-Dien Afandi was published, initially in Ottoman Turkish, then translated into Arabic in 1900. Additionally, “Al-Khilafah wa Sultat al-Ummah” by Abdul Ghani Al- Sinni was issued in late 1923.

In Egypt, there is the book “Al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah Aw Nizam al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah” by Abdel Wahab Khalaf, published in 1930. Another book is “Muzakarat fi al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah,” compiled by Sheikh Muhammad Rizq al-Zalbani, a professor at the Faculty of Sharia, and published in 1953.

Reforming the Caliphate to Overcoming It

The central idea around which Jamal Afandi's book revolves is that the adoption by the Ottoman state of Western organizations does not contradict Sharia for two reasons: first, expanding political rulings is permissible based on the jurisprudential principles that allow for differences in rulings according to changing times, and it is permissible to act according to the greater good. Second, since these organizations do not contradict the fundamental Sharia principles, Europeans transferred from the people of Andalusia “Islamic legal rulings as principles, and they elaborated them in a manner that suited and benefited them... until they developed a science of human rights that took most of its principles from Islamic Sharia rulings and principles, thus resembling Islamic freedom.”

Despite this arbitrary association between European organizations and Islam, there remained two questions that Abdul Rahman Afandi needed to answer: First, explaining the decline, or, in other words, why did Islamic countries become continuously weak and experience significant decline, despite the fact that Sharia politics ensures the good governance of kingdoms? He attributed this to internal factors such as disunity among Muslims and the prevalence of a culture of dependency among them, as well as external factors such as the aggression of European countries against Islamic countries.

The second question relates to the methods of reform and the necessary measures to reform Islamic governments, assuming that the way to do this is to strengthen the unity of religion among the people subject to the Islamic Caliphate and to revive independent Islamic states such as the Ottoman Empire and Iran by reforming their internal affairs according to the guidance of the Prophet's Sharia. This can only be achieved by “drafting a comprehensive journal on the principles of Sharia politics, reviewing reputable books, and applying conditions and matters according to the requirements of time and place.”

Afandi's conclusions differ from those of Al-Sinni in his book “Al-Khilafah wa Sultat al-Ummah,” which was published about a quarter of a century later. Al-Sinni argued that the caliphate is “a subsidiary and jurisprudential issue, unrelated to belief,” but rather a worldly and political issue more than a religious one. Therefore, there are no details concerning it, as the Quran or the prophetic Hadiths do not explicitly mention the method of appointing a caliph, the conditions of the caliphate, or whether the Islamic Ummah in different times and conditions must appoint a caliph or not. This implies the non-necessity of establishing the caliphate and the possibility of legitimate acceptance of modern nation-states.

The Integration of the Nation-State into the Structure of Sharia Politics

As to Abdul Wahab Khalaf's book, it was published by the Salafi Press in Cairo in 1930. It outlines the reasons that prompted him to focus on Sharia politics and document them. In 1923, he was assigned to teach a new subject at the School of Sharia Law, namely Sharia politics, which emerged in response to King Fuad's interest in the issue of the Islamic caliphate. Khalaf states, “We began teaching this emerging science with only its curriculum in hand, which comprises several studies on various topics. Therefore, it was necessary to create a unit to organize these subjects, to understand the framework that defines Sharia politics, to distinguish the research subject within it, and to determine its ultimate goal.”

Based on that, Khalaf was described as the first to formulate modern formulations of Islamic Sharia politics, and this description is not without merit. He redefined Islamic political concepts, particularly Sharia politics, and mapped out the topics falling under them. He studied sensitive issues and reinterpreted them in a new way, such as the relationship between the land of Islam and the land of war, the relationship between the Islamic state and foreign states, and the status of dhimmis in the modern Islamic state. He ventured into unprecedented interpretations when he considered that obligating them to wear a special dress was not from Islam. He also discussed the issue of freedom of belief, arguing that Islam recognized this freedom and left it to each individual to believe according to his own understanding.

However, these interpretations did not touch upon the issue of the caliphate, as he remained a believer in its obligation according to Sharia and defended its existence based on three arguments: the consensus of the companions on appointing a caliph after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), that what is obligatory, such as protecting the borders and establishing the boundaries, can only be done through it, and that it serves to repel harm and bring benefits.

However, he was keen to remove any religious sanctity from this position and from those who hold it. “The general guardianship of the caliph and its inclusion in religious affairs does not make the caliph a religious figure or derive his authority from hidden power, but he is just an individual among the Muslims in whom they trust his competence to safeguard religion and worldly affairs.”

Although Sheikh Khalaf attempted to remove the exaggerated sanctity surrounding the caliphate and to redefine the relationship between citizens and the caliph, he did not reach the point of suggesting a modern formulation for it, as Sunhuri did, nor did he completely exclude it. He did not speak of “constitutional Sharia government” as Sheikh Rizq al-Zalbani did in the mid-twentieth century when he taught the subject of Sharia politics to Al-Azhar students without mentioning the caliphate, justifying this exclusion by stating that “Sharia politics is based on promoting interests, so it necessarily does not adhere to a specific path or limit itself to fixed boundaries, but it must change whenever the interests change according to times or places.” This reveals the extent of the evolution that has occurred in the science of Sharia politics in the past few decades.Top of Form

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